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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The function of the United States grain distribution 
system is to transport grain from farms to final end-users. 
Final end-users are either domestic processors in major 
cities, foreign users located overseas, or feedlots in rural 
America. The system moves grain via the nation's roadways, 
waterways, and rail lines. 
The entire United States highway system contains 
approximately 3.9 billion miles of road. The local road 
system, which serves rural residents and farms, comprises of 
2.7 billion road miles, while the interstate and expressway 
system consists of about 52,000 road miles. The arterial and 
collector road system connects local roads to the interstate 
and expressway system and contains approximately 1.16 billion 
miles of road. 
The nation's inland waterway system consists of over 
15,000 miles of nine-foot navigable channels. The system 
contains 167 lock sites with 216 lock chambers. The nation's 
largest waterway is the Mississippi River system consisting of 
5,965 miles of navigable channels which flows from the Twin 
Cities to the Gulf of Mexico. 
The United States railroad system contains 162,470 miles 
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Of road. The two largest grain hauling railroads are the 
Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) and the Union Pacific 
Railroad (UP). The BN operates of 23,088 miles of road 
stretching from the Midwest to the Pacific Northwest and to 
the Gulf of Mexico. From 1986 to 1990 the BN was the nation's 
leading grain carrier, hauling a yearly average of 370,800 
carloads of grain. The second leading grain hauling railroad 
during the 1986 to 1990 interval was the UP, hauling an 
average of 277,500 carloads of grain each year. The UP 
contains 20,261 miles of road connecting the Midwest to New 
Orleans, the Pacific Ocean, and the Texas Gulf. 
Figure 1.1 shows the grain distribution system as an 
intricate network involving numerous grain handlers. Grain 
moves from farms to domestic and foreign end-users many 
different ways. Farmers haul grain with trucks and tractor-
wagon combinations to nearby facilities, which depending upon 
location, may include local country elevators, terminal and 
subterminal elevators, river elevators, or domestic 
processors. Country elevators are grain handlers located in 
rural areas and transport grain by rail, truck, and rail-truck 
combination to other elevators or domestic end-users. 
Subterminal elevators are large grain handlers located at 
major crossings of the transportation system which transship 
grain to other grain handlers including domestic end-users by 
rail, truck, and rail-truck combination. Terminal elevators 
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Figure 1.1. Grain distribution system. 
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are large grain handlers located in major cities which ship 
grain by rail, truck, and rail-truck to river elevators, port 
elevators and domestic end-users. River elevators located on 
major tributaries ship grain by baige to port elevators 
located along the coastal areas of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes. Port 
elevators ship grain to overseas markets in large ocean 
vessels. 
Railroad Industry 
The exact quantities of grain hauled by trucks, 
railroads, and barges is difficult to obtain since grain is 
hauled by several modes while moving from the point of origin 
to final end users. Furthermore, the amount of grain hauled 
by the trucking industry is not recorded by any organization. 
Table 1.1, however, shows the quantities of grain hauled by 
railroads and barges as reported by the Association of 
American Railroads for the period 1980-1990. The quantity of 
grain hauled by the railroad industry ranged from a high of 
5.4 billion bushels of grain in 1988 to a low of 4.04 billion 
bushels of grain in 1985. During the interval, the average 
annual quantity of grain hauled by the railroad industry was 
4.72 billion bushels, more than twice as much as the amount 
hauled by the barge industry. The railroad industry provides 
Table 1.1. Quantity of grain hauled by railroads and barges 
in billions of bushels, 1980-1990. 
Quantity Percent Change 
Year Railroad Barge Railroad 
Rail Market 
Share 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
5.00 2.15 
4.38 2.29 
4.22 2.51 
4.67 2.42 
4.82 2.35 
4.04 2.04 
4.31 1.85 
5.15 2.24 
5.40 2.32 
5.03 2.41 
4.89 N/A 
+ 13.4 
-12.4 
-3.7 
+10.7 
+ 3.2 
-16.6 
+ 6.7 
+19.5 
+ 4.9 
-6.9 
-  2 . 8  
70. 0 
65.7 
62.7 
65. 9 
67.2 
66.4 
70.0 
69.7 
69.9 
67.7 
N/A 
a vital link in the transport of grain from its point of 
origin to final end users. 
Despite the vital importance of the railroad industry to 
the movement of grain, the railroad industry with tariff 
rates, has been consistently plagued with problems of grain 
car shortages and surpluses [Baumel and Nelson, 1970; ICC, 
1991]. A tariff rate is a posted price which shippers either 
accept or reject. Currently, for a change in tariff rates to 
occur, railroads must notify shippers 20 days in advance of 
the change. Therefore, under current regulatory practices, 
tariff rates are unable to respond instantaneously to changes 
in demand. Barges, trucks, and ocean vessels experience 
greater rate flexibility and are able to respond q[uickly to 
changes in demand. A study which examined the relationships 
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between rail and truck market shares of barley and wheat 
transported from North Dakota to Eastern markets found the 
rail market share to be more responsive to total shipments 
than the truck market. The greater responsiveness indicates 
the rail industry provides the additional capacity when total 
shipments rise [Wilson, 1984]. 
The continuing car shortages and surpluses are caused by 
the rigidity of the tariff system coupled with an erratic 
demand for U.S. grain exports. Table 1.1 also shows the 
percent change in rail car loadings from the prior year during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1980s, three instances 
of severe car shortages occurred in the grain industry 
[Dempsey, 1990; Fitzpatrick, 1990]. First, in 1980 the amount 
hauled by railroads increased 13.4 percent and decreased 12.4 
percent the following year. Massive grain movements to the 
Soviet Union led to the sharp increase and subsequent decrease 
in rail car loadings. The high demand for rail transportation 
in 1980 left many shippers without grain cars. A second car 
shortage occurred in 1987, when the policies of the Export 
Enhancement Program managed by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation of the United States Department of Agriculture 
increased grain car loadings by 19.5 percent. The Export 
Enhancement Program accelerated grain exports by granting 
bonuses to exporters causing wheat sales to expand overseas. 
The Commodity Credit Corporation also began selling its huge 
wheat inventory, resulting in the release of an average of 
13.7 million bushels of wheat each week. The third major car 
shortage of the 1980s occurred in late 1989 when the Soviet 
Union purchased the equivalent of 94,000 grain cars to be 
delivered before the end of the 1989. Shipper demand for rail 
cars was intensified by low water levels and navigational 
problems on the Mississippi River. The railroad industry 
actually hauled more grain the previous year indicating the 
car shortage was caused by the Soviets desiring a large amount 
of grain in a very short period of time. Currently, there is 
a major car shortage due to the record breaking 1994 crop and 
the closing of the Mississippi River. 
The major U.S. grain export ports are located along the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean coastlines. In 1991 
approximately 2.7 billion bushels of grain flowed through Gulf 
of Mexico ports to foreign end users, amounting to 70 percent 
of all grain exports. The Pacific Ocean ports exported 800 
million bushels of grain or about 20 percent of all grain 
exports. Formerly, the major importers of U.S. grain were 
Japan and the old Soviet Union. During the 1990/91 crop year 
the United States exported 93.6 million metric tons of grain 
overseas. Japan was the leading importer of U.S. grain with 
22.7 million metric tons and the old Soviet Union was second 
with 12.0 million metric tons [USDA, 1992]. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union into the smaller 
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independent Soviet Repviblics implies the days of the Soviets 
buying an enormous quantity of grain and creating inverted 
markets may never re-occur. Furthermore, most railroad 
experts agree that exports to the Soviet Republics will 
decrease significantly when they modernize their agricultural 
industries [Unknown, 1993], In the near future, however, 
exports to the republics appear to be strong if Congress 
passes loan guarantees allowing them to purchase grain. Also, 
in the future Japan will continue to be a major importer of 
U.S. grains. The future of NAFTA and GATT play major roles in 
the future of grain exports to China, Mexico, and the rest of 
the world. Other legislation such as possible taxes on the 
barge industry also affect the share of grain hauled by 
railroads to export markets. 
The instability of grain exports and the subsequent 
volatility in rail car demand are caused by (1) political 
events such as grain embargoes, guaranteed export credits, and 
the granting of most favored nation trading status, (2) 
government programs such as the Export Enhancement Program and 
acreage reduction programs, (3) weather affecting both grain 
production and the navigation of the nation's waterways. 
The recent trend in rail car loadings for domestic and 
export markets is shown in Figure 1.2 [Pautsch et al., 1991]. 
Grain car loadings to domestic end-users tend to be relatively 
stable while grain car loadings to export markets are 
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fluctuating throughout the 1988-1990 period. If there is a 
surge in the demand for U.S grain exports, the demand 
increases for all forms of transportation, the barge and 
trucking industries respond with increasing rates making rail 
transportation with rigid rates a more attractive form of 
transportation. The result is shippers demanding more service 
than the railroad can produce at the prevailing tariff rates. 
Conversely, if there is a sudden decrease in the demand for 
U.S. grain exports, the demand for all forms of transportation 
falls, the barge and trucking industries respond with 
decreasing rates making rail transportation with rigid rates a 
less attractive form of transportation. In this case, 
shippers demand less service than the railroad is willing to 
produce at prevailing tariff rates. The fluctuating nature of 
grain exports along with rigid railroad rates cause persistent 
car shortages and surpluses. 
Projected Future Grain Car Shortages 
A study analyzing recent trends in domestic and export 
grain movements, U.S. grain production, and rail car 
additions/retirements predicted continuing periods of car 
shortages into the 21st century [Norton and Klindworth, 1989]. 
Table 1.2 shows the projected grain car deficits for 1993-2001 
for various percentage decreases in car cycle times. 
Projected car deficits are used as an indicator of future car 
supply problems. A projected car deficit is defined as the 
Thousands 
of Cars 
100 
80 
Domestic 
60 
Export 40 
20 
0 I I 
" Jan 88 Dec 90 
* Moving Average 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Grain Transportation Situation". 
* 
Figure 1.2. Grain car loadings. Class 1 Railroad, by four week periods. 
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difference between the projected average fleet of grain cars 
and the projected annual peak requirement for grain cars in a 
given year. Regardless of the assumption concerning decreases 
in car cycle times, car deficits are present in 1993 and 
continue into the next century. This indicates the grain 
industry will experience rail car supply problems throughout 
the next decade. 
Table 1.2. Norton and Klindworth projected grain car 
fleet deficits, 1993-2001. 
Annual percentage decreases in grain car cycle times 
Yeeur OT 0 0.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 3. 0 
1,000 cars 
1993 14 .0 11.5 9.2 6.8 4.5 2.3 0 .1 
1994 19 .4 16.4 13.4 10.6 7.8 5.1 2 .5 
1995 25 .3 21.7 18.2 14.8 11.5 8.3 5 .2 
1996 30 .3 26.0 22.0 18.0 14.3 10.6 7 .1 
1997 34 .9 30.0 25.4 20.9 16.6 12.5 8 .6 
1998 38 .6 33.2 28.0 23.0 18. 3 13.8 9 .5 
1999 42 .8 36.7 30.9 25.4 20.2 15.3 10 .5 
2000 47 .1 40.4 34.0 28.0 22.3 16.9 11 .8 
2001 50 .6 43.2 36.3 29.7 23.6 17.8 12 .4 
The next section discusses the effects of car shortages 
on shippers relying on rail transportation. Shippers located 
within 100 miles of a waterway or a domestic processor have an 
alternative to rail and are not as severely affected as other 
shippers. During high grain export demand periods, these 
shippers are able to truck grain to river terminals or to 
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domestic processors and avoid the problems associated with the 
lack of rail cars. 
pf c^r short:e»qgg pn Shippgrg 
The presence of car shortages has many effects on grain 
shippers relying on rail transportation. First, shippers lose 
the ability to move grain in a timely fashion due to a lack of 
grain cars. Shippers experience increasing interest costs 
from holding rather than selling and shipping their grain. 
The opportunity to use or invest their receipts from grain 
sales is delayed from late car placement. During the Fall of 
1990 and Winter of 1991 the Churchs Ferry Farmer co-op in 
North Dakota reported car orders being filled as much as 75 
days after the desired want date. From this delay, the co-op 
held grain more than 60 days beyond the originally planned 
shipping date. The interest costs from holding the grain 
absorbed their entire margin from the sale [Haugeberg, 1990]. 
A general manager of Central Washington Grain Growers, Inc., 
states that in early 1988, the interest rate was 9% and the 
cash price of wheat was $2.82 a bushel. The interest cost 
resulting from a 30 day delay in shipping a 26 car train was 
$1,789.90 or 2.1 cents per bushel [Anderson, 1990]. From the 
Fall of 1989 to the Spring of 1990, the Edison Co-op 
Association in Nebraska incurred interests costs of $4,104,000 
on inventory awaiting shipment [Coding, 1990]. 
Second, if the delay for rail transportation is long, the 
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amount of grain owned by elevators may exceed its capacity. 
The excess grain will have to be stored on the ground and tha 
elevator may cease buying grain from farmers. During the 1989 
wheat harvest, the Farmers Grain and Supply Company had to 
store 43,000 bushels of wheat on the ground at a cost of 0.084 
cents per bushel due to the lack of service [Tunnel, 1990]. 
Elevators may insure against the additional costs of storing 
grain on the ground by increasing its storage capacity. 
However, avoiding these additional outside storage costs due 
to the lack of timely rail service by increasing capital costs 
is not cost efficient. 
Third, shippers often contract with grain exporters and 
domestic processors for the delivery of grain months in 
advance. These grain contracts usually have clauses 
penalizing shippers for failure to deliver the grain by the 
contracted date. In 1989, the Wallace County Co-op Equity 
Exchange in Kansas received discounted prices for late 
shipments due to the inability of obtaining timely rail 
seirvice [Tunnel, 1990]. 
Fourth, the rail freight rate may change from the time 
cars are ordered to the delivery of the cars. In the period 
from September 1987 to December 1989, the Farmers Union 
Mercantile and Shipping Association experienced at various 
times increases in freight rates while waiting for grain cars 
[Tunnel, 1990]. 
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Fifth, to avoid the added costs of delayed rail service, 
shippers often turn to alternative and higher priced modes of 
transportation. In 1990, the Fanners Union Mercantile and 
Shipping Association shipped 200,000 bushels of wheat by truck 
to alleviate the rising costs from the lack of rail service. 
The price for truck delivered wheat was five cents per bushel 
less than the price for rail delivered wheat resulting in 
$10,000 of reduced revenue [Tunnel, 1990]. In 1990, the 
Farmers Grain and Supply Company sold 60,000 bushels of wheat 
for truck shipment due to the backlog of rail car orders. The 
price differential between rail delivered and truck delivered 
wheat was six cents a bushel [Tunnel, 1990]. In both of these 
cases, lower prices were paid to farmers due to their 
inability of receiving timely rail service. 
Finally, the inability to obtain prompt rail service may 
force shippers out of some markets. In an inverted market 
where grain is more valuable now than in the future, shippers 
will want to sell and ship as much grain as possible in a very 
short period of time. The shippers receiving cars benefit 
from such a situation, while shippers unable to obtain service 
lose very profitable sales. 
Investment in Covered Hopper Cars 
A solution proposed by the National Grain and Feed 
Association to alleviate car shortages is to expand the 
existing fleet of grain cars [NGFA, 1990]. Table 1.3 shows 
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the additions to the grain car fleet from 1970 to 1989 by both 
shippers and railroads. From 1983 to 1989 railroads added 
only 699 railroad cars while shippers have added 887 private 
cars. 
Table 1.3. C113 Covered hopper cars installed by 
year built and ownership, January 1, 
1989 ULMER File. 
Year Private Railroad All 
Built Cars Cars Cars 
1970 1,883 4,775 6,658 
1971 1,015 6,043 7,058 
1972 2,474 3,442 5,916 
1973 4,138 9,450 13,588 
1974 5,794 5,308 11,102 
1975 2,554 4,586 7,140 
1976 192 2,971 3,163 
1977 856 3,458 4,314 
1978 5,103 4,590 9,693 
1979 14,199 7,337 21,536 
1980 13,628 14,861 28,489 
1981 5,137 7,395 12,532 
1982 1,356 661 2,017 
1983 139 92 231 
1984 165 76 241 
1986 0 7 7 
1987 30 0 30 
1988 0 524 524 
1989 553 0 533 
During the 1970s, the ICC attempted to encourage 
investment in rail cars through a per diem incentive program, 
which doubled the rate of return for rail cars during high 
demand periods. Per diem charges are the rate a railroad 
charges another railroad for the use of their cars. The 
16 
program resulted in an over investment in rail cars and a 
decrease in equipment utilization. The program gave railroads 
the incentive to keep their cars on other rail lines in order 
to earn the increased per diem charges. In 1980, the ICC 
rescinded the program and allowed the market to determine per 
diem rates. As a result of the over investment in rail cars 
during the 1970s and the lower per diem rates, the period from 
1983 to 1989 saw very little investment in rail cars as 
railroads reduced their fleets. 
Recently, however, railroads have begun to slowly add new 
grain cars to their fleets. Since 1990, the BN has acquired 
about 3000 new covered hopper cars. During the period from 
1993 to 1995 the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad is 
scheduled to add approximately 1000 covered hoppers, the 
Kansas City Southern Railroad will be adding about 300 covered 
hoppers, and the Union Pacific Railroad will be adding 3,400 
covered hoppers to its fleet. Conrail has rebuilt about 700 
covered hopper in 1993. The Canadian Pacific Railroad is also 
in the process of adding 900 covered hopper cars to be ready 
for use in the U.S. and Canada sometime in 1994. Finally, 
Canadian Pacific is currently entering in covered hopper swap 
agreements with U.S. railroads. Swap agreements allow 
Canadian cars to go south to help with the U.S. harvest and in 
return American cars go north to help with the Canadian 
harvest. 
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Despite the recent investments in grain cars, the 
unstable nature of the demand for grain cars continues to 
leave railroads with little incentive to invest in grain cars 
which satisfy the needs of all shippers. New additions to 
fleet may be used only during export surges. An investment in 
grain cars requires up to $500 per month to cover interest and 
depreciation costs [Baumel, 1990]. If maintenance, insurance 
and administration costs are included, a monthly return of 
about $600 may be needed to cover costs. The high cost of 
acquiring a grain car plus the instability of grain car demand 
leaves little incentive for railroads to acquire a fleet of 
cars sufficient to continually satisfy the needs of shippers. 
The likelihood of a railroad acquiring a fleet of grain cars 
needed to ameliorate the temporary and intense periods of 
demand prompted a railroad spokesman to ask rhetorically 
[Howe, 1990], "Do you build a church big enough for Easter 
Sunday?" The ICC has acknowledged the non-feasibility of 
railroads acquiring a fleet of cars to completely satisfy the 
temporary surges in demand [ICC, 1989]. 
The national grain car fleet is also aging and many 
grain cars are in need of replacement. The expected life of a 
grain car is approximately 25 to 30 years. The 1989 fleet of 
grain cars were analyzed and 34 percent of the grain cars 
owned by railroads were over 20 years old, 36 percent were 
between 10 and 20 years old, and 3 0 percent were less than 10 
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years old. The private fleet was not as old as the railroad 
fleet, only 12 percent were more than 20 years old, 34 percent 
were between 10 and 20 years old, and 54 percent were less 
than 10 years old [Kober, 1990]. The age of the current grain 
fleet and the recent trend in rail car acquisitions has the 
grain industry concerned about the future availability and 
condition of the national fleet of grain cars [Howe, 1990; 
Kaufman, 1990; Housh, 1990]. 
Increasing the Grain Carrvina Capacity of a Fleet 
Railroads are trying alternative methods rather than 
investing heavily in grain cars to better serve the continual 
needs of its shippers. Railroads are trying to use its 
existing fleet more efficiently in order to increase its grain 
carrying capacity. Railroads have increased the average 
payload of cars by buying rail cars with higher weight limits 
and lower empty weights. Both types of innovations have 
allowed the amount of grain carried by rail cars to increase. 
For example, box cars had a 50 to 70 ton weight limit and had 
an empty weight of 60,000 pounds. Today the standard net 
weight limit for covered hopper cars is 100 tons and covered 
hoppers tare weight is less than 43,000 pounds [Burger, 1991]. 
Currently, newly built covered hoppers have net weight limits 
of 110 tons. 
Railroads are also trying to increase their "effective" 
fleet by decreasing car cycle times. Car cycle time is the 
19 
time interval between when a loaded car begins a trip and when 
the car is emptied and ready to be loaded again. By 
decreasing car cycle times, the existing fleet is able to haul 
more grain and improve service to shippers. The UP reported 
that during the first half of 1990, it lowered its grain car 
cycle time from 23.0 days to 21.6 days, allowing the existing 
fleet to move 4,000 more carloads than the first half of the 
previous year [Gotschall, 1990]. The BN has reduced its car 
cycle time from 26.3 days in 1981 to 17.6 days in 1990, which 
allowed the average number of trips per month made by a 
covered hopper car to increase from 1.16 to 1.74 trips per 
month [Sperry, 1991]. 
The methods used by railroads to decrease car cycle times 
include programs which encourage the rapid loading and 
unloading of grain cars at origin and destination points, 
programs eliminating interchange delays such as mergers and 
run-through agreements, preventive maintenance programs which 
eliminate the out of service time for grain cars, programs 
designed to improve communication between shippers, receivers, 
and the railroad, and programs encouraging the scheduling of 
rail movements [Burger, 1991; Weaver, 1991]. Many of these 
methods have been used extensively over the past 10 years and 
over the last few years railroads have experienced diminishing 
returns in reducing car cycle times from all approaches except 
scheduling service [Burger, 1991]. 
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Scheduling service allows railroads to reduce car cycle 
times. Railroads are able to plan and coordinate future 
movements better when they have locked in business ahead of 
time. Also, having service locked in ahead of time gives the 
railroad some indication of future demand. Railroads are then 
able to make more informed fleet sizing decisions. A recent 
study of the BN Certificate of Transportation market where 
shippers bid for guaranteed service for a specified future 
time period indicated that the railroad obtains valuable 
information regarding future demand. This additional 
information is used in capacity decisions such as fleet sizing 
and in operational practices to reduce car cycle times 
[Wilson, 1991]. 
During the 1980s, transportation consultants at Arthur D. 
Little identified and monitored five major trends occurring in 
the railroad industry [Burger, 1991]. These trends are; 
1) Graduated Contraction - which refers to the reduction of 
track and employees since the 1930s. 
2) Easing of Regulation - which includes the Staggers Act of 
1980 and the Shippers Act of 1984. 
3) Operational Restructuring - which includes the emergence 
of marketing, corporate mergers, regional railroad spinoffs, 
locomotive run-through or power sharing arrangements, and 
interline cooperation agreements. 
4) Labor Deregulation - includes the formation of regional 
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carriers, negotiation of labor agreement concessions, and the 
attempts to modify current rail labor law. 
5) Scheduled Service - includes efforts by railroads to have 
service scheduled beforehand which increase grain car 
productivity and improve customer service levels. 
The consultants at Arthur D. Little believe that the 
trend toward,scheduled service is the only trend that will 
continue extensively throughout the 1990s to increase railroad 
revenues, improve service to shippers, and improve asset 
productivity [Burger, 1991]. 
Staggers Act of 1980 
Congress passed the Staggers Act of 1980 in response to 
the financial woes of the railroad industry, such as the 
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad liquidation and the 
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad bankruptcy. The Act 
was designed to simultaneously improve the financial condition 
of railroads and enhance service to shippers and the public by 
improving track conditions and rail car availability [US 
Congress, 1980b]. Staggers allows railroads and shippers to 
enter into contracts for rates and shipping services including 
car supply. Staggers gave railroads increased rate 
flexibility and the ability to innovate with new service 
offerings. Specifically, the Act encourages railroads to 
offer premium services to increase the utilization of railroad 
assets. The Staggers Act is the foundation for the car 
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ordering systems presently used In the railroad industry. 
Following the passage of the Staggers Act, railroads 
began negotiating contracts with shippers for car supply 
services. Rates and the specifics of the car supply service 
were mutually agreed upon by the railroad and the shipper. 
Some railroads continue contracting but the two largest grain 
hauling railroads have been developing alternative advanced 
car ordering shippers. The BN has developed a Certificate of 
Transportation (COT) program where shippers bid for the 
opportunity to receive the premium service of guaranteed car 
supply. The UP offers guaranteed car supply to shippers based 
on historical use. Each of these programs was developed to 
improve the financial condition of the railroad, better serve 
shippers, and encourage more efficient use of railroad assets. 
These programs allow shippers to order guaranteed service up 
to five months in advance. Railroads are able to make more 
informed fleet sizing decisions and better schedule future 
grain movements increasing the productivity of grain cars. 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the 
effects of guaranteed service on the welfare of shippers and 
railroads. The analysis compares a car ordering system 
offering guaranteed service and conventional tariff service 
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with the standard pre-Staggers car ordering system offering 
only conventional service. Shippers order conventional 
service on a spot basis and the railroad fills conventional 
service car orders on a reactionary first-come first-serve 
basis. Shippers order guaranteed service in advance without 
complete knowledge of grain market conditions. The railroad 
must fill all guaranteed car orders or pay a penalty for 
failure to perform. 
Chapter 2 examines in more detail the characteristics of 
recent grain car ordering systems employed by railroads. The 
direction of future grain car ordering systems is discussed. 
Chapter 3 reviews recent court cases brought before the ICC as 
a result of these newly formed grain car ordering systems. 
Chapter 4 presents the pre-Staggers rail car allocation 
system of shippers ordering conventional tariff service on a 
spot basis and the railroad filling the orders on a 
reactionary basis. First, the sequence of decisions is 
discussed along with the environment facing grain shippers and 
the railroad. Next, the effect of increased variability on 
shipper and railroad welfare is examined. The case of the 
railroad and grain shippers having symmetric information is 
compared to the original asymmetric case of grain shippers 
having more grain market information. Finally, the effect of 
the relative size of per unit operating to per unit capacity 
costs on railroad and shipper welfare is investigated. 
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Chapter 5 presents a rail car allocation system offering 
guaranteed service as well as conventional tariff service. 
First, the sequence of decisions is discussed along with the 
new environment facing grain shippers and the railroad. Next, 
the effects increased variability and the relative size of per 
unit operating costs to per unit capacity cost on shipper and 
railroad welfare are examined. The Informational and rail car 
productivity effects of guaranteed service on shipper and 
railroad welfare are identified. A comparison of the two rail 
allocation systems is also discussed. Finally, the effects of 
placing an upper limit on the amount of guaranteed service a 
railroad can produce is investigated. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RAILROAD CAR ORDERING SYSTEMS 
Before 1980, the traditional tariff service was the only 
type of service offered by railroads. Rail service was 
provided entirely on a reactionary basis in which railroads 
tried to meet the last minute shipper requests for empty cars 
or movement of loaded cars. Car orders were rarely made more 
than a few days in advance and car movement orders were 
generally placed by shippers within 24 hours of the desired 
shipping date. 
Railroads were required to provide identical service at 
rigid pre-determined rates to all shippers. The railroads 
lacked any prior information on the plans of shippers, which 
hampered capacity and operational planning. Railroads were 
forced to function with this system prior to 1980, because of 
heavy government regulation of the railroad industry. 
Railroad car ordering systems, however, have been 
changing rapidly since the deregulation process of 1980 [US 
Congress, 1980a; US Congress, 1980b]. The newly deregulated 
environment encourages modal rivalry, prompting railroads to 
reduce costs through improved asset utilization. With 
increased competition, suddenly shipper complaints of long 
delays in receiving cars and the differing needs among 
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shippers became very significant to the railroads. Hence, 
railroads began to experiment with new types of car ordering 
systems. After viewing the consequences of these new systems, 
railroads either made slight modifications or performed 
complete overhauls. 
This chapter discusses in detail the evolution of the 
current advanced car ordering systems used by the two largest 
grain carrying railroads, the BN and UP railroads. Also, the 
newly formed advanced car ordering system of the Canadian 
Pacific Rail System's Soo Line will be discussed. Finally, 
possible future directions of advanced grain car ordering 
systems will be presented. 
Burlington Northern Railroad 
The BN has had two types of advanced car ordering systems 
since the passage of the Staggers Act. The original system 
used private contract negotiations between individual shippers 
and the BN to determine price and car allocation. The BN 
found several undesirable properties of the contracting system 
and changed to their current Certificate of Transportation 
program (COT). The COT program determines price and allocates 
guaranteed service through a quasi auction. 
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Contracting 
After the passage of the Staggers Act, the BN and many 
other railroads began offering both tariff and contract 
service. In contract service, the process of car allocation, 
price determination, and all other aspects of rail movements 
is done through private negotiations between the railroad and 
individual shippers. The car allocation process is done 
through guaranteed car supply contracts. These contracts 
state the negotiated number of covered hopper cars, the 
negotiated time window for car placement, and location for car 
placement. In case of railroad non-performance, the contracts 
also stated a. negotiated per day penalty and a negotiated 
maximum penalty payable by the railroad. Shippers pay a non­
refundable negotiated sum of money for the guaranteed car 
supply contract. The terms of guaranteed car supply contracts 
were confidential and proprietary. All other transportation 
seirvices provided by the railroad were determined separately 
either by tariffs, contracts, exempt circulars, or quotations. 
Contract service offered with tariff service gave 
shippers the options of obtaining non-guaranteed car supply 
through tariff service or guaranteed car supply under 
privately negotiated terms. Contract service allowed 
railroads to increase asset utilization since part of the 
demand for its services was known ahead of time. Other types 
of contracts negotiated within contract service were origin 
28 
contracts, destination contracts, switching contracts, and 
demurrage contracts. 
Currently, smaller grain carrying railroads continue to 
use contract service in conjunction with tariff service. The 
BN, however, found several undesirable repercussions arising 
from contract service [Weaver, 1991]. First, the 
administration of contracts became very burdensome. The BN 
would enter into many different types of contracts and on 
numerous occasions several contracts were applicable to the 
same movement, making administration very difficult. Second, 
privately negotiated contracts are kept confidential, barring 
the flow of information into the market and inhibiting the 
discovery of a market clearing price. Third, contract service 
can discriminate against small shippers. Large shippers, 
exporters, and domestic processors can guarantee railroads 
sizable tonnage of grain for reduced rates and better service, 
leaving small shippers with a sizable disadvantage. Finally, 
contracts occasionally limited shipper access to markets. A 
few large grain handlers could negotiate large contracts with 
reduced rates to the same destination effectively barring the 
rest of the grain Industry from selling to that region. 
Certificate of Transportation Program 
In response to the above consequences occurring from 
contract service the BN developed its Certificate of 
Transportation (COT) program during the last half of 1987. 
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The COT program, like contract service, is designed to provide 
shippers forward transportation rates with guaranteed car 
supply and allow the BN to lock in future business. The COT 
program, however, eliminates the private and confidential 
negotiation process connected with contract service. 
In the COT program, shippers bid for guaranteed car 
supply. After the bidding process, the BN reveals the winning 
bids on many news services, allowing price information to 
freely flow in the market. COTs provide shippers with greater 
flexibility than contracts, since COTs are not tied to 
specific origins and destinations. Shippers changing their 
marketing plans can buy and sell COTs from each other in an 
unstructured secondary market. This secondary market allows 
shippers desiring COTs and shippers no longer needing COTs to 
interact to their mutual benefit. 
Specifically, a COT is a BN guarantee for car supply 
within a specified month. Between 2:00 and 3:00 pm Central 
Time on the day of the tender, shippers wishing to obtain a 
guaranteed supply of cars within a designated future month on 
a specified corridor bid against each other for the available 
supply of COTs. The BN announces the minimum acceptable bid 
and the number of COTs available for sale before bids are 
submitted. After 3:00 pm the auction concludes and the BN 
discloses all winning bids at or above the minimum acceptable 
price and the number of COTs sold. The BN does not disclose 
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the recipients of the COTs. 
Each COT has a future shipping period for the delivery of 
the cars, either the first half or the last of a designated 
month. A specific want date is stated by the shipper, but the 
BN only guarantees car placement during the shipping period. 
The shipper, also, has the obligation to place a car order by 
stating the names of the facilities at which the cars are to 
be placed prior to the fifth calendar day before the shipping 
period. 
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of the COT program [Weaver, 
1991], Initially, in January 1988, the shipment size of COTs 
was in 54-car units and the entire winning bid was to be paid 
immediately after the auction. To avoid discriminating 
against small shippers, the BN added single car COTs and 
eventually reduced the COT prepayment to one-fourth of the 
winning bid with the balance due at the time of the car order. 
Initially, the BN COT program only offered COTs on their 
east and west corridors hauling corn, sorghum, and soybeans. 
Presently, the COT program also hauls barley, wheat, grain 
products, oats, and rye on 14 major BN corridors. In an effort 
to allow market forces to influence the allocation of cars, 
the BN modified its initial program to allow shippers to 
change corridors up to 10 days prior to the delivery window at 
a price of $200 per car. The BN amended its initial policy by 
setting the minimum acceptable bid to be both above and below 
Table 2.1. The evolution of the COT program. 
Feature CC>T§ i (Pllpt) CQTs 11 COTs III COTs IV 
1/88 6/88 4/89 1/91 
Commodity Com, sorghum, 
and soybrans 
only 
Adds tMirley and 
wheat to include all 
major whole grains 
and oil seeds 
No change (NC) Added 
grain 
products, 
oats, and 
rve 
Corridors East-West All major grain 
corridors 
Directional 
unchanged, but 
allows for 
corridor change 
up to 10 days 
prior to delivery 
period for 
teSO/car 
Reduced 
corridor 
change to 
$200/car 
Shipment 
Size 
54-car units Com, sorghum, 
soyt>^ns; 54 cars 
and singles 
Wheat: 26 cars and 
singles 
Baney; 26 cars and 
sinales 
NC NC 
Prepayment Advance 
payment of 
fuirCOT 
price 
1/2 of COT price, 
prepayment, with 
balance due at time 
of car order 
1/4 of COT price 
with balance due 
at time of car 
order 
NC 
Interest on 
Prepayment 
90-day, T-BIII 
rate, refunded 
after receipt 
of jsrepayment 
Commercial Interest 
rate as published 
In Wall Street 
Journal. Refunded 
after receipt of 
preoavment in full 
Commercial interest 
rate unchanged but 
Interest discounted 
from prepayment 
balance due 
NC 
Publication 
Media 
Commodity News 
Service and 
PC-compatible 
Bulletin Board 
Commodity News 
Service, Bonneville 
T elecommunications 
and PC-compatlble 
Bulletin Board 
Added ACRES NC 
Minimum 
Bid 
Tariff level Below tariff, 
depending on 
mari<et 
NC NC 
Default 
Provision 
Up to 100% of 
base value at 
RR option 
NC Up to 25% of 
tsase value at 
RR option 
NC 
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the tariff level, depending on perceived market conditions. 
To ensure the promise of guaranteed car supply during the 
specified time frame, the BN pays a penalty of $50 per car for 
each day car placement is delayed with a maximum payment of 
$400 per car. However, for the period from January 1988 to 
December 1990, the BN had fulfilled its promise of guaranteed 
car supply 99.9 percent of the time [Sipe, 1991]. If shippers 
do not use the cars associated with their COTs, the BN keeps 
the entire COT prepayment as a failure-to-use penalty. 
Conventional or Tariff Service 
In 1988, the BN changed the main features of the way non-
COT cars order (tariff service) were handled. First, the BN 
began assessing a $50 per car cancellation penalty for 
shippers canceling non-guaranteed car orders. Originally, 
shippers could cancel car orders at any time, leading shippers 
to over order rail cars during periods of perceived car 
shortages. Consequently, the BN lacked information concerning 
the demand for its services because shippers freely canceled 
their car orders. Operational planning and fleet sizing 
decisions were very difficult. Secondly, the BN began 
restricting the number of days in advance car orders were 
accepted. Finally, the BN began publishing a list of 
outstanding car orders with an estimate of when they will be 
filled. These changes were made to allow the BN to increase 
asset utilization and to better inform shippers. 
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Currently, the car order cancellation penalty has 
increased from $50 to $200 per car. Car orders unfilled 
fifteen days after the want date can be canceled without 
penalty, a reduction from the previous thirty day requirement. 
Also, the BN accepts car orders for only up to seven weeks in 
advance. If the seven week estimated capacity of the BN 
becomes fully reserved, additional car orders are not 
accepted. The BN has never guaranteed the delivery of tariff 
service cars, but has taken steps to reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding tariff service. 
Union Pacific Railroad 
The UP has had two advanced car ordering systems since 
the passage of the Staggers Act. In the first system, the UP 
announced the quantity of guaranteed car service available for 
a specified future month. Shippers ordered guaranteed service 
over the phone and the UP allocated the quantity of guaranteed 
service on a first-come first-serve basis. The system turned 
into a phone lottery where the winning shippers whose 
telephone calls were answered received guaranteed service. 
Shippers kept on hold did not receive guaranteed service. The 
second system, a historical use based program, was developed 
to alleviate the problems of the phone lottery. The 
historical use program allocates guaranteed car placement 
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service among shippers based on the historical number of 
railroad owned cars placed at each location. 
Phone Lottery 
The first UP advanced car order system was introduced in 
September 1989. For the first time, shippers located along 
the UP could order covered hopper cars in advance and receive 
a guarantee that the cars would arrive in a timely manner. 
Shippers specified the commodity to be shipped, the location 
for car placement, the total number of cars needed, and the 
earliest and latest dates for car placement. The car 
placement dates were to be in the same month and at least 
seven days apart. The UP only guaranteed the delivery of 
grain cars sometime during the month of the desired car 
placement window, not within the desired car placement window. 
For example, if a shipper specified August 7 to August 14 as 
the car placement period, the UP only guaranteed to place the 
cars sometime in August. 
Shippers could cancel guaranteed car orders without 
charge if the car order was unfilled on either the day after 
the desired car placement period, the day after the desired 
month, or within seven days after a line haul rate increase. 
Otherwise, the penalty for canceling a guaranteed car order 
was $70 per car. If the UP failed to fill a guaranteed car 
order, payment to the shipper was $70 per car for all cars not 
physically or constructively placed during the desired month. 
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The shipper, after receiving payment, had the option of 
canceling the order without charge or having the UP fill the 
car order the next month on a priority basis. 
The UP did not guaranteed all car orders. Only the car 
orders which the UP believed they could fill during the 
designated month received the car placement guarantee. Car 
orders failing to receive guaranteed placement were placed on 
the stand-by list. Orders on the stand-by list were filled on 
a first-come, first-serve basis whenever cars became 
available. Stand-by orders may or may not be filled. 
Shippers could cancel stand-by list orders at any time without 
penalty. At the end of each month, all unfilled stand-by car 
orders were eliminated from the car ordering system. Shippers 
had to place new car orders the following month to replace the 
eliminated orders. These unfilled stand-by car orders did not 
receive the $70 per car compensation from the UP nor were they 
filled on a priority basis after the desired month. 
This car allocation program, however, had a major flaw in 
the distribution of guaranteed service. On the first Tuesday 
of every month, the UP announced the amount of guaranteed 
service to be allocated in a specified future month. At 9:00 
a.m. shippers were able to order cars for guaranteed delivery 
four months in advance and for earlier months provided those 
months had unfilled guaranteed capacity. Shippers ordered 
cars over the phone and guarantees were distributed on a 
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first-come, first-serve basis. The difference between 
receiving guaranteed car placement and being placed on the 
stand-by list was as little as a few seconds. Shippers 
failing to receive guaranteed car placement were placed on the 
stand-by list and continued to bear the costs and the risks of 
unreliable rail service. 
During the end of 1989 and early 1990, the UP monthly 
guaranteed car supply was fully reserved within minutes of 
being offered. Table 2.2 shows that the average time needed 
to exhaust the guarantee car capacity was 6 minutes and 27 
seconds for unit trains and 24 minutes and 10 seconds for 
single cars [Truckor, 1990]. Many shippers were put on hold, 
only to discover later that the guaranteed car supply was 
fully reserved. Hence, during periods of high rail car 
demand, the original UP advanced car ordering system became 
the equivalent of a lottery or a radio station give-a-way 
where the first callers receive free tickets to a rock concert 
and the remaining callers are left frustrated. 
Historical Use Based Program 
On January 1, 1991, in response to shipper complaints, 
the UP changed to its present advanced car ordering system of 
using a monthly car loading base to allocate guaranteed car 
supply [Machalaba, 1990; Truckor, 1990]. The monthly base is 
determined on a historical four-year average of railroad 
provided cars at each location. If a facility has been 
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recently built or expanded, the UP establishes a base that is 
agreeable to both the UP and the shipper. Shippers are given 
the base number of cars at each location. Car orders at each 
location can be guaranteed by applying the car order against 
the base. 
Table 2.2. Union Pacific Railroad phone lottery. 
Offering Car Cars Sold out 
Month Cateaorv Offered minutes 
November Unit trains 6,000 6:15 
1989 Single cars 6,500 36:00 
December Unit trains 5,300 6:11 
1989 Single cars 7,000 25:00 
January Unit trains 5,300 6:55 
1990 Single cars 6,000 14:30 
To have car orders guaranteed, shippers are required to 
place the order at least one month prior to the desired car 
placement month. Any unused portion of a monthly base is 
canceled without penalty at the end of the period. All car 
orders beyond the base or made less than one month in advance 
are not guaranteed and are treated as stand-by orders. The 
penalty for railroad non-performance and shipper cancellation 
of guaranteed car orders remained at $70 per car. The 
treatment of stand-by orders is the same as in the phone 
lottery advanced car ordering system. Stand-by orders do not 
receive a guarantee. If not filled at the end of the month, 
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Stand-by orders are withdrawn from the system requiring the 
shipper to place a new order for the following month. 
The UP reasoning for using a historical base to allocate 
guaranteed car supply is to increase the predictability and 
equity in guaranteed car placement [Machalaba, 1990]. 
Currently, shippers located along the UP receive guaranteed 
car placement allocated on a historical basis and stand-by car 
placement. The UP historical use car allocation system is an 
alternative to the Burlington Northern method of allocating 
guaranteed service through the use of an auction. Each 
system, however, was formed to improve service to shippers, to 
-improve utilization of railroad assets, and allow more 
informed railroad fleet sizing decisions by increasing the 
predictability of future rail car demand. 
Canadian Pacific Soo Line 
The Soo advanced car ordering system allows shippers to 
bid for the advanced acquisition of guaranteed transport for 
wheat and durum. The Soo puts an amount of guaranteed car 
placement or Protected Equipment Rate Exchanges (PERXs), 
available to shippers for as much six months in advance. 
Shippers bid for the right to obtain a PERX. Winners are 
guaranteed delivery of grain cars sometime during a specified 
two week window. The Soo PERX system is very similar to the 
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Burlington Northern COT program, but there a few differences 
[Burke, 1993]. First, PERX are not associated with a minimum 
acceptable bid allowing shippers to freely bid for advanced 
guaranteed service both above and below the tariff rate. 
Secondly, PERX are non-transferable and are tied to an origin. 
COTs are tied to a corridor and are transferable in a 
secondary market. Finally, the Soo commits less than 20 
percent of its fleet to production of PERX, whereas the BN 
limits the number of grain cars to production of COTs to 40 
percent of its fleet. 
Future Car Ordering Systems 
Several other possible types of advanced car ordering 
systems have been discussed. First, a system separating car 
costs from line haul costs called the "zero base" plan has 
been proposed [Harding, 1991]. Shippers would be allowed to 
book line haul service and grain cars for future time periods. 
The grain cars could be the shipper's own private cars, cars 
acquired from railroads, or cars from other shippers. Rates 
for grain cars would be market driven and could change on 
short notice. If a grain car owner prices cars too low, its 
cars will be quickly booked and the owner will increase its 
price. On the other hand, if a grain car owner prices its 
cars too high, the cars will sit idle forcing the owner to 
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reduce its price [Harding, 1991]. The main idea of the 
program is to allow market forces to dictate the value placed 
on covered hopper cars. The market would shift cars from one 
region to another and to signal the need for additional 
covered hopper cars. 
Second, the notion of priority pricing used in the 
utility industry has been discussed as a method to price 
railroad services [Wilson, 1989 and 1991; Kalt, 1991]. The 
railroad would offer many types of service (priority classes) 
where shippers with a higher priority would receive cars 
before shippers with a lower priority. Currently, rail car 
allocation programs distinguish between only two classes -
guaranteed and tariff. One method to implement a priority 
pricing scheme is the use of an auction similar to the BN COT 
program and SOO PERX system. In these systems, the COT or 
PERX holders receive guaranteed delivery of cars, the higher 
priority, and the other shippers use general tariff service 
and are not guaranteed the timely delivery of grain cars. 
An alternative method of implementing a priority pricing 
system is for the railroad to set the price rather than 
shippers bidding for various types of service. This system, 
called the Rail Car Pricing system, allows shippers with a 
higher value for transportation to receive cars over shippers 
with lower values but also has shippers paying the same price 
for the same type of service [Pautsch et al., 1991]. 
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Fourth, several railroad companies have expressed 
interest in using airline yield management techniques to 
manage their grain car inventories [Chicago Board of Trade, 
1991; Davies, 1991a and 1991b]. Airline yield management 
models consist of pricing and allocating seats to various fare 
classes [Belobaba, 1987; Kraft et al., 1986]. Airline seat 
inventory control models treat prices as exogenously 
determined through competitive forces and concentrate solely 
on allocating seats among fare classes to maximize expected 
revenue. The use of airline yield management techniques to 
the management of grain car inventory has been investigated 
[Pautsch et al., 1991], The analysis assumed the railroad 
offers two types of service and found the allocation of grain 
cars across corridors and types of service which maximized 
expected revenue of the railroad. 
Finally, railroads are looking into the possibilities of 
becoming a scheduled carrier similar to the airline industry 
[Robinson, 1991; Burger, 1991; Welty, 1991]. Recent 
technological advances, such as advanced train control 
systems, have made it possible for railroads to become 
scheduled carriers. However, railroads remain uncertain about 
the possible long term benefits from installing this latest 
high cost technology [Welty, 1991]. 
The BN has implemented a process which should eventually 
transform the BN into a scheduled carrier [Robinson, 1991]. 
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The current BN COT program is expected to eventueilly evolve 
into a visionary program called Integrated Network Management 
(INM). INM will allow shippers to choose from among several 
types of service options based on the needs of the shipper. 
The INM system is very similar to the airline industry and to 
the railroad industry in Europe. INM will allow shippers to 
know, at the time the freight is purchased, the precise time 
their grain will be shipped. Shippers who move their grain on 
a time sensitive basis will be able to choose a higher quality 
service at premium rates. Shippers with grain movements that 
are not time sensitive can choose a lower quality of service 
or can choose stand-by service at discount rates [Robinson, 
1991]. The railroad should be able to better utilize its rail 
cars by knowing in advanced precisely what is to be shipped, 
how much is to be shipped, when the shipment must move, and 
the destination of the shipment. The amount of reduction in 
car cycle times will depend significantly on the ability to 
match traffic flows with asset use throughout the BN system 
[Robinson, 1991]. 
Scheduled doublestack rail service has begun in the 
movement of sea containers. The Shipping Act of 1984 gave 
railroads the authority to provide scheduled service on a 
contracted basis. The Act was designed to [U.S. Congress, 
1984]: 
1) establish a non-discriminatory regulatory process for the 
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common carriage of goods by water in the foreign commerce of 
the United States with a minimum of government intervention 
and regulatory costs, 
2) provide an efficient and economic transportation system in 
the ocean commerce of the United States that is, insofar as 
possible, in harmony with, and responsive to, international 
shipping practices, and 
3) encourage the development of an economically sound and 
efficient United States flag liner fleet capable of meeting 
national security needs. 
In attempting to create an efficient transportation 
system the Act clarified the immunity of intermodal activities 
from antitrust statues [Casavant and Wilson, 1991]. The Act 
allowed ocean liner companies, unhappy with the effects of 
unreliable doublestack rail service in the movement of sea 
containers, to contract for rail service with scheduled 
service requirements. Railroads found they were able to meet 
the scheduled time requirements for delivery with surprising 
consistency and the resulting asset productivity in the 
doublestack business far exceeded all other intermodal 
activities [Burger, 1991]. 
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Grain Car Ordering System Svunmary 
Table 2.3 displays the main features of the different 
grain car ordering systems discussed in this chapter. The 
evolution of the car ordering systems used by the BN, UP, and 
Canadian Pacific are summarized. 
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Table 2.3. Comparison of alternative grain car 
ordering systems. 
Placement 
Railroad/Program Guarantee 
BN; 
COT 
Days 
15 
Penalty Paid By 
BB Shipper 
—$/day— 
Car Pricing 
AllPCfltlpn Mechanism 
50 
COT 
prepayment Auction Bidding 
Non-COT none 
UP: 
Phone Lottery 30 
Historical Use 30 
Stand-by orders none 
Soo; 
PERXs 
Tariff 
Pre-Staggers 
Guaranteed Car 
Supply Contract 
2 weeks 
none 
none 
70 
70 
200 
70 
70 
First-come 
First-serve 
Telephone 
Request 
Historical 
Shipping 
Use 
First-come 
First-serve 
Auction 
First-come 
First-serve 
First-come 
First-serve 
negotl-
negotlated ated negotiated contract 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Tariff 
Bidding 
Tariff 
Tariff 
contract 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECENT COURT CASES 
The Staggers Act of 1980 provided railroads with the 
power to offer premium services encouraging better utilization 
of their assets. The development of new car allocation 
programs, however, has been met with shipper resistance. Two 
recent court cases heard before the Interstate Commerce 
Committee (ICC) as a result of railroads trying to increase 
rail car productivity are; (1) Docket Number 39169, Shippers 
Committee, OT-5 vs The Ann Arbor Railroad Company et al., 
(hereinafter called SCOT-5 case) and (2) Docket Number 40169, 
National Grain and Feed Association vs The Burlington Northern 
Railroad et al., (hereinafter called COT case). 
SCOT-5 Case 
Shippers Committee, OT-5 (SCOT-5) is an association of 
grain elevators, domestic processors, grain export companies, 
and rail car leasing companies which use and supply private 
covered hopper cars. Private cars are rail cars owned or 
leased by shippers. These cars are traditionally controlled 
by shippers. Shippers are able to demand that their cars be 
returned immediately after unloading. 
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Leasing or purchasing rail cars provide shippers with 
increased flexibility. First, if railroad equipment is 
unavailable, shippers may use their private cars to avoid lost 
or delayed sales. Second, shippers may use private cars to 
store grain near their customers to ensure swift delivery and 
achieve a marketing advantage over their competitors. Also, 
if grain receivers do not unload railroad owned cars in a 
timely manner, the railroad assesses demurrage charges. 
Private cars, however, are exempt from such charges. Finally, 
shippers receive compensation from the railroad each time a 
railroad uses its private car. 
In 1983 the SCOT-5 group filed a complaint before the ICC 
citing [ICC News, 1989]: 
(1) alleged railroads violations in the registration of 
private cars for purely commercial reasons, 
(2) the challenge to the railroad's right to determine 
whether particular shipments will use railroad owned cars 
or private cars. 
The SCOT-5 group was seeking the opportunity for shippers 
investing in private grain cars to earn a proper return on 
their investment during periods of car surplus as well as 
during car shortages. Specifically, the group coveted 
unimpeded access to the rail system for private covered hopper 
cars along with market based compensation for the use of 
private cars. 
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The group also wanted to change the newly created BN 
practice of refusing to accept private cars. The BN was 
offering to lease private cars with the stipulation of 
maintaining control of the cars. The BN sought to maintain 
control in order to decrease car cycle times and improve fleet 
efficiency. Shippers, however, lost control over their 
investment and could no longer strategically use private cars 
to maximize their earnings. 
In 1984, an administrative law judge issued an interim 
decision stating it was unlawful for railroads to prohibit 
private cars from using their rail lines. Moreover, the law 
judge ruled that it is in the public interest for private cars 
to have free access to the rail system. The judge ordered the 
parties to negotiate a sharing agreement specifying how 
private cars would be used during periods of car surplus. The 
railroads quickly appealed the decision. 
A sharing agreement could not be reached because both 
parties possessed different definitions regarding market based 
compensation and open access. Five years later, in 1989, the 
judgment was withdrawn and a new ruling was issued. First, 
the ICC ruled railroads cannot deny registration to private 
cars except for mechanical, safety, or storage considerations. 
Secondly, the commission ruled that railroads have the right 
to use their own cars over private cars whenever railroad 
equipment are available. 
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The effect of this decision was to reduce the potential 
return to private cars, discouraging private car ownership and 
allowing railroads to earn a greater return on rail car 
investment. After hearing the decision a grain company 
official stated, "...the commission has relegated the entire 
private grain fleet to a secondary status" [Abramson, 1989]. 
Martin Fitzpatrick, an administrator of the Department of 
Agriculture's Office of Transportation, added that the ICC 
ruling, " ...will probably discourage investment by private 
shippers and could very well impact future car supply" 
[Abramson, 1989]. 
The SCOT-5 group, wishing to clarify the meaning of when 
railroad equipment are available, requested the case be 
reopened. The SCOT-5 group wanted to know exactly how many 
days late railroad equipment could be before shippers had the 
right to use their own cars. But on September 11, 1990 the 
ICC decided not to reopen or clarify their ruling regarding 
the use of private cars. The ICC ruled that the shippers did 
not present enough new evidence to reopen or clarify the case 
[Brown, 1990]. 
COT Case 
The National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) is an 
organization representing domestic processors along with 
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country, terminal, and port elevators. The organization 
includes 40 state and regional feed and grain associations and 
has more than 10,000 grain and feed companies as members. 
The NGFA had many objections concerning the equitable 
treatment of shippers in the BN's newly created COT program. 
First, the NGFA argued the BN receives an unfair informational 
advantage by disclosing only the winning bids and not all the 
COT bids [Casavant, 1991]. The BN sets the total number of 
COTs available and the minimum acceptable bid for each 
corridor based on the information from all past bids submitted 
by shippers. Shippers, on the other hand, prepare COT bids 
and the number of COTs to bid on with the knowledge of only 
the past winning bids. The NGFA, therefore, contended the BN 
creates for itself an unfair informational advantage by 
withholding all the demand information from shippers it 
receives from the COT auction. 
Second, the NGFA contended the BN has the incentive to 
exploit grain car supply in order to increase revenues 
[Casavant, 1991]. The NGFA asserted the BN has unfair control 
over the total number of grain cars on the BN, the allocation 
of grain cars across BN corridors, and the division of grain 
cars between COT and tariff service on each corridor. 
Specifically, the NGFA complained that by setting the minimum 
acceptable bid and the number of COTs available on a corridor 
the BN has the incentive to increase the value of its COT 
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service by decreasing its tariff service reliability. By 
making tariff service less reliable, shippers lose an 
alternative to COT service. Shippers needing to move grain 
over the BN will then submit higher bids in order to ensure 
the acquisition of grain cars. Furthermore, by controlling 
the allocation of cars across corridors, the BN is able to 
manipulate car supply and practice price discrimination in 
order to maximize profits on individual corridors [Casavant, 
1991]. The BN charges a $200 per car fee for changing COT 
corridors, thus creating a barrier between corridors and 
segregating the corridors into separate markets. 
Third, the NGFA contended the COT program violates the 
BN's common carrier obligation. A definition of a 
transporter's common carriage obligation does not appear in 
case law. However, from historical precedents, it appears to 
be an obligation to offer transportation service either for 
the movement of commodities or passengers to all who would 
demand such service on terms and conditions applicable to all 
[Pautsch et al., 1991]. Using the common carrier obligation, 
shippers contend that all shippers in a similar circumstance 
as a COT recipient should be able to obtain COT seirvice at the 
same price. 
Finally, the NGFA asserted the COT program increases the 
riskiness of tariff service. The NGFA complains every grain 
car committed to the COT program reduces the number of cars in 
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tariff service [Casavant, 1991]. During periods of car 
shortages, as the percentage of grain cars in the COT program 
increases, the average waiting time for tariff service 
increases causing greater hardship on shippers using tariff 
service. Also, the BN established a $50 per car penalty for 
shippers canceling tariff service increasing the risk 
associated with ordering tariff service. 
On January 28, 1992 the ICC ruled the COT program did not 
defy any ICC rule or cause the BN to violate its common 
carrier obligation. An ICC conmiissioner described the COT 
program as, "...one of the few truly innovative carrier 
marketing programs arising out of the Staggers Act" 
[Cawthorne, 1992]. Another commissioner was encouraged by the 
steps the BN had taken to address the concerns of small 
shippers and added the commission would be open to hear future 
complaints about the COT program [Brown, 1992]. NGFA 
officials were disappointed in the decision and stated that, 
"...in major and potentially precedent setting cases such as 
the this one, the majority of the ICC is issuing decisions 
that give short shrift to shipper concerns on rail 
transportation matters" [Cawthorne, 1992]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRE-STAGGERS PROGRAM 
Prior to the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, railroads 
provided only conventional tariff service to grain shippers. 
This type of grain car ordering system will be called the pre-
Staggers car allocation system and is described in Figure 4.1. 
In the ensuing analysis grain shippers are assumed to be 
identical and possess identical information sets. Each 
shipper has an initial inventory of grain denoted as y. The 
analysis is formulated as a one period model. At the 
beginning of the period, grain shippers either sell grain 
using conventional tariff service or store the grain. At the 
end of the period the grain shipper salvages its remaining 
grain inventory. Storage costs are incurred on all grain 
stored to the end of the period. 
Grain shippers are assumed to acquire information about 
their grain salvage value (z) before learning the price of 
grain (p). After receiving their grain market information 
shippers know a high (low) salvage value indicates shipper 
aggregate demand for conventional rail service will be lower 
(higher) on average for a given price of grain. 
Shippers order conventional tariff service, q,.'', based on 
the realizations of p and z. However the railroad, with less 
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Railroad chooses a tariff rate T 
Shippers leaun their salvage value z 
Railroad chooses a fleet size R 
Shippers and railroad learn the grain price p 
Shippers order conventional tariff service qj 
Eq.d > Q^? Yes 
Each shipper receives Each shipper salvages y -
Q"" > n 
— cars 
n amount of grain 
Each shipper salvages 
y -q*^  amount  o f  gra in  
i 
Each shipper receives 
q'' cars 
i 
Figure 4.1. Sequence of decisions for the pre-staggers 
car allocation system. 
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grain market information, chooses its tariff rate (t) and 
fleet size (R) without knowing the grain price and the shipper 
salvage value. The likelihood of the railroad choosing a 
tariff and fleet to satisfy the demand for its service is 
remote. If there is excess demand for conventional tariff 
service, the railroad is assumed to allocate its service 
equally among the n shippers. If there is excess supply of 
rail service, each shipper receives its conventional service 
car order. Grain not moved by conventional service is stored 
and then salvaged by the shipper. 
This chapter presents the formal analysis of the pre-
Staggers car allocation system used extensively by railroads 
prior to 1980. The similarities of the railroad tariff and 
fleet decisions to the uncertainty literature concerning peak 
load pricing and monopoly models is presented. Next, the 
formal analysis of the pre-Staggers shipper and railroad 
decision making process is discussed. Third, the effect of 
the relative size of unit operating costs and unit capacity 
costs on the tariff and capacity decisions of a monopolist 
railroad is examined. Fourth, the effects of market type and 
demand stabilizing policies on the railroad tariff and fleet 
size decisions are also studied. Finally, the effects of the 
railroad having the same grain market information as shippers 
is presented. 
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Literature Review 
Finns making price and capacity decisions before knowing 
the state of demand have been investigated in the peak load 
pricing literature and monopoly models under uncertainty. 
Peak Load Pricing Models 
The problem of public utility pricing and capacity 
decisions under random demand was formulated as the utility 
finding the price and capacity which maximizes expected social 
welfare [Brown and Johnson, 1969]. Expected social welfare 
was defined as expected consumer surplus plus expected utility 
profit. Demand was allowed to be random in an additive and 
multiplicative fashion. Per unit capacity costs ($B) and per 
unit operating costs ($b) were assumed to be constant. Under 
the additive and multiplicative settings, the optimal price 
under uncertainty was found to be less than the optimal price 
in a deterministic setting. The deterministic price is equal 
to unit operating costs plus unit capacity costs, while the 
price under uncertainty is only equal to unit operating costs. 
This pricing scheme under uncertainty allows the utility to 
recover its operating costs but not its capacity costs, 
indicating the utility will need to be subsidized. 
Capacity under additive uncertainty was found to be 
greater than under the deterministic setting. With 
multiplicative uncertainty, capacity is usually greater than 
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under the deterministic setting unless demand is very elastic 
and capacity costs are very large [Brown and Johnson, 1969]. 
Subsequent analysis relaxed the assumptions made in the 
original analysis. In particular, the assumptions of 
rationing to those with the highest valuations and costless 
rationing were altered. 
Rationing schemes other than rationing to those with the 
highest value were studied under additive uncertainty 
[Visscher, 1973]. If output is rationed to those with the 
lowest valuations, then price under uncertainty is equal to 
the deterministic price. Capacity can be less under 
uncertainty when demand is very elastic and costs are very 
high. Also, rationing output randomly was investigated 
[Visscher, 1973]. In this case, the optimal price is in the 
interval [b,b+B] and capacity may be less than or greater than 
capacity in the riskless setting. 
Rationing to those with low willingness to pay and random 
rationing of available capacity were studied under 
multiplicative uncertainty [Carlton, 1977]. In both cases, 
the optimal price exceeds the deterministic price (b+B) and 
the finn no longer needs to be subsidized. In fact, the firm 
makes positive profits when rationing to those with the lowest 
valuations. The optimal capacity in either case may be 
greater than or less than the deterministic capacity. 
The original finding of a public utility needing to be 
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subsidized prompted an alternative analysis [Sherman and 
Visscher, 1978]. A constraint such that expected revenues 
ec[ual expected costs was incorporated when deriving welfare 
maximizing price and capacity. The result is a stochastic 
version of the welfare maximizing Ramsey prices. 
The original assumption of costless rationing was also 
relaxed [Crew and Kleidorfer, 1976]. A per unit cost of 
rationing was added which represented the cost of ranking 
consumers. The resulting price of the utility exceeded 
marginal operating costs. 
Monopoly Models 
A monopolist choosing output and price before knowing 
demand was studied [Mills, 1962; Karlin and Carr, 1962]. The 
monopolist was assumed to have constant per unit cost of 
production and capacity. Demand uncertainty was modeled in an 
additive [Mills, 1962] and in a multiplicative fashion [Karlin 
and Carr, 1962]. A monopolist facing random demand will price 
its output lower and its output may be greater or less than 
the riskless case. In general, the more inelastic the demand, 
the greater the wedge between the monopoly price and marginal 
costs indicating a higher loss in missing potential sales. 
Hence, output would likely be greater under uncertainty when 
demand is very inelastic. With multiplicative demand 
uncertainty, optimal price is always greater than the 
deterministic case. 
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Shipper Environment 
This section presents the shipper information structure, 
the shipper optimal choice of conventional rail service, the 
amount of conventional rail service actually received by 
shippers, and the loss in shipper profit due to car shortages. 
Shipper Information Structure 
Shippers are assumed to have identical grain inventories, 
identical salvage values, storage functions, and possess the 
same information. Consequently, all shippers will have a 
higher (lower) than average salvage value which will lead to a 
lower (higher) than average demand for conventional rail 
service. This structure allows for the replication of the 
fluctuating demand for covered hopper cars presently occurring 
in the railroad industry. 
The shipper salvage function net of storage costs is 
shown in ecjuation 4.1. The amount of grain salvaged is 
represented by m. Each shipper is assumed to receive z for 
each bushel of grain salvaged. However, each shipper is 
assumed to incur storage costs when salvaging grain. The 
grain storage function is assumed to be convex and is 
represented by vm^ with v>0. Furthermore, the marginal net 
salvage value of grain (net of storage costs) is assumed 
positive for all salvage qviantities, i.e. z-2vy>0 for all z. 
These assumptions ensure shippers will either sell none, all, 
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or part of their grain inventory using conventional tariff 
service. The assumptions imply the first derivative with 
respect to the amount salvaged is positive and its second 
derivative is negative in the relevant range mc[0,y]. 
sv(in)-zm-vm^ (4.1) 
where: 
sv= the net value of salvaging m bushels of grain. 
m= quantity of grain salvaged. 
z= shipper salvage value known only by shippers. 
v= shipper storage cost parameter known by all agents. 
Shippers are assumed to have complete information when 
ordering conventional tariff service. Shippers learn their 
salvage value z, the grain price p, the tariff rate t, the 
fleet size R, and the number of trips each rail car in 
conventional service completes a^. Shippers calculate the 
railroad conventional tariff service capacity as a^R. 
Shippers know the aggregate demand for conventional tariff 
service given the tariff rate, salvage value, and grain price. 
Given the railroad capacity and shipper aggregate demand, 
shippers know if their conventional service car order will be 
rationed. The rationing rule imposed by the railroad is that 
during car shortages, the railroad capacity is allocated 
equally among the shippers. Therefore, each shipper knows it 
is unable to influence the amount of conventional service it 
receives by over-ordering rail cars. 
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Shipper Demand for Conventional Tariff Service 
Since shippers are unable to influence the amount of 
conventional service they receive during car shortages, 
shippers are unable to strategically over-order conventional 
tariff service. Shippers order only the desired amount of 
conventional service. Each shipper determines the amount of 
conventional service to order by maximizing profit as shown in 
equation 4.2. 
Max . (p_t)qj^+z (y-qi'^)-v(y-qi^)2 (4.2) 
where: 
sn^= profit for the ith shipper. 
p= price of grain. 
t= tariff rate. 
y= grain inventory. 
q^j= conventional rail service demand for the ith shipper, 
y-q^, = amount of grain the ith shipper desires to salvage. 
The first order condition, shown in equation 4.3, implies 
the shipper equates the marginal revenue from selling grain 
delivered by rail [p-t] to its opportunity cost which is the 
marginal revenue from salvaging grain [z-2v(y-q^,) ]. 
[p-t]-[z-2v(y -q i'i)]-0 (4.3) 
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Figure 4.2 shows the shipper's optimal choice of the 
conventional service car order q***,. If the shipper places an 
order for q^', rail cars, the marginal revenue from selling 
grain delivered by rail exceeds the marginal revenue from 
salvaging grain and the shipper will increase its rail car 
order to maximize its profits. Similarly, an order for q^". 
rail cars results in the marginal revenue from salvaging grain 
to exceed the marginal revenue from selling grain delivered by 
rail and the shipper will decrease its rail car order. 
Equation 4.4 rearranges the first order condition and 
solves for q^, to give the optimal amount of conventional 
service to order as a function of the marginal revenue from 
selling grain delivered by rail (p-t). 
q.i'- 0 if p--tiz-2vy 
, p-t-z-H2vy .f z_2vyi:p-t^z (4-4) 
2v 
- y if p-tiz 
The ith shipper demand for conventional service is shown 
in Figure 4.3. If the marginal revenue from selling grain 
delivered by rail is less than or equal to the marginal 
revenue from salvaging the y*'' bushel of grain (z-2vy), the 
shipper will not order conventional rail service. Similarly, 
if the marginal revenue from selling grain delivered by rail 
is greater than or equal to the marginal revenue from 
salvaging the first bushel of grain (z), the shipper orders 
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Rail 
z -2vy 
0 Conventional 
service car order 
d' d" d* 
Figure 4.2. Shipper optimal choice of conventional service. 
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Fisrure 4.3. Conventional service car order as a function of 
the marginal revenue of selling grain delivered 
by rail. 
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conventional rail service to move its entire inventory of 
grain. Consequently, if the marginal revenue from selling 
grain delivered by rail is in the interval (2-2vy,2) the 
shipper orders conventional rail service to move a portion of 
its inventory. 
For notational convenience, define T=t/2v to be a 
normalized tariff rate. Similarly, define p=(p-z)/2v to be 
the single random variable dictating demand for conventional 
rail service. A high value of p represents a large grain 
price relative to the shipper's net salvage function. If p is 
high, shippers desire to move a large quantity of grain by 
conventional rail service. Conversely, a low value of p 
represents a low grain price relative to the shipper's net 
salvage function and shippers desire to ship a small quantity 
of grain by conventional rail service. Equation 4.5 shows the 
conventional service rail demand for a shipper as a function 
of r and p. Since all shippers are identical the subscript i 
is dropped. 
q ^ '-min [max [p-t+y, 0] ,y] 
where; 
q<^*- 0 if p<t-y 
-p-T+y if pc[x-y , x ]  
- y if p>T 
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The aggregate demand for conventional rail service, Q'', 
is equal to the number of shippers multiplied by the 
conventional service demand for a representative shipper as 
shown in ec[uation 4.6. 
Q'^(P,T)-nq'^'Cp.T) (4.6) 
Amount of Conventional Service Received bv Shippers 
Shipper profit depends on the number of cars received 
from the railroad rather than the number of cars the shipper 
orders. The amount of conventional service a shipper receives 
is equal to the minimum of the shipper's car order q^ and the 
shipper's rationed quantity. During periods of car surpluses 
each shipper receives its entire car order. However, during 
car shortages, car orders are rationed and each shipper 
receives an equal proportion of the railroad's conventional 
service capacity, denoted as Q'"(R)/n. The assumption of 
identical shippers eliminates the possibility of shippers 
receiving more cars than they desire during car shortages. 
Equation 4.7 presents the amount of cars a shipper receives 
from the railroad. 
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k-inir|q'''(p,T) , ^ 
which implies; 
(4.7) 
k- q'''(p,x) if 0''(p,x) iQ(R) 
- if 0''(p,x)^0MR) 
n 
where: 
k=ainount of conventional service a shipper receives. 
q^=ainount of conventional service a shipper orders. 
Q''=aggregate conventional service ordered by shippers. 
Q'"=railroad capacity of conventional service. 
In Figure 4.4, represents the shipper conventional 
service order and k represents the amount of conventional 
service the shipper receives from the railroad. The maximum 
value of p at which the shipper does not order rail service is 
defined as p°=max[p|q^(p,t)=0]. Similarly, the minimum value 
of p at which the shipper orders conventional rail service to 
move its entire inventory of grain is defined as 
p^=min[p|q^(p,r)=y]. The shipper orders conventional rail 
service to move a portion of its grain inventory when 
p€(p°,py) . 
Shippers, however, do not receive their entire car order 
if aggregate demand for conventional seirvice exceeds the 
conventional service capacity of the railroad. In Figure 4.4, 
the value of p at which shipper aggregate demand for 
conventional rail service equals the railroad capacity of 
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0 Cars y 
n 
Figure 4.4. Shipper car shortage. 
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conventional rail service is represented as p*". Shippers 
receive their entire car order if p is less than or equal to 
p*" and their car orders are rationed if p is greater than p*". 
The car shortage experienced by a shipper due to rationing is 
measured by A and is equal to the distance between q*** and k. 
As p rises, shippers demand more conventional service but 
continue to receive only the rationed quantity, hence the car 
shortage increases in the interval [p'",p^]. The car shortage 
experienced by a shipper reaches a maximum and becomes 
constant for p>p^, since shippers cannot sell more grain than 
their initial inventory. 
Loss in Shipper Profit Due to Rationing 
Desired shipper profit is defined as the profit earned if 
the shipper receives all of the conventional service it 
orders. By inserting shipper conventional service demand into 
the shipper profit function and recalling 2v(p-T)=(p-t-z), the 
desired shipper profit, dsTr, is written as equation 4.8 
dsn- zy-vy^ if p<x-y 
-zy+2vy (p-x)+v{p-T) 2 ifpc[T-y,x] (4-8) 
zy+2vy(p-v) if p > x  
Actual shipper profit is the profit earned based on the 
number of cars it receives from the railroad. Recall that 
shippers receive their conventional service demand during car 
surpluses and QV" rail cars during car shortages. Hence, 
actual shipper profit, asjr, is written as equation 4.9. 
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asn- 2v(p-x) g''+zy-v(y-g'')^ if pix-y+-
n 
-2v(p-T)-^+2y-v|y--^ if pkT-y+-^ 
n \ n ) n 
(4.9) 
The loss in shipper profit due to rationing (L), shown in 
equation 4.10, is equal to the difference between desired 
shipper profit and actual shipper profit. The loss in shipper 
profit is zero when p^p*", since the railroad is able to 
completely fill all car orders for conventional tariff 
service. 
L- 0 if p<p'^ 
-2v(p-x)|y--^j+v(p-x)2+v|y--^j if peEpSp^] (4.10) 
-2v(p-x)^y--^j+v|y--^j if p>py 
Figure 4.5 shows the shipper loss due to rationing as a 
function of p. The figure assumes the shipper storage cost 
parameter v is constant, so an increase in p reflects an 
increase in the grain price relative to the salvage value z. 
Differentiating the loss function with respect to p, shows the 
slope of the loss function in ($,p)-space to be 2vA, where A 
is the car shortage experienced the shipper. The car shortage 
is (p-T+y)-QVn if pe[p'",py] and y-QV" if P^P^- The loss curve 
is convex after p"", since the car shortage experienced by a 
shipper increases as p increases. The loss curve is linear 
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Figure 4.5. Shipper loss due to rationing. 
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after since the car shortage becomes constant due to the 
shipper initial inventory constraint. 
Railroad Environment 
This section presents the optimal production level of 
conventional tariff service, the railroad subjective 
probability beliefs about shipper aggregate demand for 
conventional tariff service, and the railroad optimal tariff 
rate and fleet size decisions. 
Production of Conventional Service 
The amount of conventional service produced by the 
railroad depends on its fleet size, tariff rate, and shipper 
demand for conventional service. The railroad chooses a fleet 
size and a tariff rate before shipper demand is known. After 
the railroad receives the conventional service car orders, the 
railroad decides how much of its fleet to put into the 
production process. 
Each rail car placed in the production of conventional 
service is assumed to be able to generate a fixed constant 
number of trips, and is acquired at a constant cost of $B 
per car. The railroad variable cost function of making Q 
trips is assumed to be linear with a constant marginal 
operating cost of $b per trip as shown in equation 4.11. 
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C [Q] -bQ with c' [Q]  -b and c" [Q] -0 for all Q (4.11) 
Given its fleet size and the parameters which determine 
shipper demand for conventional service (p and T), the 
railroad determines the profit maximizing number of cars to 
put into conventional service. The objective of the railroad 
is stated in equation 4.12. 
Max n-(2v"c-b) anRn-B R 
Rn (4.12) 
subject to R^sR and a^R^siQ "^(p, x) 
where: 
R^=number of cars placed in conventional service. 
a^=marginal product of a car in conventional rail service. 
R =railroad fleet size. 
Q''=shipper aggregate demand for conventional rail service. 
The first constraint states the number of rail cars used 
in the production of conventional service, R„, must be less 
than or equal to the number of cars in the fleet. The second 
constraint states that the railroad cannot produce more 
conventional service than shippers demand. Combining the two 
constraints, implies the number of rail cars put into 
conventional service is less than or equal to min[R,QVoi„]. 
The number of rail cars in the fleet indicates the maximum 
number of cars available for conventional service, while the 
ratio oVoin' indicates the minimum number of cars needed to 
satisfy shipper demand for conventional service. 
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The first order condition for the unconstrained 
maximization problem is stated in ec[uation 4.13. 
-^-Oj2VT-b] (4.13) 
Equation 4.13 is positive, since the railroad always chooses, 
ex ante, a tariff rate such that the constant marginal revenue 
of hauling a grain car is greater than the constant marginal 
cost of hauling. Therefore, either the demand constraint or 
the capacity constraint is binding. The optimal number of 
cars to put into the production process is denoted as R^* and 
is equal to min[R,QVan3 • 
If aggregate demand for conventional service exceeds the 
conventional service capacity of the railroad, the railroad 
fleet size is binding. The railroad desires to put more cars 
into conventional service but is unable to due to the fleet 
size constraint. In this case, the railroad produces its 
conventional service capacity level of a^R by placing its 
entire fleet in the production of conventional service, Rn*=R. 
However, if aggregate demand for conventional service falls 
short of railroad capacity, the demand for conventional 
service is binding. The railroad wants to use its entire 
fleet to produce conventional service but shipper demand is 
insufficient to keep the entire fleet active. The railroad 
produces Q'' amount of conventional service by placing a part 
of its fleet into the production of conventional service. 
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R^*=QVa„ and the remaining portion of the railroad fleet, R-
oVttn' idle. 
The maximum profit of the railroad, given its fleet size, 
tariff rate, and demand for conventional service is shown in 
equation 4.14. 
n(P,T,R)-(2VT-b)OnRn-BR 
where; 
Q 
(4.14) 
Rn- min R, 
a, 
Railroad Subjective Probabilitv of Aaareaate Demand 
The railroad does not know shipper aggregate demand for 
conventional rail service when choosing its tariff rate and 
fleet size, since the shipper salvage value (z) and the future 
price of grain (p) are unknown to the railroad. The railroad, 
however, knows the probability distributions of p and z and 
thus knows the probability distribution of p=(p-z)/2v, where v 
is the shipper storage parameter. The railroad uses the 
probability distribution of p to form its subjective 
probability about shipper aggregate demand for conventional 
rail service. 
The probability distribution function, 0(W), shown in 
equation 4.15, represents the railroad subjective probability 
that shipper aggregate demand for conventional service will be 
less than or equal to W. Since all q^ are the same, the 
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probability that shipper aggregate demand for conventional 
rail service is less than or equal to W is the same as the 
probability that individual shipper demand is less than or 
equal to W/n. 
Substituting the individual shipper demand curve into 
equation 4.15 yields the cumulative distribution for aggregate 
shipper conventional service demand shown in equation 4.16. 
Using equation 4.16 and setting W=0 reveals the 
probability that shipper aggregate demand equals zero is equal 
to the probability of p being less than or equal to p°=T-y. 
Similarly, the probability shipper aggregate demand will be 
less than or equal to the railroad capacity is equal to the 
probability of p being less than or equal to p'"=r-y+Q'"(R)/n. 
Equation 4.17 shows the railroad subjective probability about 
shipper aggregate demand using its belief about the random 
variable p. 
<j) (W) -Prob (0 ''sW) -Prob{nq '''sw) 
(4.15) 
<|) (W) -Prob (0 -prob/piT-y+-^\ (4.16) 
(1)(W)-H(p°(x) ) if W-0 
-H(p"(x)) if We(0,Q'(R)) 
-H(p'^(x,R)) if W-Q'^(R) 
(4.17) 
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Where: 
H(p)=probability distribution function of p. 
p° (T )=T-y .  
p''(T,R)=T-y+(Q'"(R)/n). 
pW(r)=T-y+(W/n). 
The subjective probability of the entire fleet of cars 
being active is etjual to the probability that the shipper 
aggregate demand for conventional service is greater than or 
equal to the railroad capacity of conventional service. The 
subjective probability the entire rail fleet will be active is 
denoted as 1-H(p'"(r ,R)) . 
In Figure 4.6 the curve UR shows the railroad capacity 
utilization rate. The railroad reaches full asset utilization 
whenever shipper aggregate demand for conventional service 
exceeds the railroad capacity. The railroad, however, has 
idle equipment whenever demand for conventional service falls 
short of railroad capacity, i.e. the value of p is less than 
P'-
The curve PF shows the percentage of shipper car orders 
for conventional service being filled by the railroad. The 
railroad is able to completely fill all car orders when p is 
less than p*". But for values of p greater than p"" the railroad 
is unable to completely fill conventional service car orders, 
since it is operating at full capacity. The percentage of car 
orders filled by the railroad decreases as the value of p 
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Figure 4.6. Railroad capacity utilization and percent o£ 
conventional service orders filled. 
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rises above p*". Figure 4.6 shows the persistent car shortages 
and car surpluses inherent in the railroad industry for the 
movement of grain. These persistent car shortages (p>p'") and 
car surpluses (p<p'') occur because the railroad chooses its 
tariff rate and capacity before knowing the demand for its 
conventional tariff service. 
Tariff Rate and Fleet Size Decisions 
The railroad uses its subjective probability regarding 
shipper aggregate demand for conventional service to find the 
fleet size R and normalized tariff rate T=(t/2v) which 
maximizes its expected profit as shown in equation 4.18. 
The first order condition for the railroad optimization 
problem with respect to the tariff rate is stated equation 
4.19. 
Max Ep [IT - (2VT-b) A„R*-BR] 
T / R 
(4.18) 
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dx " 
9R* 
2va„R„%(2VT-b)a„-^ - 0 
p' 
- j'[2vn (p-T+y) -n(2vT-b)]h(p)dp 
p° 
m 
+/2va„Rh(p)dp-0 (4.19) 
p' 
where; 
Sn * 
" 0 if P > P ' ( T , R) and P < P ° ( T )  
dx 
_  a Q d  (t) ^ if pe[p° ( T )  , P ^ ( T , R )  ]  dx 
Equation 4.19 states that the railroad chooses the optimal 
tariff rate such that the expected marginal profit with 
respect to the tariff rate during car shortages plus the 
expected marginal profit with respect to the tariff rate 
during car surpluses is equal to zero. Figure 4.7 shows the 
expected marginal railroad profit during periods of car 
shortages if p is uniformly distributed. In this case, 
is a linear downward sloping curve in the positive 
quadrant. The expected marginal railroad profit during car 
shortages is always positive, since railroad output remains at 
capacity with tariff rate changes. However, as the tariff 
rate rises, the probability of operating at full capacity 
decreases causing the expected marginal profit to decline. 
If p is uniformly distributed, the expected marginal 
railroad profit during car surpluses is represented by curve 
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Figure 4.7. Optimal choice of tariff rate. 
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The expected marginal railroad profit during car 
surpluses declines as the tariff rate rises and eventually 
becomes negative. The decrease in expected profits is to due 
the reduction in rail service demand as a result of a higher 
tariff. The railroad chooses the tariff rate T* such that the 
expected marginal railroad profit during car shortages 
balances with the expected marginal railroad profit during car 
surpluses. In Figure 4.7, the optimal tariff rate r* is set 
such that the distance T*a plus T*a' is equal to zero. 
Equation 4.20 states the railroad acquires a fleet size 
such that the marginal cost of an additional car is equal to 
the expected marginal revenue of a car during car shortages. 
The marginal revenue of an additional car during car surpluses 
is zero, since the additional car will not be used. 
aR p (2VT-b)o„-^ -B 
-J'[2vT-b]an h(p)dp-B-0 
P' (4.20) 
where: 
0  if P < P M T , R )  
- 1 if pip'^(T,R) 
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Figure 4.8 shows the marginal cost of adding an 
additional car to the fleet as the horizontal line B. If p is 
uniformly distributed, the expected marginal revenue of a car 
declines as the fleet size increases, since a larger fleet 
size implies a lower probability of full capacity utilization. 
The optimal fleet size R* equates the marginal cost of adding 
a car to the expected marginal revenue of a car during car 
shortages as shown in Figure 4.8. 
The railroad tariff and fleet size decisions are made 
simultaneously and are analyzed in (R,r) space as shown in 
Figure 4.9. The curve FOC" represents the combinations of R 
and r such that the fleet size first order condition holds. 
The slope and the rate of change of the slope of FOC" are 
shown in equation 4.21. 
Similarly, the curve FOC'" represents the combinations of 
R and T such that the tariff first order condition is 
satisfied. The slope and the rate of change of the slope of 
FOC^ are shown in equation 4.22. 
dR 
dx 
(4.21) 
84 
$ 
B MC, car 
0 
R 
Figure 4.8. Optimal choice of fleet size. 
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Figure 4.9. Railroad fleet and tariff decisions 
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dR_ -g^Tt 
dx" EK^ 
(4.22) 
Equation 4.23 shows the second and third partial 
derivatives of the first order conditions needed to sign the 
slope and the rate of change in the slope. 
If the random variable p is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed, so that h(p'")=h(p°) and h'(p'")=h'(p°)=0, then all 
the partials in equation 4.2 3 are negative except E7rpgg=E7r^^^=0 
and EJTg^ which is indeterminate. Assuming E^^^ is positive, 
then FOC'^ is upward sloping and convex while FOC" is upward 
sloping and concave. The optimal R and r are found at the 
intersection of FOC" and FOC^ as shown in Figure 4.9. The case 
- j-Avrxhip) dp - n{2vx-h) [A(p -h(p °) ] 
p" (4.23) 
En„^'6vn[h(p°) -i3(p') ] -n{2vx-b) [h'ip'^) -h'(p°) ] 
-a„(2\n:-b)h'(p^) 
' ^ 
^/JRR--(2VT-jb) ^  h'(pn 
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of Ejrp^=0 is shown in Figure 4.10. In this case, FOC^ is a 
vertical line and FOC" is a horizontal line. Finally, if 
is negative both curves are downward sloping but the rate of 
change of the slope is indeterminate. 
The conventional service equilibrium can be characterized 
in (z,p) space as shown in Figure 4.11. The ray AD in (z,p) 
space represents the combinations of z and p such that 
shippers receive all the cars they desire and railroad assets 
are fully utilized, i.e. the values of p and z such that 
P=P'^(t'/R)* The combinations of z and p lying below the line 
result in shippers being rationed but railroad assets are 
fully utilized. For example, a high grain price and a low 
salvage value creates a demand for rail service which exceeds 
the capacity of the railroad, i.e. a value of p>p'"(r,R). The 
combinations of z and p lying above the line result in 
shippers receiving all the cars they desire but part of the 
railroad fleet is idle. For example, a low price of grain and 
a high salvage value creates a demand for rail service which 
is less than the capacity of the railroad, i.e. a value of 
p<p''(T,R). 
Distribution of Costs on Railroad Decisions 
This section examines the effect of the relative size of 
constant per unit operating costs and constant per unit 
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Figure 4.11. Conventional service equilibriiun. 
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capacity costs on the railroad decisions and profits. The 
total constant per unit cost of producing output is denoted as 
C. Per unit operating costs, b, are represented by A.C and per 
unit capacity costs, B' = (B/Oj,), are represented by {1-A,)C. 
Increasing (decreasing) X increases (decreases) unit operating 
costs and decreases (increases) unit capacity costs. The 
effect of changing k on the tariff rate T, fleet size R, and 
profits are examined under deterministic and uncertain demand. 
Deterministic Demand 
In the deterministic case, the variable p is assumed to 
be equal to its expected value. The demand for the railroad 
service is denoted as n(Ep-T+y) and the railroad capacity is 
denoted as a^R. The railroad knowing the demand for its 
service will acquire a capacity level sufficient to cover 
demand at the optimal tariff rate. The railroad's optimal 
capacity given its tariff rate T is shown in equation 4.24. 
R'- (p-c-^y) 
where; (4.24) 
— „ Ep-Ez p-Eo- ^ 
2v 
The railroad chooses r to maximize its profit as shown in 
equation 4.25. 
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max^ rr7t-n(p-T+y) (2vT-jb)-BJ?* 
-/i(^-T+y)[2vT-A.C- (1-A)  CVK^i?*] 
-n (^-T +y) [2 VT - q 
(4.25) 
where: 
C=total per unit cost of production. 
b=A,C=unit operating costs. 
B'=B/o^=(l-'X)C=unit capacity costs. 
A,€[0,1] . 
The first order condition, equation 4.26, states the 
monopolist railroad chooses r such that the marginal revenue 
of producing a trip is equal to the total constant marginal 
cost of producing the trip. 
The optimal tariff rate, fleet size, and railroad profit are 
shown in equations 4.27-4.29. 
2VT-2v(p-T+y) - C (4.26) 
T*--^[2v(p+y) +q (4.27) 
(4.28) 
[2v(p+y) -C] ^ 
8v 
(4.29) 
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In the deterministic setting, X, the distribution of 
marginal production costs between marginal operating and 
marginal capacity costs is irrelevant to the railroad 
normalized tariff and capacity decisions. Only the total 
constant marginal cost of producing a unit of output is 
important. 
Data for a numerical example are presented in Table 4.1. 
The optimal values of tariff rate r, fleet size R, and 
railroad profit under the deterministic case are shown in 
equation 4.30. 
t*-35.71 
i?'-952.38 (4.30) 
rrit*-$2,857,143 
Table 4.1. Data for the Deterministic Setting. 
Shipper grain inventory in cars (y) = 25 
Expected shipper grain price per car (Ep) = $9,450 
Expected grain salvage value per car (Ez) = $5,950 
Shipper storage parameter (v) = $70 
Expected value of p [Ep=(Ep-Ez)/2v] = 25 
Total railroad cost of producing a trip (C) = $3,000 
Number of trips by a car in conventional service (a^) = 1.5 
Number of shippers (n) = 100 
Demand Uncertainty 
The optimizing procedure for a railroad facing random 
demand for its service when choosing its tariff rate and fleet 
were shown in equations 4.19 and 4.20. To see the effect of A. 
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on the tariff and fleet size decisions substitute b=A.C and 
B=(l-A.)Ca„ into the first order conditions. Equation 4.31 
shows the system of equations which determine the effect of A, 
on the tariff rate and fleet size. 
En„ Eii,^ 
di 
dk 
dR 
dk 
-Eit 
-En 
xX 
RX 
(4.31) 
where 
> 0 
> 0 
Assuming is positive, then an increase in A increases 
T and the fleet size R. Figure 4.12 shows the effects of 
increasing A, on the curves FOc" and FOC'". Recall FOC" are the 
combinations of (R,r) such that the railroad fleet size is 
optimal and FOC'^ are the combinations of (R,T) such that the 
railroad normalized tariff rate is optimal. The fleet size 
and tariff rate r which maximizes railroad expected profit is 
found at the intersection of these two curves. 
When choosing an optimal fleet size, the railroad equates 
the expected marginal profit from an additional rail car to 
the marginal capacity costs. Increasing k increases marginal 
operating costs and decreases marginal capacity costs by equal 
amounts. Holding r constant, an increase in marginal 
operating costs decreases the marginal profit from an 
additional rail car by an identical amount. However, the 
94 
R FOC^ FOC FOC 
/ 
R* 
FOC 
R* 
0 
Figure 4.12. The effect of \ on the optimal tariff 
T*and fleet size R*. 
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expected marginal profit from an additional rail car decreases 
by a lesser amount, since there is the probability the rail 
car may not be used. Therefore, increasing A and holding r 
constant decreases the marginal capacity cost by a greater 
amount than the reduction in expected marginal profit. The 
railroad will acquire a larger fleet for a given T when k 
increases, indicated by FOC" shifting upward to FOC"' in Figure 
4.12. 
Similarly, if X. increases, the railroad increases its 
tariff rate r for a given fleet size. Marginal operating 
costs rise, implying the railroad will increase its tariff 
rate r. Figure 4.12 shows FOC'' shifting to the right when k 
increases. Therefore, as k increases, FOC" shifts up and FOC'' 
shifts to the right, increasing the optimal fleet size and 
tariff rate. 
For illustrative purposes, shipper demand for rail 
service is assumed to be uniformly and normally distributed. 
If demand follows a normal distribution, the distribution is 
arbitrarily truncated in the interval [0,50]. Table 4.2 shows 
that as X increases, T and R also increase when p is uniformly 
distributed over various intervals. Similarly, Table 4.3 
shows the increasing effects of A. on r and R when p is 
normally distributed with different standard deviations. 
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Table 4.2. The Effect of Costs on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution over the Intervals [20,30], 
[10,40], and [0,50], C=$3000. 
Fleet 
Interval X T R Errir 
0.0 34.76 938.11 2,269,102 
0.1 34.84 950.11 2,292,711 
0.2 34.93 964.95 2,319,829 
0.3 35.03 981.89 2,351,259 
0.4 35.13 1,002.02 2,388,058 
[20,30] 0.5 35.24 1,026.26 2,431,638 
0.6 35.35 1,055.88 2,483,929 
0.7 35.47 1,092.77 2,547,629 
0.8 35,58 1,139.75 2,626,625 
0.9 35.67 1,201.38 2,726,734 
1.0 35.71 2,857,143 
0.0 32.44 849.49 1,179,570 
0.1 32.73 890.22 1,236,053 
0.2 33.05 938.03 1,303,283 
0.3 33.39 994.55 1,384,014 
0.4 33.76 1,061.79 1,481,850 
[10,40] 0.5 34.15 1,142.42 1,601,535 
0.6 34.54 1,239.97 1,749,394 
0.7 34.93 1,359.40 1,933,984 
0.8 35.44 1,502.30 2,167,722 
0.9 35.89 1,666.67 2,467,634 
1.0 36.96 2,815,848 
0.0 35.16 624.49 431,900 
0.1 35.94 701.90 524,487 
0.2 36.68 790.72 637,952 
0.3 37.37 892.76 776,733 
0.4 38.00 1,010.41 946,299 
[0,50] 0.5 38.56 1,146.83 1,153,482 
0.6 39.03 1,306.36 1,406,971 
0.7 39.39 1,495.34 1,718,101 
0.8 39.82 1,666.67 2,100,223 
0.9 40.89 1,666.67 2,518,080 
1.0 41.96 2,952,009 
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Table 4.3. The Effect of Costs on Railroad Decisions with a 
Normal Distribution with Standard Deviations of 
2,3, and 4, C=$3000. 
Fleet 
Sienna T R Errir 
0.0 35.16 952.21 2,474,968 
0.1 35.20 958.51 2,492,279 
0.2 35.24 965.71 2,511,373 
0.3 35.29 974.06 2,532,623 
0.4 35.34 983.94 2,556,531 
2 0.5 35.39 995.92 2,583,791 
0.6 35.45 1,010.93 2,615,418 
0.7 35.51 1,030.68 2,652,988 
0.8 35.58 1,058.85 2,699,057 
0.9 35.65 1,106.34 2,759,667 
1.0 35.71 2,857,143 
0.0 34.87 950.30 2,287,141 
0.1 34.93 959.85 2,312,649 
0.2 35.00 970.76 2,340,839 
0.3 35.07 983.42 2,372,276 
0.4 35.15 998.39 2,407,716 
3 0.5 35.23 1,016.53 2,448,211 
0.6 35.31 1,039.23 2,495,294 
0.7 35.41 1,069.08 2,551,342 
0.8 35.51 1,111.59 2,620,431 
0.9 35.62 1,183.09 2,710,975 
1.0 35.72 2,857,117 
0.0 34.58 946.99 2,101,643 
0.1 34.66 959.87 2,135,020 
0.2 34.75 974.59 2,171,985 
0.3 34.85 991.65 2,213,296 
0.4 34.95 1,011.82 2,259,971 
4 0.5 35.06 1,036.24 2,313,423 
0.6 35.18 1,066.78 2,375,711 
0.7 35.31 1,106.89 2,450,025 
0.8 35.44 1,163.90 2,541,822 
0.9 35.58 1,259.61 2,662,348 
1.0 35.74 2,856,277 
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Demand Variability on Railroad Decisions 
The effects of a mean preserving spread/contraction of 
the conventional rail service demand on railroad decisions has 
two important applications. First, the domestic demand for 
U.S. grain is more stable than the demand for U.S. grain 
exports. A railroad primarily serving export markets has a 
more volatile demand for its conventional service than a 
railroad serving primarily domestic markets. Hence, the 
effect of market type, domestic versus export, primarily 
served by the railroad on its decisions are captured by 
studying the effect of a mean preserving contraction of the 
random variable p characterizing the aggregate demand for 
conventional rail service. 
Second, suppose the noise surrounding the aggregate 
demand for conventional rail service is reduced by stabilizing 
either the shipper salvage value z or the future grain price p 
at its expected value. Further assume, the salvage value is 
normally distributed with mean z® and variance and the 
future price of grain is normally distributed with mean p® and 
variance The salvage value and the future price of grain 
are assumed to be independent of each other. Therefore, the 
random variable p=(p-z)/2v, which characterizes shipper 
aggregate demand, is normally distributed with mean (p®-z®)/2v 
and variance (o^+a^)/. In this case, the effect of 
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stabilizing the random variable (p or z) at its expected value 
is comparable to a mean preserving contraction of the random 
variable p. 
For instance, suppose the future price of grain becomes 
stabilized at its expected value. The railroad when making 
its tariff and fleet size decisions knows the future price of 
grain to be p® but remains uncertain about the shipper salvage 
value z. Under these assumptions, the railroad when making 
its decisions uses the random variable p', defined as (p'-
z)/2v, to form its beliefs regarding the future state of 
shipper aggregate demand for conventional rail service. The 
random variable p' is normally distributed with mean (p*-z®)/2v 
and variance (a^^)/(4v^). The random variable p * is a mean 
preserving contraction of the random variable p, since p is 
normally distributed with mean p*-z* and variance 
(c^p'+0/(4v2)-
Similarly, if a government policy stabilized shippers 
salvage value z at its expected value, then the railroad when 
making its tariff and fleet size decisions knows the shipper 
salvage value is z®. The railroad, however, remains uncertain 
about the future price of grain. The railroad uses the random 
variable p", defined as (p-z®)/2v, to form its beliefs 
regarding the future state of shipper aggregate demand for 
conventional rail service. The random variable p" is normally 
distributed with mean (p®-z®)/2v and variance The 
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random variable p" is a mean preserving contraction of the 
random variable p. 
Simulations 
Tables 4.4-4.6 show the optimal tariff rate and fleet 
when the cost level is $3000 and the random variable p is 
uniformly distributed in the intervals [25,25], [20,30], 
[10,40], [0,50], and [-10,60]. The cost level C represents 
the total constant per unit cost of production. The tariff 
rate is represented by tau, fleet by R, and railroad expected 
profit by Ex-rr profit. The probability aggregate demand for 
rail service is zero at the optimal tariff is represented by 
the column prob D=0. The probability shippers want to ship 
their entire inventory by rail at the optimal tariff is 
represented by the column prob D=max. The probability 
aggregate demand exceeds the capacity of the railroad at the 
optimal tariff and fleet is denoted by the column prob ration. 
Finally, the column reliability is equal to probability the 
railroad is able to satisfy shipper aggregate demand and is 
equal to one minus the probability of rationing. The railroad 
fleet needed to haul all the grain is represented by 1,666.67 
cars. 
From Table 4.4 changing the variability of p from its 
expected value of 25 to the interval [20,30] decreases the 
tariff rate but the fleet size may increase or decrease. The 
fleet size decreases when capacity costs are high and 
Table 4.4. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and A.=0.0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 
0 . 0  
Interval 
[ 25,25] 
[ 20,30] 
[ 10,40] 
[ 0,50] 
[-10,60] 
35.71 
34.76 
32.44 
35.16 
40.64 
Fleet 
R 
952.38 
938.11 
849.49 
624.49 
496.72 
Erra-
2,857,143 
2,269,102 
1,179,570 
431,900 
225,596 
Prob 
D=0 
0.000 
0.000 
0.203 
0.366 
Prob 
D=max 
0.000 
0.252 
0.297 
0.277 
Prob 
Ration Reliability 
0.0000 
0.6164 
0.6605 
0.6095 
0.5273 
1.0000 
0.3836 
0.3395 
0.3905 
0.4727 
[ 25,25] 35.71 
[ 20,30] 34.84 
0.1 [ 10,40] 32.73 
[ 0,50] 35.94 
[-10,60] 41.26 
952.38 2,857,143 
950.52 2,292,711 
890.22 1,236,053 
701.90 524,487 
615.18 333,126 
0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.242 
0.219 0.281 
0.375 0.268 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.5897 0.4103 
0.6304 0.3696 
0.5706 0.4294 
0.4930 0.5070 
[ 25,25] 35.71 
[ 20,30] 34.93 
0.2 [ 10,40] 33.05 
[ 0,50] 36.68 
[-10,60] 41.84 
952.38 2,857,143 
964.95 2,319,829 
938.03 1,303,283 
790.72 637,952 
747.07 471,607 
0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.232 
0.234 0.266 
0.383 0.259 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.5594 0.4406 
0.5960 0.4040 
0.5292 0.4708 
0.4565 0.5435 
[ 25,25] 35.71 
[ 20,30] 35.03 
0.3 [ 10,40] 33.39 
[ 0,50] 37.37 
[-10,60] 42.36 
952.38 2,857,143 
981.89 2,351,259 
994.55 1,384,014 
892.76 776,733 
894.51 646,888 
0.000 0.000 
0 .000 0 .220 
0.247 0.253 
0.391 0.252 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.5245 0.4755 
0.5563 0.4437 
0.4848 0.5152 
0.4175 0.5825 
Table 4.5. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and A,=0.4, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.7 
Fleet Prob Prob Prob 
X. Interval T R Errw D=0 D=niax Ration Reliabilitv 
[ 25,25] 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 0.0000 1.0000 
[ 20,30] 35.13 1,002.02 2,388,058 0.000 0.000 0.4841 0.5159 
0.4 t 10,40] 33.76 1,061.79 1,481,850 0.000 0.208 0.5104 0.4896 
[ 0,50] 38.00 1,010.41 946,299 0.260 0.240 0.4369 0.5631 
[-10,60] 42.81 1,060.26 886,005 0.397 0.246 0.3755 0.6245 
[ 25,25] 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 0.0000 1.0000 
[ 20,30] 35.24 1,026.26 2,431,638 0.000 0.000 0.4369 0.5631 
0.5 t 10,40] 34.15 1,142.42 1,601,535 0.000 0.195 0.4573 0.5427 
[ 0,50] 38.56 1,146.83 1,153,482 0.271 0.229 0.3848 0.6152 
[-10,60] 43.18 1,247.97 1,137,566 0.403 0.240 0.3300 0.6700 
[ 25,25] 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 0.0000 1.0000 
[ 20,30] 35.35 1,055.88 2,483,929 0.000 0.000 0.3811 0.6190 
0.6 [ 10,40] 34.54 1,239.97 1,749,394 0.000 0.182 0.3953 0.6047 
[ 0,50] 39.03 1,306.36 1,406,971 0.281 0.219 0.3275 0.6725 
[-10,60] 43.44 1,462.66 1,472,304 0.406 0.237 0.2802 0.7198 
[ 25,25] 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 0.0000 1.0000 
[ 20,30] 35.47 1,092.77 2,547,629 0.000 0.000 0.3141 0.6859 
0.7 [ 10,40] 34.93 1,359.40 1,933,984 0.000 0.169 0.3225 0.6775 
[ 0,50] 39.39 1,495.34 1,718,101 0.288 0.212 0.2635 0.7365 
[-10,60] 43.75 1,666.67 1,882,813 0.411 0.232 0.0000 1.0000 
Table 4.6. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and A.=0.8, 0.9, and 1.0 
0 . 8  
Interval 
[ 25,25] 
[ 20,30] 
[ 10,40] 
[ 0,50] 
[-10,60] 
35.71 
35.58 
35.44 
39.82 
44.82 
Fleet 
R 
952.38 
1,139.75 
1,502.30 
1,666.67 
1,666.67 
Ernr 
2,857,143 
2,626,625 
2,167,722 
2,100,223 
2,330,516 
Prob 
D=0 
0.000 
0.015 
0.296 
0.426 
Prob 
D=max 
0.000  
0.152 
0.204 
0.217 
Prob 
Ration Reliability 
0.0000 
0.2325 
0.2343 
0.0000 
0.0000 
1.0000 
0.7675 
0.7657 
1.0000 
1.0000 
[ 25,25] 35.71 
[ 20,30] 35.67 
0.9 [ 10,40] 35.89 
[ 0,50] 40.89 
[-10,60] 45.89 
952.38 2,857,143 
1,201.38 2,726,734 
1,666.67 2,467,634 
1,666.67 2,518,080 
1,666.67 2,789,700 
0.000 0.000 
0.030 0.137 
0.318 0.182 
0.441 0.202 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.1308 0.8692 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 1.0000 
[ 25,25] 35.71 
[ 20,30] 35.71 
1.0 [ 10,40] 36.96 
[ 0,50] 41.96 
[-10,60] 46.96 
952.38 2,857,143 
1,666.67 2,857,143 
1,666.67 2,815,848 
1,666.67 2,952,009 
1,666.67 3,260,364 
0.000 0.000 
0.065 0.101 
0.339 0.161 
0.457 0.186 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 1.0000 
0.0000 1.0000 
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increases when capacity costs are low. 
Further increases in the variability of p shows both the 
tariff rate and fleet size may increase or decrease. Holding 
everything else constant, increasing the interval on which p 
is uniformly distributed places more probability weight at the 
extremes. If the tariff rate remains the same, increasing the 
internal will increase the probability demand is zero and the 
probability demand reaches its maximum. For instance, if the 
tariff rate is 36 with each shipper having 25 units of grain 
to sell and p is uniformly distributed in the interval 
[10,40], then the probability shipper aggregate demand is zero 
is equal to prob(p<p®)=0.03 and the probability shippers will 
want to ship all of their grain by rail is equal to 
prob(p^py)=0.13, as shown in equation 4.32. 
11 
'dp -0.03 prob(pip°)-| f-^ 
10 I-
40 
prob(pipy)-| 
, 10 
" (4.32) 
36 • --
dp -0.13 
But if p is uniformly distributed in the interval [0,50], then 
the probability shipper aggregate demand is zero is equal to 
0.18 and the probability of shipper aggregate reaching its 
maximum is equal to 0.32, as shown in equation 4.33. 
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11 
dp -0.18 prob(pip°)-/[-j^ 
0 '• 
50 
prob(pipy) "I J-^^jdp -0.32 
(4.33) 
so
36 
At first, the railroad decreases its tariff rate to 
recapture the lost expected sales from the lower extreme of 
the distribution. In this case, a lower tariff rate implies 
the expected profit from recaptured sales in the lower extreme 
of the distribution exceeds the reduction in expected profit 
from sales in the rest of the distribution. 
However, holding the tariff rate constant, as the 
interval on which p is uniformly distributed becomes wider and 
wider, the probability demand is zero and reaches its maximum 
becomes larger and larger. The expected shipper demand 
becomes less and less responsive to changes in the tariff 
rate. A greater reduction in the tariff rate is needed to 
recapture the same amount of expected sales from the lower 
extreme of the distribution. Eventually, recapturing these 
lost expected sales from lower extreme of the distribution 
becomes too costly. Furthermore, the less responsive shipper 
expected demand at the upper extreme of the distribution gives 
the monopolist railroad the incentive to increase its tariff 
rate. 
The effect of a mean preserving spread when p is normally 
distributed are shown in Tables 4.7-4.10. Again the tariff 
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rates fall as sigma, the standard deviation of p, increases. 
Tariff rates eventually increase when sigma gets large enough 
(a=7 or 8). The response of the fleet size to a mean 
preserving spread of p is again indeterminate. Finally, a 
mean preserving spread of p decreases expected railroad 
profits. 
The results coincide with the uncertainty literature. In 
particular, when demand is modeled in an additive fashion, the 
monopolist's price is lower and its output may be greater or 
less than the riskless case [Mills, 1962; Karlin and Carr, 
1962]. When increases in the variability of p are small 
around the riskless case, the tariff rate falls and the fleet 
size may increase or decrease agreeing with the past findings. 
In these instances, when p is normally or uniformly 
distributed, the demand for rail service is also normally or 
uniformly distributed. 
However, if the variability of p becomes large enough, 
the demand for rail service no longer follows the same 
distribution as p. The lower bound of zero and an upper bound 
in the form of an inventory constraint creates a non-
differentiable aggregate demand density function with positive 
weight at the two extremes. Large increases in the 
variability of p, creates a greater probability that demand 
will be either zero or its upper limit and lessens the 
probability demand will be sensitive to changes in the tariff 
Table 4.7. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and X=0.0, 0.1, 0.2. 
Fleet Prob Prob Prob 
X a  T R Ernr D=0 D=inax Ration Reliability 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 - - 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.44 952.87 2,664,999 0.000 0.000 0.6046 0.3954 
2 35.16 952.21 2,474,968 0.000 0.000 0.6094 0.3906 
3 34.87 950c30 2,287,141 0.000 0.000 0.6145 0.3855 o
 • 
o
 4 34.58 946.99 2,101,643 0.000 0.008 0.6198 0.3802 
5 34.28 941.54 1,919,053 0.001 0.032 0.6250 0.3750 
6 34.02 932.50 1,741,365 0.004 0.066 0.6298 0.3702 
7 33.83 919.05 1,572,135 0.010 0.103 0.6335 0.3665 
8 33.70 901.66 1,415,784 0.020 0.138 0.6358 0.3642 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 — — 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.46 956.00 2,673,802 0.000 0.000 0.5788 0.4212 
2 35.20 958.51 2,492,279 0.000 0.000 0.5834 0.4166 
3 34.93 959.85 2,312,649 0.000 0.000 0.5381 0.4119 
0.1 4 34.66 959.87 2,135,020 0.000 0.008 0.5931 0.4069 
5 34.39 957.83 1,959,959 0.001 0.030 0.5980 0.4020 
6 34.16 952.31 1,789,440 0.004 0.063 0.6024 0.3976 
7 33.99 942.52 1,626,946 0.011 0.099 0.6056 0.3944 
8 33.89 928.89 1,476,740 0.021 0.133 0.6075 0.3925 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 — — 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.48 959.57 2,683,494 0.000 0.000 0.5495 0.4505 
2 35.24 965.71 2,511,373 0.000 0.000 0.5537 0.4463 
3 35.00 970.76 2,340,839 0.000 0.000 0.5581 0.4419 
0.2 4 34.75 974.59 2,171,985 0.000 0.007 0.5627 0.4373 
5 34.51 976.45 2,005,366 0.001 0.029 0.5673 0.4327 
6 34.30 974.94 1,842,939 0.004 0.061 0.5712 0.4288 
7 34.16 969.30 1,688,110 0.012 0.095 0.5739 0.4261 
8 34.09 959.93 1,544,981 0.022 0.127 0.5753 0.4247 
Table 4.8. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and A.=0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. 
Fleet Prob Prob Prob 
X a  r R Ernr D=0 D=max Ration Reliability 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 - - 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.50 963.70 2,694,261 0.000 0.000 0.5159 0.4841 
2 35.29 974.06 2,532,623 0.000 0.000 0.5197 0.4803 
3 35.07 983.42 2,372,276 0.000 0.000 0-5237 0.4763 
0.3 4 34.85 991.65 2,213,296 0.000 0.007 0.5279 0.4721 
5 34.63 998.03 2,056,229 0.001 0.027 0.5319 0.4681 
6 34.45 1,001.16 1,903,018 0.005 0.058 0.5353 0.4647 
7 34.34 1,000.30 1,756,991 0.012 0.091 0.5375 0.4625 
8 34.29 995.84 1,622,080 0.024 0.122 0.5383 0.4617 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 _ — 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.53 968.60 2,706,351 0.000 0.000 0.4769 0.5231 
2 35.34 983.94 2,556,531 0.000 0.000 0.4803 0.5197 
3 35.15 998.39 2,407,716 0.000 0.000 0.4838 0.5162 
«
 
o
 4 34.95 1,011.82 2,259,971 0.000 0.006 0.4874 0.5126 
5 34.76 1,023.52 2,113,833 0.001 0.025 0.4909 0.5091 
6 34.61 1,032.10 1,971,232 0.005 0.055 0.4937 0.5063 
7 34.53 1,036.85 1,835,418 0.013 0.087 0.4953 0.5047 
8 34.52 1,038.11 1,710,142 0.026 0.116 0.4955 0.5045 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 — — 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.56 974.53 2,720,109 0.000 0.000 0.4313 0.5687 
2 35.39 995.92 2,583,791 0.000 0.000 0.4342 0.5658 
3 35.23 1,016.53 2,448,211 0.000 0.000 0.4371 0.5629 If) 
•
 
o
 4 35.06 1,036.24 2,313,423 0.000 0.006 0.4401 0.5599 
5 34.90 1,054.34 2,179,960 0.001 0.024 0.4430 0.5570 
6 34.79 1,069.49 2,049,739 0.006 0.051 0.4451 0.5549 
7 34.73 1,080.97 1,925,928 0.014 0.082 0.4460 0.5540 
8 34.75 1,089.08 1,812,082 0.028 0.111 0.4457 0.5543 
Table 4.9. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and X=0.6, 0.7, and 0.8. 
Fleet Prob Prob Prob 
a. a T R Ernr D=0 D=max Ration Reliability 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 - - 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.58 981.98 2,736,038 0.000 0.000 0.3772 0.6228 
2 35.45 1,010.93 2,615,418 0.000 0.000 0.3794 0.6206 
3 35.31 1,039.23 2,495,294 0.000 0.000 0.3817 0.6183 
0.6 4 35.18 1,066.78 2,375,711 0.000 0.005 0.3840 0.6160 
5 35.05 1,092.87 2,257,202 0.001 0.022 0.3862 0.6138 
6 34.97 1,116.16 2,141,672 0.006 0.048 0.3876 0.6124 
7 34.95 1,135.96 2,032,196 0.016 0.077 0.3879 0.6121 
8 35.01 1,152.49 1,932,120 0.030 0.105 0.3870 0.6130 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 — — 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.61 991.71 2,754,923 0.000 0.000 0.3119 0.6881 
2 35.51 1,030.68 2,652,988 0.000 0.000 0.3134 0.6866 
3 35.41 1,069.08 2,551,342 0.000 0.000 0.3150 0.6850 
0.7 4 35.31 1,106.89 2,450,025 0.000 0.005 0.3166 0.6834 
5 35.22 1,143.39 2,349,570 0.002 0.021 0.3180 0.6820 
6 35.17 1,177.27 2,251,869 0.007 0.045 0.3188 0.6812 
7 35.18 1,207.83 2,159,893 0.017 0.073 0.3185 0.6815 
8 35.27 1,235.20 2,076,748 0.032 0.099 0.3171 0.6829 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 — — 0.0000 1.0000 
1 35.65 1,005.78 2,778,110 0.000 0.000 0.2316 0.7684 
2 35.58 1,058.85 2,699,057 0.000 0.000 0.2325 0.7675 
3 35.51 1,111.59 2,620,431 0.000 0.000 0.2333 0.7667 00 
•
 
o
 4 35.44 1,163.90 2,541,822 0.000 0.005 0.2342 0.7658 
5 35.39 1,215.08 2,463,916 0.002 0.019 0.2349 0.7651 
6 35.38 1,263.83 2,388,582 0.007 0.042 0.2350 0.7650 
7 35.43 1,309.41 2,318,668 0.019 0.068 0.2344 1.0000 
8 35.55 1,351.76 2,256,983 0.035 0.093 0.2329 0.7671 
Table 4.10. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Railroad Decisions with a 
Uniform Distribution, C=$3000 and A,=0.9 and 1.0. 
Fleet Prob Prob Prob 
a T R Errjr D=0 D=inax Ration Relieibilitv 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 - - 0. 0000 1.0000 
1 35.68 1,029.44 2,808,390 0.000 0.000 0. 1307 0.8693 
2 35.65 1,106.34 2,759,667 0.000 0.000 0. 1310 0.8690 
3 35.62 1,183.09 2,710,975 0.000 0.000 0. 1312 0.8688 
4 35.58 1,259.61 2,662,348 0.000 0.004 0. 1315 0.8685 
5 35.57 1,335.17 2,614,324 0.002 0.017 0. 1316 0.8684 
6 35.59 1,408.46 2,568,737 0.008 0.039 0. 1314 0.8686 
7 35.68 1,478.63 2,528,260 0.020 0.063 0. 1307 1.0000 
8 35.83 1,545.15 2,495,295 0.037 0.087 0. 1296 0.8704 
0 35.71 952.38 2,857,143 — — 0. 0000 1.0000 
1 35.71 1,666.67 2,857,143 0.000 0.000 0. 0000 1.0000 
2 35.71 1,666.67 2,857,143 0.000 0.000 0. 0000 1.0000 
3 35.72 1,666.67 2,857,117 0.000 0.000 0. 0000 1.0000 
4 35.74 1,666.67 2,856,277 0.000 0.004 0. 0000 1.0000 
5 35.83 1,666.67 2,852,215 0.002 0.015 0. 0000 1.0000 
6 36.00 1,666.67 2,844,012 0.010 0.033 0. 0000 1.0000 
7 36.25 1,666.67 2,833,580 0.025 0.054 0. 0000 1.0000 
8 36.56 1,666.67 2,823,742 0.046 0.073 0. 0000 1.0000 
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rate. 
Therefore, the effects of either market type served by 
the railroad or policies to stabilize rail demand on the 
railroad tariff and capacity decisions is indeterminate. 
However, a railroad serving primarily domestic markets versus 
a railroad serving primarily export markets will have higher 
expected profits. Similarly, policies to stabilize rail 
demand will lead to higher expected profits for the monopolist 
railroad. 
Symmetric Information 
This section examines the effects of the railroad having 
the same grain market information as the grain shippers. The 
symmetric information could occur through government 
regulation or by the railroad developing closer working 
relations with grain shippers. Four decades into the computer 
age reveal that the very nature of business is information 
[Coates, 1993]. Recent developments of American business to 
develop a closer working relationship between customers and 
suppliers include a just-in-time inventory (JIT II) system 
[Dysart, 1993; Burke, 1991; McClenahen, 1991] and the 
organizational structure of a virtual corporation [Davidow, 
1992; Byrne et al., 1993; Malone and Davidow, 1992]. In the 
JIT II system, a representative of the supplier is employed 
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full time at the customer's location. This "in-plant" learns 
the needs and the business of the customers. Similarly, a 
virtual corporation is defined as a temporary network of 
independent companies - suppliers, and customers - linked by 
information technology to share skills, costs, and access to 
one another's markets [Byrne et al., 1993], 
These concepts which share information between customers 
and suppliers would allow the railroad to learn the shipper's 
information regarding its salvage value. In this section, the 
railroad is assumed to learn the shippers salvage value z 
simultaneously with shippers, i.e., before making its fleet 
size decision but after the tariff decision. 
In this section and in the next chapter, the grain price 
p is assumed to be normally distributed in the interval [7700, 
11200] with an expected value of 9450. The salvage value z is 
assumed to be trinomially distributed with 1/3 probability 
assigned to each of the following values Ez-e, Ez, and Ez+6, 
where Ez=5950 and £ represents the spread of the distribution. 
With these assumptions, the expected value of p (p-z/2v) 
continues to be 25. The remaining data used in the numerical 
analysis are unaltered and are shown in Table 4.1. 
The welfare impact of the railroad and shippers sharing 
information as well as its affect on the railroad tariff rate 
and capacity decisions are the focus of this section. Perfect 
information shows the maximum amount of total welfare 
113 
Obtainable. The optimal tariff rate t (=2vr*), railroad 
conventional service capacity, railroad profit, shipper 
profit, and total welfare under deterministic demand with 
z=Ez=5950 and p=Ep=9450 are shown in equation 4.34. Railroad 
conventional service capacity is defined as the fleet size R 
multiplied by the number of trips a car in conventional 
service completes, o^=1.5. Total welfare (TW) is defined as 
the sum of railroad and shipper profits. 
t*-$5000/car an.R*-l/428,571.57 
rrn*-$2,857,143 (4.34) 
sn*-$ 119,286 
7W*-$2,976,429 
Table 4.11 shows the optimal tariff rate t, railroad 
conventional service capacity, and total expected welfare with 
asymmetric information under the pre-Staggers car allocation 
system. The results of the previous section concerning the 
effects of A and a mean preserving spread on railroad 
decisions and expected profits continue to hold under the new 
distributional assumptions of p and z. 
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show the expected railroad profit, 
expected shipper profit, and expected total welfare. The 
informational gain by the monopolist railroad increases 
expected railroad profit and expected total welfare. Expected 
shipper profit is only slightly less under symmetric 
information. Expected total welfare increases, since the 
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Table 4.11. The Pre-Staggers Program with Asymmetric 
Information, with C=$3,000. 
X c 
Tariff 
t 
RR 
Caoacitv Errw Esw 
Total 
Ejt 
0. 0 
100 
200 
300 
4,802 
4,797 
4,790 
1,412.22 
1,411.41 
1,409.91 
1,942,197 
1,923,545 
1,892,971 
122,545 
122,626 
122,759 
2,064,742 
2,046,171 
2,015,730 
0. 1 
100 
200 
300 
4,817 
4,813 
4,806 
1,436.51 
1,436.19 
1,435.59 
1,981,791 
1,963,895 
1,934,539 
122,444 
122,524 
122,658 
2,104,235 
2,086,419 
2,057,197 
0. 2 
100 
200 
300 
4,833 
4,829 
4,823 
1,464.27 
1,464.60 
1,464.99 
2,025,860 
2,008,122 
1,980,831 
122,333 
122,415 
122,548 
2,148,193 
2,130,537 
2,103,379 
0. 3 
100 
200 
300 
4,850 
4,846 
4,841 
1.496.46 
1.497.47 
1,499.09 
2,075,354 
2,059,269 
2,032,854 
122,211 
122,292 
122,426 
2,197,565 
2,181,561 
2,155,280 
0. 4 
100 
200 
300 
4,868 
4,865 
4,860 
1,534.52 
1,536.36 
1,539.30 
2,131,552 
2,116,571 
2,091,960 
122,076 
122,157 
122,289 
2,253,628 
2,238,728 
2,214,249 
0. 5 
100 
200 
300 
4,887 
4,885 
4,881 
1,580.51 
1,583.34 
1,587.99 
2,196,229 
2,182,529 
2,160,025 
121,926 
122,007 
122,138 
2,318,155 
2,304,536 
2,282,163 
0. 6 
100 
200 
300 
4,908 
4,096 
4,903 
1,637.94 
1,641.96 
1,648.73 
2,271,956 
2,259,771 
2,239,768 
121,758 
121,836 
121,968 
2,393,714 
2,381,607 
2,361,736 
0. 7 
100 
200 
300 
4,931 
4,929 
4,927 
1,713.09 
1,718.75 
1,728.20 
2,362,707 
2,352,353 
2,335,384 
121,569 
121,647 
121,777 
2,484,276 
2,474,000 
2,457,161 
0. 8 
100 
200 
300 
4,955 
4,954 
4,952 
1.819.46 
1,827.39 
1.840.47 
2,475,237 
2,467,170 
2,453,997 
121,359 
121,437 
121,562 
2,596,596 
2,588,607 
2,575,559 
0. 9 
100 
200 
300 
4,979 
4,979 
4,978 
1,995.99 
2,007.42 
2,026.28 
2,623,288 
2,618,239 
2,610,071 
121,129 
121,202 
121,322 
2,744,417 
2,739,441 
2,731,393 
1. 0 
100 
200 
300 
5,009 
5,011 
5,014 
2,855,393 
2,854,559 
2,853,160 
120,768 
120,819 
120,887 
2,976,161 
2,975,378 
2,974,047 
Table 4.12. The Welfare Effect of Symmetric Information Under the Pre-Staggers 
Car Ordering System for 0.0 < X < 0.4. 
symTTiPtric Information Asymmetric Information 
Total Total 
X ErrTT ESTT EJT Errw EST mr 
100 1,948,467 122,541 2,071,008 1,942,197 122,545 2,064,742 
0. 0 200 1,948,467 122,612 2,071,079 1,923,545 122,626 2,046,171 
300 1,948,467 122,731 2,071,198 1,892,971 122,759 2,015,730 
100 1,987,805 122,440 2,110,245 1,981,791 122,444 2,104,235 
0. 1 200 1,987,805 122,512 2,110,317 1,963,895 122,524 2,086,419 
300 1,987,805 122,631 2,110,436 1,934,539 122,658 2,057,197 
100 2,031,586 122,330 2,153,916 2,025,860 122,333 2,148,193 
0. 2 200 2,031,586 122,401 2,153,987 2,008,122 122,415 2,130,537 
300 2,031,586 122,521 2,154,107 1,980,831 122,548 2,103,379 
100 2,080,755 122,208 2,202,963 2,075,354 122,211 2,197,565 
0. 3 200 2,080,755 122,279 2,203,034 2,059,269 122,292 2,181,561 
300 2,080,755 122,398 2,203,153 2,032,854 122,426 2,155,280 
100 2,136,583 122,072 2,950,879 2,131,552 122,076 2,253,628 
0. 4 200 2,136,583 122,143 2,950,950 2,116,571 122,157 2,238,728 
300 2,136,583 122,262 2,951,059 2,091,960 122,289 2,214,249 
Table 4.13. The Welfare Effect of Symmetric Information under the Pre-Staggers 
Car Ordering System for 0.5 < A. < i.o. 
Symmetric Information Asymmetric Information 
Total Total 
k Err?r ESiT ET Ernr EST 
100 2,200,829 121,923 2,322,752 2,196,229 121,926 2,318,155 
0. 5 200 2,200,829 121,995 2,322,824 2,182,529 122,007 2,304,536 
300 2,200,829 122,114 2,322,943 2,160,025 122,138 2,282,163 
100 2,276,049 121,756 2,397,805 2,271,956 121,758 2,393,714 
0. 6 200 2,276,049 121,827 2,397,876 2,259,771 121,836 2,381,607 
300 2,276,049 121,946 2,397,995 2,239,768 121,968 2,361,736 
100 2,366,187 121,567 2,487,754 2,362,707 121,569 2,484,276 
0. 7 200 2,366,187 121,638 2,487,825 2,352,353 121,647 2,474,000 
300 2,366,187 121,757 2,487,944 2,335,384 121,777 2,457,161 
100 2,477,954 121,359 2,599,313 2,475,237 121,359 2,596,596 
0. 8 200 2,477,954 121,430 2,599,384 2,467,170 121,437 2,588,607 
300 2,477,955 121,547 2,599,502 2,453,997 121,562 2,575,559 
100 2,624,997 121,127 2,746,124 2,623,288 121,129 2,744,417 
0. 9 200 2,624,997 121,198 2,746,195 2,618,239 121,202 2,739,441 
300 2,625,003 121,313 2,746,316 2,610,071 121,322 2,731,393 
100 2,855,393 120,768 2,976,161 2,855,393 120,768 2,976,161 
1.0 200 2,854,559 120,819 2,975,378 2,854,559 120,819 2,975,378 
300 2,853,160 120,887 2,974,047 2,853,160 120,887 2,974,047 
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Increase in expected railroad profit exceeds the slight 
decrease in expected shipper profits. 
The decrease in expected shipper profit is due to a very 
slight increase in the tariff rate as shown in Table 4.14. 
The railroad obtains the shipper information after making its 
tariff decision but before its fleet size decision. Hence, 
the tariff is relatively unaffected by the sharing of 
information. 
The increase in expected railroad profits and total 
welfare is due mainly to the railroad making a more informed 
fleet size decisions. Tables 4.15-4.18 present the railroad's 
conventional service capacity under symmetric and asymmetric 
information. The capacity level of the railroad at the 
expected value of z is relatively unchanged between the 
symmetric and asymmetric cases. However, with the sharing of 
information the railroad expands its capacity fleet when the 
shipper salvage value is low and decrease its capacity when 
the salvage value is high. A low (high) salvage value 
indicates to the railroad that shipper demand for conventional 
will be higher (lower) than average. 
The monopolist railroad uses the shipper information to 
increase its expected profits by acquiring a more appropriate 
capacity level. The more appropriate capacity level reduces 
the probability of car shortages and decreases the probability 
of idle rail cars. Expected shipper profit decreases slightly 
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Table 4.14. The Effect of Symmetric Information on 
the Pre-Staggers Tariff Rate, C=$3000. 
Symmetric Asymmetric 
^ _S_ Tariff Tariff 
100 4,803 4,802 
0.0 200 4,803 4,797 
300 4,803 4,790 
100 4,818 4,817 
0.1 200 4,818 4,813 
300 4,818 4,806 
100 4,834 4,833 
0.2 200 4,834 4,829 
300 4,834 4,823 
100 4,851 4,850 
0.3 200 4,851 4,846 
300 4,851 4,841 
100 4,869 4,868 
0.4 200 4,869 4,865 
300 4,869 4,860 
100 4,888 4,887 
0.5 200 4,888 4,885 
300 4,888 4,881 
100 4,909 4,908 
0.6 200 4,909 4,096 
300 4,909 4,903 
100 4,932 4,931 
0.7 200 4,932 4,929 
300 4,932 4,927 
100 4,955 4,955 
0.8 200 4,955 4,954 
300 4,955 4,952 
100 4,979 4,979 
0.9 200 4,979 4,979 
300 4,980 4,978 
1,0 
100 
200 
300 
5,009 
5,011 
5,014 
5,009 
5,011 
5,014 
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and total welfare increases with the sharing of information. 
To persuade shippers to share their grain market information, 
the railroad could agree to transfer a portion of its 
increased welfare to shippers. 
Total welfare with symmetric information is lower than 
under perfect information. If the monopolist railroad knows 
the value of z and p before making its tariff and fleet 
decisions, welfare losses due to car shortages and idle 
equipment is zero. The monopolist railroad, however, will use 
the additional information and increase its tariff rate in 
order to maximize its expected profits. 
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Table 4.15. The Effect of Symmetric Information 
Capacity under the Pre-Staggers Car 
System for A=0.0, 0.1, and 0.2. 
on Railroad 
Allocation 
Symmetric 
Information 
Asymmetric 
Information 
X 
€ 
z 
Conventional 
Cacacity 
Conventional 
Caoacitv 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,483.88 
1,412.45 
1,341.03 
1,412.22 
0.0 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,555.31 
1,412.45 
1,269.60 
1,411.41 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,626.74 
1,412.45 
1,198.17 
1,409.91 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,508.01 
1,436.58 
1,365.15 
1,436.51 
0.1 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,579.43 
1,436.58 
1,293.72 
1,436.19 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,650.86 
1,436.58 
1,222.29 
1,435.59 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,535.58 
1,464.15 
1,392.72 
1,464.27 
0.2 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,607.01 
1,464.15 
1,321.29 
1,464.60 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,678.44 
1,464.15 
1,249.87 
1,464.99 
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Table 4.16. The Effect of Symmetric Information 
Capacity under the Pre-Staggers Car 
System for A,=0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. 
on Railroad 
Allocation 
A. £ z 
Symmetric 
infponation 
Conventional 
Capacity 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Conventional 
Caoacitv 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,567.54 
1,496.11 
1,424.68 
1,496.46 
0.3 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,638.97 
1,496.11 
1,353.25 
1,497.47 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,710.40 
1,496.11 
1,281.83 
1,499.09 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,605.26 
1,533.83 
1,462.40 
1,534.52 
0.4 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,676.68 
1,533.83 
1,390.97 
1,536.36 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,748.11 
1,533.83 
1,319.54 
1,539.30 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,650.98 
1,579.55 
1,508.12 
1,580.51 
0.5 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,722.41 
1,579.55 
1,436.70 
1,583.34 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,793.84 
1,579.55 
1,365.27 
1,587.99 
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Table 4.17. The Effect of Symmetric Information 
Capacity under the Pre-Staggers Car 
System for A.=0.6, 0.7, and 0.8. 
on Railroad 
Allocation 
k € z 
Symmetric 
Information 
Conventional 
Capacity 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Conventional 
cacacitv 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,708.01 
1,636.58 
1,565.15 
1,637.94 
0.6 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,779.43 
1,636.58 
1,493.72 
1,641.96 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,850.86 
1,636.58 
1,422.29 
1,648.73 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,782.62 
1,711.19 
1,639.76 
1,713.09 
0.7 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,854.05 
1,711.19 
1,568.33 
1,718.75 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,925.47 
1,711.19 
1,496.90 
1,728.20 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,888.30 
1,816.87 
1,745.44 
1,819.46 
00 
•
 
o
 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,959.73 
1,816.87 
1,674.02 
1,827.39 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
2,301.08 
1,816.79 
1,602.51 
1,840.47 
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Table 4.18. The Effect of Syminetric Information 
Capacity under the Pre-Staggers Car 
System for A,=0.9. 
on Railroad 
Allocation 
X 6 z 
Symmetric 
Information 
Conventional 
Capacity 
Asymmetric 
Information 
Conventional 
Caoacity 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
2,063.53 
1,992.10 
1,920.67 
1,955.99 
0.9 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
2,134.96 
1,992.10 
1,849.24 
2,007.42 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
2,206.22 
1,991.94 
1,777.65 
2,026.28 
124 
CHAPTER 5 
GUARANTEED SERVICE 
In 1987 railroads began offering guaranteed service to 
shippers as an alternative to conventional tariff service. 
The purpose of this chapter is examine the affects of 
guaranteed service on the welfare of the railroad and 
shippers. 
The analysis assumes a characteristic of the Union 
Pacific Railroad grain car allocation system in that the 
railroad charges the same transportation rate for guaranteed 
service and conventional tariff service. Figure 5.1 shows the 
sequence of railroad and shipper decisions under guaranteed 
service. 
In this chapter, the review of the relevant literature on 
the public utilities dilemma of choosing price and capacity 
before knowing demand is extended. Second, the aspects 
surrounding the shipper choices of conventional service and 
guaranteed service are examined. Similarly, the issues facing 
a railroad offering both conventional tariff service and 
guaranteed service is discussed. Next, three ways guaranteed 
service affects the welfare of shippers and railroad are 
revealed. Each effect is isolated and studied, i.e., the 
effect of the shipper externality, the informational effect. 
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Shippers learn their salvage value z 
^^^hippers and railroad learn the grain price P 
Yes 
No 
Railroad chooses a tariff rate T 
Railroad chooses a fleet size R 
Each shipper receives 
9i + cars 
Shippers order guaranteed service g 
Each shipper receives 
gj +qd cars 
Each shipper salvages 
y - Qj - amount of grain 
Each shipper salvages 
y - g: - q!^ amount of grain 
Shippers order conventional tariff service q. 
Figure 5.1. Sequence of decisions with guaranteed service. 
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and railcar productivity effect. Finally, the effects of 
limiting the amount of guaranteed service offered to shippers 
is examined. 
Literature Review 
Firms choosing price and capacity before knowing demand 
creates periods of large surpluses and shortages. One method 
to alleviate the adverse effects of shortages is for a 
regulatory agency to impose a reliability of service 
constraint. The firm when choosing price and capacity must 
adhere to the exogenously imposed constraint. The effect of a 
reliability (or quality) of service standard on the pricing 
and investment behavior of a firm has been investigated 
[Meyer, 1975]. The reliability of service constraint states 
that the probability of demand exceeding capacity must be less 
than or equal to some exogenously specified level set by a 
regulatory agency. Each customer faces the same service 
quality and price from the utility. Optimal prices are 
higher, choking off demand and allowing the reliability 
constraint to be met. Also, the optimal choice of such 
reliability constraints for either a welfare maximizing or for 
a regulated profit maximizing monopolist has been studied 
[Crew and Kleindorfer, 1978]. 
The reliability of service approach assumes customers can 
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be costlessly ranked according to their willingness to pay. 
In practice a firm's ability to rank customers according to 
their willingness to pay is very limited. Interruptible 
service establishes an order to ration service to customers 
during periods of excess demand. The monopolist or utility 
divides customers into classes based on some observable 
characteristics. For example, a utility may divide its 
customers into residential, commercial, and industrial 
classes. The price charged to each class and the order in 
which service is interrupted is decided by the utility. When 
demand exceeds capacity, the group with the lowest reliability 
of seirvice is cut off first [Tschirhart and Jen 1979]. 
An alternative framework of interruptible service allows 
customers rather than the utility to choose their ranking. In 
the analysis, customers are free to give the utility the right 
to cut their supply when demand exceeds supply in return for a 
reduction in their electricity rates [Marchland, 1973]. 
Another framework, called ripple control service, the 
utility chooses price and capacity before knowing demand 
[Dansby, 1979]. All customers, however, are limited to a pre-
specified level of usage chosen by the utility whenever demand 
exceeds capacity. The probability of being interrupted is the 
same for all customers. 
A model similar to interruptible service where consumers 
ration themselves, called the self-rationing model, was 
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developed [Panzar and Sibley, 1978]. The utility chooses a 
usage price and a fuse price to maximize social welfare. The 
utility must choose a capacity to meet the total demanded by 
consumers. Consumers reserve a particular level of capacity 
before the state of demand is known at a stated fuse price. 
The consumer may not use all of its reserved capacity but they 
cannot use more capacity than their reserved level. For each 
unit of capacity actually used, the consumer pays the 
additional usage price. The optimal usage price is equal to 
the constant marginal operating costs, b, and the fuse price 
(the price to reserve capacity) is equal to the constant 
marginal capacity costs, B. Hence, the utility makes zero 
profit in all states of demand. No specific assumptions were 
made concerning how uncertainty enters the demand function. 
The previous results of zero profit were dependent on the 
assumptions of additive or multiplicative uncertainty and the 
type of the rationing scheme imposed. 
This self rationing scheme generally leads to a lower 
level of welfare compared to the costless ex post rationing to 
those with the greatest willingness to pay. The model does 
not allow consumers to trade capacity rights. Hence, if one 
consumer wants more than its reserved capacity and another 
consumer uses less, welfare Improvement is lost. Similarly, 
if all consumers want more than their reserved amount, welfare 
Improvement could be made, since the marginal willingness to 
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pay Is not equated across consumers. However, if consumers 
are similar, the self rationing approach leads to optimal 
welfare levels. 
The self rationing model was later extended in two ways. 
First, individual customer demands were allowed to vary within 
the billing period and customer demands were assumed to be 
imperfectly correlated rather than identically correlated 
[Schwarz and Taylor, 1987]. Second, the usage and fuse prices 
were allowed to be nonlinear rather than linear [Oren et al., 
1985]. 
A similar approach to interruptible service and self-
rationing is the literature on priority pricing [Chao and 
Wilson, 1987; Wilson, 1989 and 1991; Tse, 1989]. The 
monopolist or utility states a price and reliability of 
service for a menu of service offerings. Consumers then 
select the type of service most desired. The firm ranks 
customers according to the reliability levels chosen. 
Available capacity is first allocated to the highest 
reliability class and the remaining capacity is allocated to 
the second highest priority class. This continues until the 
entire capacity is used or all customers are served. 
Consumers are offered a more diverse set of products 
differentiated by the cpaality of service. Consumers are able 
to choose the price and reliability level is best suited for 
them. Consumers with high valuations for the service pay the 
130 
higher price for better reliability. Thus, in periods of 
shortages, the available supply is rationed to the consumers 
with the highest evaluation of the service (i.e., those with 
the greater costs of interruption) satisfying the condition 
for allocative efficiency. 
Priority service can also be interpreted as insurance 
against supply shortages. Consumers pay a higher premium for 
a greater reliability of service and a lower probability of 
receiving interrupted service. 
Priority service gives the supplier firm an informational 
benefit by allowing consumers to reveal their willingness to 
pay for quality improvements provided by additional capacity. 
The information aids the firm in capacity planning. The 
greater the number of customers acquiring higher priority 
service, the'greater the incentive to expand capacity. 
Customers are paying higher prices causing the marginal 
revenue of used capacity to increase. 
Recently, the airline use of advanced purchase discounts 
has been studied [Gale and Holmes, 1992 and 1993]. The 
airline industry is characterized by a peak demand that faces 
capacity constraints and an off peak period where capacity is 
not a factor. In order for the airline to increase output, it 
must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak 
period. The purpose of the advanced purchase discounts is to 
shift demand from the peak to the off-peak period. Differing 
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qualities of service is not an issue. 
The research presented in this chapter is related more to 
priority pricing literature than to the literature on advance 
purchase discounts. There are two types of rail service -
guaranteed and conventional tariff service. Guaranteed 
service is never interrupted and therefore has the highest 
possible (quality of service. Conventional tariff service is 
spot service and is the lower priority service. The analysis 
allows customers to purchase various quantities of both types 
of service. 
The sequence of decisions in which the services are 
purchased characterizes the railroad industry. The higher 
priority service is purchased with customers uncertain as to 
its value, while conventional service is acquired with full 
information. Private information is passed from customers to 
the firm when purchasing guaranteed service. The 
informational gain allows the firm to better predict the 
demand for conventional service. Finally, the analysis 
allows different production technologies to be used for the 
two types of service. 
Shipper Environment 
This section examines the shipper choices of conventional 
tariff service and guaranteed service. First, the shippers 
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choice of conventional tariff service given their precommitted 
quantity of guaranteed service is studied. In Figure 5.1, 
shippers choose guaranteed service after learning the value of 
their salvage value z but before learning the price of grain. 
Shippers must use the guaranteed service previously ordered 
regardless of the realized grain price. The choice of 
conventional tariff service comes after learning the price of 
grain. Therefore, the shipper's demand for guaranteed service 
affects its conventional tariff service demand. 
Second, the affects of guaranteed service on the ration 
quantity of conventional service received by a shipper during 
car shortages is investigated. During car shortages, each 
shipper receives an equal amount of the railroad's 
conventional service capacity called the ration quantity. The 
railroad fleet is used to produce either conventional service 
or guaranteed service. Therefore, for a given fleet size, as 
the aggregate amount of guaranteed service changes, the 
railroad conventional service capacity and the ration quantity 
change. 
Third, shippers purchase guaranteed service based on 
their expectations of having their conventional tariff service 
car order rationed. Hence, shipper beliefs regarding the 
possibility of having their conventional tariff service car 
order rationed is also examined. 
Finally, the shipper choice of guaranteed service is 
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characterized. Shippers order guaranteed service to insure 
themselves of moving grain by rail when the marginal revenue 
from selling grain delivered by rail is more attractive than 
the salvage value. 
Shipper Choice of Conventional Tariff Service 
Shippers have the same complete information as under the 
pre-Staggers car allocation system when deciding the amount of 
conventional service to order. Shippers know their grain 
salvage value, storage costs, the rail rate, the railroad's 
conventional service capacity, and the current price of grain. 
Shippers also know the amount of guaranteed service they 
previously purchased. 
Shippers are assumed to know if their car order for 
conventional service will be rationed and the ration quantity 
they will receive from the railroad. Hence, shippers know 
they are unable to influence the amount of conventional 
service received by over-ordering rail cars. Consecjuently, 
shippers order only the desired amount of conventional 
service. 
The shipper profit optimization problem for the amount of 
conventional service to order is the same as under the pre-
Staggers car allocation system except the shipper must load 
all the guaranteed cars previously acquired as shown in 
equation 5.1. 
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-v(y-gi-qi')2 
(5.1) 
where: 
g,= guaranteed service previously ordered by the ith shipper. 
q,'''= conventional service ordered by shipper i. 
p= grain price. 
t= railroad tariff rate. 
z= shipper grain salvage value. 
v= shipper storage cost parameter. 
y= initial shipper grain inventory. 
sjrj= ith shipper profit. 
The first order condition, shown in equation 5.2, implies 
the shipper equates the marginal revenue from selling grain 
delivered by conventional rail service [p-t] to its 
opportunity cost which is the marginal revenue from salvaging 
grain. 
Guaranteed service causes the opportunity cost of selling 
grain delivered by conventional rail service to increase from 
[z-2v(y-qj''') ] to [z-(2v(y-gj-qj''') ] as shown by the shift from 
^^Raii Figure 5.2. The increase is due to the 
shipper previously acquiring amount of guaranteed rail 
service. 
The ith shipper demand for conventional service with and 
[p-t] - [z-2v{y-g^-gj^') ] -0 (5.2) 
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$ 
MC„., Z 
z - 2vy 
0 Conventional q' 
service car order 
Figure 5.2. Shipper optimal choice of conventional service 
with and without guaranteed service. 
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without guaranteed service as a function of the marginal 
revenue from selling grain delivered by conventional rail 
service is shown in Figure 5.3. The shipper's choice of 
conventional service given g, amount of guaranteed service was 
previously acquired is denoted as q,*''. The shippers 
conventional service car order without guaranteed service is 
denoted as q^. The ith shipper demand for conventional rail 
service is shifted to the left by the amount of guaranteed 
service previously acquired. Hence, the ith shipper demand 
for conventional service having precommitted to guaranteed 
service is written as q^'=max[0,q^-g,]. 
A shipper previously acquiring guaranteed service 
decreases its conventional service car order by g^ when the 
marginal revenue from selling grain delivered by conventional 
rail service, [p-t], is above [z-2v(y-g,) ]. The shipper does 
not order conventional service when the marginal revenue from 
selling grain delivered by conventional rail service is below 
[z-2v(y-g,) ]. In this region, the marginal revenue from 
selling grain delivered by conventional rail service is less 
than or equal to the marginal revenue from salvaging the last 
bushel of uncommitted grain. The shipper only uses its 
guaranteed service to move grain by rail. Finally, if the 
marginal revenue from selling grain delivered by conventional 
rail service is greater than or equal to the marginal revenue 
from salvaging its first bushel of uncommitted grain (z), the 
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Marginal revenue of 
selling grain delivered 
by rail 
z 
z - 2vy 
0 Conventional 
service car order 
Figure 5.3. Shipper demand for conventional service 
with and without guaranteed service. 
138 
shipper desires to use conventional rail service to move its 
entire uncommitted grain inventory. 
The shipper's demand for conventional rail service under 
a car allocation system with guaranteed service is shown in 
equation 5.3. 
Qi'- 0 if p-tiz-2vy+2vgi 
p-t-z+2v(y-gi) ^ rs 3^ 
^ if z-2vy+2vgjLip-tsz 
2 V 
y-g^ if p-tiz 
Using the notation from the previous chapter, T=(t/2v) 
and p=(p-z)/2v, the shipper demand for conventional service is 
rewritten as equation 5.4. 
qi''-inin[max[p-T+y-gi, 0] ,y-gi] 
where; 
qi"*'- 0 if p<x-y+gi 
-p-T+y-g^ if pe[T-y+gi,T] 
- y-g^ if p>T 
The aggregate demand for conventional service, Q''', is 
eqpjal to the sum of the individual shipper demand curves. The 
aggregate demand for conventional service, Q''', can be 
expressed as the aggregate conventional service demand under 
the pre-Staggers system minus the aggregate quantity of 
guaranteed service ordered as shown in equation 5.5. 
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Q'' ' (P,T: ,G)  QI ' (P,T,GI)  
n 
max [0,q'^{p,t) -g^] 
(5.5) 
where; 
G=aggregate quantity of guaranteed service ordered. 
Conventional Service Received bv Shippers 
The conventional service capacity of the railroad 
offering guaranteed service is represented by Q""'. A 
conventional service car shortage (surplus) occurs when the 
aggregate demand for conventional service is greater (less) 
than the conventional service capacity of the railroad. 
During a car surplus, the shipper receives all of the 
conventional service it orders. However, during car 
shortages, each shipper receives the ration quantity of 
conventional rail service, denoted as Q**'/". Equation 5.6 
shows the amount of conventional service a shipper receives 
from a railroad offering guaranteed service. 
ki-min qi^'(p.T,gi) , (5.6) 
where: 
k'j= conventional service the ith shipper receives from a 
railroad offering guaranteed service. 
qj'''= conventional service ordered by the ith shipper. 
Q'''/n= ration quantity of conventional rail service. 
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Shj.pp?y 9eliefs 
Shippers order guaranteed service to insure against the 
possibility of having their conventional car service orders 
rationed. Shippers are assumed to believe they are small 
enough relative to the aggregate that they do not have a 
significant affect on the aggregate demand for guaranteed 
service. When ordering guaranteed service shippers know the 
rail rate, the probability distribution of the future grain 
price, their salvage value z, and their storage costs. 
The salvage value z reveals to the shipper both the 
aggregate demand for guaranteed service and the railroad fleet 
size. First, a low salvage value implies shippers place a 
high value on rail transportation, indicating the possibility 
of a large demand for conventional service when the price of 
grain is revealed. Shippers believe there exists a large 
probability that conventional service will be rationed. 
Consequently, the aggregate demand for guaranteed service 
increases. The aggregate amount of guaranteed service desired 
by shippers is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing 
function of z. For example, in Figure 5.4, if the salvage 
value is z®, the aggregate guaranteed service orders will be 
G®. But, if the salvage value falls to z^, the value of rail 
service rises and shippers increase the aggregate quantity of 
guaranteed service orders to g'*. 
Second, the railroad determines fleet size based on the 
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Aggregate 
guaranteed 
service car order 
G 
b G 
a 
G 
G(2) 
0 
Salvage value z 
Figure 5.4. The relationship between the salvage value z 
and aggregate guaranteed service car orders 6. 
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aggregate amount of guaranteed service ordered. If the 
railroad receives a large number of guaranteed service orders, 
the railroad knows shippers do not have an attractive 
alternative to rail service and expect a larger than average 
demand for conventional service. The railroad accumulates a 
larger fleet of rail cars to serve the larger than average 
expected conventional service demand. Hence, railroad fleet 
size is a monotonically increasing function of the aggregate 
amount of guaranteed service ordered as shown in Figure 5.5. 
If shippers order G" amount of guaranteed service the railroad 
responds with a fleet of R°. But if the amount of guaranteed 
service ordered rises to g'', the railroad increases its fleet 
to R**. Shippers are therefore assumed to know the railroad's 
fleet response to the aggregate amount of guaranteed service 
ordered. 
The shipper upon learning its salvage value z, infers 
both the aggregate demand for guaranteed service and the 
railroad fleet size. Therefore, the shipper is able to 
determine the probability of being rationed. 
The probability of conventional service being rationed is 
equal to the probability of the grain price being above some 
critical level. Let the price, p/, denote the critical price 
of grain given r and z at which the ith shipper conventional 
service demand is equal to the ration quantity of conventional 
service. Grain prices below (above) the critical price, p/, 
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R 
R(G) 
b R' 
a R 
0 
Figure 5.5. The relationship between fleet size R and 
aggregate gruaranteed service car order 6. 
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Indicate shippers (do not) receive their entire conventional 
service car order. 
Let <^ (Q'"/n) denote the shipper's subjective probability 
that its demand for conventional service is less than or equal 
to its rationed share of the conventional service capacity. 
Hence, l-0(Q'"/n) denotes the shipper's subjective probability 
its conventional service car order will be rationed as shown 
in equation 5.7. 
where: 
t=2vT=tariff rate. 
Pj'"= grain price at which the ith shipper demand for 
conventional service equals its ration quantity. 
m(p)=grain price density function. 
Shipper Choice of Guaranteed Service 
Shipper profit depends on the amount of guaranteed and 
conventional service received from the railroad. Recall k',. 
denotes the total amount of conventional service the ith 
-prob|piz+2vx-2vy+2vgi + -^[Q '^']j (5.7) 
-prob(piPi') 
•• 
- J m(p)dp 
Pi' 
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shipper receives from the railroad and g, denotes the amount 
of guaranteed service the ith shipper orders. The railroad is 
assumed to fill all guaranteed car or-ders. Therefore, the ith 
shipper receives gj+k', amount of rail service. The profit of 
the ith shipper, sjr,, from shipping gj+k', by rail and 
salvaging the remaining y-g,-k', grain is shown in equation 
5.8. 
snj-(p-2vT) ig^+k'j) •^ziy-g^-k'j)-viy-g^-k'(5.8) 
Shippers, however, choose guaranteed service before 
knowing the price of grain p. Hence, shippers choose the 
amount of guaranteed service which maximizes their expected 
profits as shown in equation 5.9. 
MaXg^ Ep[{p-2vT) (gi+k'i)+z(y-gi-k'i)-v(y-gi-k'i)2] 
where 
Qi (P/ ^ / Si) , 
n 
k'i-min 
^ 2v 
The first order condition, equation 5.10, states that 
shippers equate the marginal expected benefits from guaranteed 
service during car shortages to the marginal expected loss 
from using guaranteed service when salvaging grain is a more 
attractive alternative. 
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/ 
[p-2vT-z+2v(y-gi-k'i) ] 
dSi )\ 
- 0  
(5.10) 
-^i-0 if k'^-O or — 
9gi n 
—1 otherwise 
The amount of conventional service received by a shipper 
is zero (k'j=0) when the shipper fails to order conventional 
service. If the grain price is below p,°, the shipper will not 
order conventional service. In this case, the amount of 
conventional service received by the shipper is unaffected by 
its choice of guaranteed service. 
Also, shippers believe the ration quantity of 
conventional service is unaffected by the size of its 
guaranteed service order. If the grain price is above Pj*", the 
shipper will receive its ration quantity. Hence, during car 
shortages, shippers believe the amount of conventional service 
it receives (k',=Q'"/n) is unaffected by its choice of 
guaranteed service. 
If the grain price is the interval [p,°,pj'"], an increase 
in the guaranteed service order decreases the conventional 
service order by the same amount. Previously, Figure 5.3 
showed the conventional service order decreasing by the 
guaranteed service order. The first order condition is 
rewritten as equation 5.11. 
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/[p-pi°]m(p)dp+j[p-pi'']in(p)dp -0 
° Pi'  
where 
Pi°-z+2vT-2vy+2vgi 
(5.11) 
Pi'^-z+2vT-2vy+2vgi+2 
Shippers must use all the guaranteed service ordered. 
The cost of guaranteed service to a shipper is the reduced 
flexibility to market its grain once the price of grain is 
revealed. The shipper prefers to salvage grain when the grain 
price falls below p,°. The shipper, however, must use the 
guaranteed rail service which reduces its expected profits. 
Conventional service car shortages occur when the price 
of grain exceeds p/. During- car shortages, shippers receive 
their ration quantity plus the amount of guaranteed service 
ordered. Shippers believe the size of their guaranteed car 
order has no affect on their ration quantity of conventional 
tariff service. Hence, shippers believe guaranteed service 
increases the amount of grain it moves by rail during 
conventional car service shortages, thereby increasing its 
expected profits. 
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Railroad Environment 
This section discusses the conventional service capacity 
of the railroad, the optimal production of conventional 
service, and the railroad's beliefs about conventional service 
demand. 
Conventional Service Caoacitv 
The railroad fleet is divided into the production of 
guaranteed service and the production of conventional service. 
The number of cars used to produce guaranteed service is equal 
to the guaranteed service shippers previously ordered divided 
by the number of trips a rail car in guaranteed service 
completes. The remaining cars are used in the production of 
conventional service. The conventional service capacity of 
the railroad is defined as the conventional service fleet 
multiplied by the number of trips a car in conventional 
service completes. Equation 5.12 shows the conventional 
service capacity, Q""', of the railroad offering guaranteed 
service. 
ttgj (5.12) 
-anR-0G 
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where: 
Q'"'= railroad conventional service capacity. 
R= fleet size. 
G= aggregate quantity of guaranteed service car orders. 
a^= marginal product of a rail car in conventional service. 
Og= marginal product of a car in guaranteed service. 
0=(anj/ag)= ratio of the marginal product of a car in 
conventional service to a car in guaranteed service. 
The ratio of the marginal product of a car in 
conventional service to a car in guaranteed service (0) is 
assumed to be in the interval (0,1]. If 6=1, there are no 
rail car productivity gains from guaranteeing service. In 
this case, the marginal product of a car in conventional 
service is equal to the marginal product of a car in 
guaranteed service. However, if 0<l the railroad is assumed 
to use the additional information it receives from guaranteed 
service car orders to increase the productivity of its cars. 
Traditionally, conventional service car orders do not 
provide the railroad with the commodity to be shipped, the 
corridor the shipment travels, or even if there is a firm 
intent to move grain. Conventional car service orders could 
be canceled without penalty up to 15 days prior to the 
movement (Sperry, 1991). However, with guaranteed service the 
railroad receives certain information as to the commodity 
volume to be shipped,"'the corridor on which it moves, and the 
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future point in time of the movement. The railroad uses this 
additional information to reduce empty mileage and increase 
the efficiency of its cars. 
Railroad Production of Conventional Service 
The production of conventional service by a railroad 
offering guaranteed service is similar to the production under 
the pre-Staggers car allocation system discussed in chapter 4. 
The tariff decision ensures the marginal revenue of a car in 
conventional service continues to exceed its marginal cost. 
Hence, the railroad desires an infinite amount of cars in 
conventional service. However, the cars actually placed into 
service is constrained either by the railroad conventional 
service fleet or shipper demand. The conventional service 
fleet, R-G/ttg, is the maximum number of cars available for the 
production of conventional service, while the minimum number 
of cars needed to satisfy shipper demand for conventional 
service is Q'^'/a^. Therefore, the optimal number of rail cars 
placed in conventional service is denoted as R^*' and is equal 
to min[R-G/aj|,Q'^'/an3 • 
Railroad Subjective Probability When Deciding Fleet Size 
In the pre-Staggers car allocation system, the railroad 
did not know the shipper salvage value z when deciding its 
fleet size. Figure 5.3 showed the aggregate amount of 
guaranteed seirvice ordered by shippers (G) to be a 
monotonically decreasing function of their salvage value z. 
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Hence; by offering guaranteed service the railroad is assumed 
to learn the shipper salvage value from the aggregate quantity 
of guaranteed service car orders. The grain price, however, 
continues to be unknown to the railroad when deciding its 
fleet. Equation 5.13 shows the railroad subjective 
probability that shipper aggregate conventional service demand 
is less than or equal to W is ecpaivalent to the probability 
that the grain price is less than or equal to some critical 
level, p". 
<j) (W) -Prob (0 -prob/psz+2vT-2vy+2vG+-^^\ 
\ n I (5.13) 
-prob(psp*') 
Similarly, the railroad's subjective probability that 
aggregate demand for conventional service is zero (W=0) is 
equal to the probability that the grain price is less than or 
equal to p°(T,z)=z+2vr-2vy+2vG. The railroad's subjective 
probability that its entire fleet will be active (W=Q'"') is 
equal to the probability the grain price is greater than or 
equal to p''(T, z,R) =z+2vT-2vy+2vG+[2vQ'" (R,G,e) ]/n. 
Railroad Subjective Probability When Deciding Tariff Rate 
The railroad chooses its tariff rate before learning the 
shipper salvage value z. The railroad knows the probability 
distributions of the future price of grain p and the shipper 
salvage value z. The railroad uses the joint probability 
distribution to form its subjective beliefs regarding 
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aggregate guaranteed service and aggregate conventional 
service demand. 
Full Model of Guaranteed Service 
The sequence of decisions between the railroad and 
shippers under guaranteed service was shown in Figure 5.1. 
The railroad first chooses the rail rate T. Shippers learn 
their grain salvage value z. From this information shippers 
learn the aggregate demand for guaranteed service and the 
fleet size response of the railroad before ordering guaranteed 
service. Simultaneously, the railroad extracts the shipper 
salvage value z from the aggregate guaranteed service orders 
before choosing its fleet size. 
The aforementioned sequence of decisions is altered to 
simplify the analysis. Figure 5.6 shows the sequence of 
railroad and shipper decisions used to study guaranteed 
service. First, the railroad determines the rail rate T. 
Next, the railroad and shippers learn the shipper salvage 
value. The railroad simultaneously chooses R with the n 
shippers choosing their optimal guaranteed service car order 
g,.. The railroad chooses a fleet given the aggregate 
guaranteed orders, while shippers order guaranteed service 
given the railroad fleet. This new sequence of decisions 
simplifies the analysis and maintains the mathematical and 
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^^^Shippers and railroad learn the grain price 7 
Yes 
No 
Railroad ctiooses a tariff rate T 
Each shipper receives 
Each shipper receives 
cars 
Shippers and railroad learn their salvage value z 
Each shipper salvages 
y - g, - amount of grain 
Each shipper salvages 
y - gj - amount of grain 
Shippers order conventional tariff service qj 
Shippers order guaranteed service g 
Railroad chooses a fleet size R 
Figure 5.6. Modified sequence of decisions with 
guaranteed service. 
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informational structure of the problem. 
The shipper's choice of guaranteed service given a fleet 
size was characterized in equation 5.11. The railroad choice 
of a fleet which maximizes its expected profits given the 
aggregate guaranteed car orders is shown in equation 5.14. 
AraXjj Errii-E^{2vx-b) (a^n+G)-Si?] 
where i?Nmidi?- — 1 
0'''(p,z,x) 
a „ 
(5.14) 
The first order condition is shown in equation 5.15. 
- 0  
aR >1 " aR 
m J (2vT-b) anm(p)dp -B-0 
p'(t,R,G) 
where (5.15) 
p '^-2v'c+z-2vy+ 
2va nR+2v(l-0)G 
n 
«g 
ni(p)- density function of p 
The fleet is fully utilized if the grain price is at 
least p*", while a portion of the fleet remains idle if the 
grain price is below p*". If the fleet is fully utilized, 
adding an extra car increases the number of cars used in 
conventional rail service, R^*, by the extra unit. The 
marginal revenue of a car used in the production of 
conventional service is equal to the marginal revenue per trip 
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(2vr-b) multiplied by the number of trips the extra car 
completes (a^) . If a portion of the fleet is idle, the 
marginal revenue of an additional car is zero. In this case, 
the rail car is not used and the number of cars used in the 
production of conventional service remains unchanged. The 
optimizing condition states the railroad equates the expected 
marginal revenue of a car to the marginal cost of acquiring a 
car (B). 
The railroad optimal fleet condition and the n shipper 
guaranteed car order conditions are solved simultaneously. 
The optimal railroad fleet size and the aggregate guaranteed 
car orders are dependent on the grain salvage value z. The 
railroad, however, chooses its tariff rate to maximize its 
expected profits before knowing z as shown in equation 5.16. 
Max^ Errn-Ep, J(2VT-b) (a „R* +G (T, z))-Br] 
where 
(5.16) 
The first order condition is stated in equation 5.17. 
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|pL-Ep,,2v(«„R„%G)+(«n-^ + |f)(2VT-b) -0 
where 
dx 
0 if R„*-0 (5.17) 
if R *-R—-
a. 
The railroad chooses the tariff rate such that the 
expected marginal profit with respect to the tariff rate 
during car shortages plus the expected marginal profit with 
respect to the tariff rate during car surpluses is equal to 
zero. 
If the grain price is below p", the demand for 
conventional service is zero. Hence, there will not be any 
cars in the production of conventional service. Any 
infinitesimal change in the tariff will not change 
conventional service demand and the number of rail cars in the 
production of conventional service remains at zero. 
If the grain is above p"", the demand for conventional 
service exceeds the conventional service fleet. In this case, 
the entire conventional service fleet is used in the 
production of conventional service. An infintesimial change 
in the tariff rate affects the conventional service fleet only 
through the amount of guaranteed service. The railroad fleet 
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size decision is optimized after the tariff decision. Hence, 
the change in the fleet size (R) due to a change in the tariff 
rate is eliminated by the envelope theorem. 
If the grain price is in the interval [p",?*"], only a 
portion of the conventional service fleet is used to satisfy 
conventional service demand. In this interval, guaranteed 
service demand replaces conventional service demand. The 
shipper demand for conventional under guaranteed service (Q''') 
is equal to the shipper demand for conventional service under 
the pre-Staggers system (Q*') minus the shipper demand for 
guaranteed service (G). 
The first order condition is rewritten in terms of the 
individual random variables p and z as shown in equation 5.18. 
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^2vG (z) + -^ (2VT-b)' 
p'"r 
+ y^2v0 z) + (2VT-b) 
Y (z)in(p) dzdp 
30 
dr 
y (z)m(p)dzdp 
+ J j* 2v[anR+(l-0)G(z) ] Y (z)m(p)dzdp 
pr— 
dG' //J (2VT-b)(1-0) at Y (z)in(p) dzdp-0 
where 
p °-z+2vT-2vy+ 2vG 
n 
2va„R+(1-0)0 
p'^-z+2vT-2vy+ " 
n 
Y ( Z )-density function of z 
(5.18) 
Railroad Decisions With and Without Guaranteed Service 
The differences in the optimizing conditions for the 
railroad with and without guaranteed service will be discussed 
briefly. The railroad fleet size and tariff decisions under 
the pre-Staggers system (Chapter 4) are restated in terms of 
the individual random variables p and z as shown in equations 
5.19 and 5.20. 
an P'' 
--^ 1 k 
(2vT-b)o„-^-B - 0  
"//t (2vT-b) a^] Y (z)m(p)dzdp-B-0 
(5.19) 
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j2va„R„% (2vT-b) -0 
•?3 2vQ'^(p, z) + (2vT-b) dQ'^  dx Y {z)in(p)dzdp 
w w 
+ J J[2va nR]Y ( 2 )m(p) dzdp-0 (5.20) 
p«— 
where 
p °-z+2vv-2vy 
2va „R 
p '^-z+2vT-2vy+-
n 
The railroad tariff rate optimizing conditions with 
guaranteed service (equation 5.18) and without guaranteed 
service (equation 5.20) are different in two ways. First, 
with guaranteed service the railroad takes into account the 
responsiveness of guaranteed service demand to changes in the 
tariff rate. Secondly, railroad capacity and the probability 
the railroad fleet is fully utilized are affected by the rail 
car productivity gains associated with guaranteed service. 
The railroad fleet size optimizing conditions with 
guaranteed service (equation 5.15) and without guaranteed 
service (equation 5.19) are different in three ways. First, 
with guaranteed service, the railroad learns the salvage value 
z of the shipper before choosing a fleet size. The 
uncertainty surrounding the demand for conventional service is 
reduced through the infoirmational gain associated with 
guaranteed service. Second, the probability of the fleet size 
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being fully utilized is affected by the improvements made in 
rail car productivity through guaranteed service. The 
critical grain price at which a given fleet size is fully 
utilized increases with rail car productivity gains. If there 
are no productivity gains from guaranteeing service, 0=1, the 
critical grain price at which a given fleet size is fully 
utilized is not changed from guaranteeing service. Finally, 
any elements of guaranteed service affecting the tariff rate 
also influences the fleet size. 
The following three sections isolate the impacts of 
guaranteed service on the railroad and shipper welfare. The 
three effects of guaranteed service are the shipper 
externality, informational gains, and rail car productivity 
gains. 
Shipper Externality 
Each shipper believes it is small enough that when 
ordering guaranteed service, the aggregate amount of 
guaranteed service ordered is not significantly affected by 
its individual guaranteed car order. As a result, shippers 
believe their ration quantity of conventional tariff service 
is not affected by their individual guaranteed car orders. In 
reality, however, a one unit increase in a guaranteed service 
order does not imply one more unit will be shipped. The 
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increase in an individual guaranteed service order may be 
provided partly at the expense of conventional service. 
Moreover, the decrease in conventional service capacity may be 
large enough to offset the increase in guaranteed service, so 
the total amount of grain hauled remains unchanged during 
periods of high rail demand. Shippers fail to realize the 
affect of their order on the conventional service ration 
quantity available to themselves and all other shippers. 
For example, assume away rail car productivity gains and 
informational effects from guaranteeing service. Hence, 6=1 
and the fleet size remains constant regardless of the amount 
of guaranteed service ordered. In this case, individual 
shippers ordering guaranteed service are worse off than under 
the pre-Staggers program. The shipper believes the expected 
benefits from ordering guaranteed service is the increased 
profits during conventional service car shortages. However, 
in a symmetric equilibrium each shipper increasing g, does 
nothing to decrease the aggregate probability of being 
rationed. In fact, guaranteed service is produced at the 
expense of conventional service. The expected benefits from 
ordering guaranteed service is actually zero. The costs of 
guaranteed service continue to be the flexibility loss in 
marketing grain once the grain price is revealed. Hence, 
shipper expected profit actually falls with guaranteed 
service. 
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Informational Effects 
This section focuses on the informational aspects from 
guaranteeing service. It has been discussed that railroads 
through guaranteeing service are able to extract the 
additional market information held by shippers regarding their 
grain salvage value z. Consequently, the railroad is better 
informed about future shipper demand for conventional tariff 
service and acquires a more suitable fleet. 
To examine the informational impact of guaranteeing 
service, rail car productivity effects are eliminated by 
assuming 6=1. This section is organized in the following 
fashion. First, the relationship between the shipper salvage 
value z and the aggregate guaranteed service order G is 
investigated. For the numerical example, the relationship 
will be shown to be linear, so the railroad observing the 
aggregate amount of guaranteed service ordered learns the 
shipper salvage value. Next, the railroad fleet size response 
to the amount of guaranteed service ordered will also be shown 
to be linear for the numerical example. Hence, shippers upon 
learning their grain salvage value know the railroad fleet and 
calculate the probability of having their conventional car 
service order rationed. Third, the effect of increased demand 
variability on the tariff rate under guaranteed service (0=1) 
is examined. It will be shown for the numerical that 
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guaranteeing service has a stabilizing effect on the tariff 
rate and expected railroad profits. The stabilization is due 
to the linearity of expected railroad profits with respect to 
the shipper salvage value. Fourth, the guaranteed service 
informational impacts on railroad decisions and total welfare 
are examined by comparing the guaranteed service model with 
only informational gains, 6=1, to the pre-Staggers car 
allocation system. Finally, the effect of A,, distribution of 
total constant per unit cost of production between operating 
and capacity costs, on railroad and shipper decisions is 
studied. 
Relationship Between Decisions 
Tables 5.1 through 5.7 show the relationship between the 
shipper salvage value z, the railroad fleet, and the amount of 
guaranteed service ordered by shippers for a given tariff 
rate. For example. Table 5.4 shows 1,391.78 units of 
guaranteed service are purchased when the salvage value is 
$5950 and the tariff rate t=$4862. Equation 5.21 shows the 
negative linear relationship between salvage value z and the 
amount of guaranteed service purchased G. The negative 
relationship shows that the greater the salvage value the less 
attractive rail service will be. Due to rounding, equation 
5.21 does not precisely replicate Table 5.4. 
G-5,641.27-0.7142*2 (5.21) 
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Table 5.1. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with 0.0 £ X < 0.3, 
t=$5000, C=$3000, and 0=1. 
Shipper Railroad Shipper 
Salvage Railroad Guaranteed Expected Expected 
Parameter Fleet Service Profit Profit 
z R G Errw Es»r 
$5650 1,095.26 1,642.89 $3,285,706 $116,394 
5750 1,047.64 1,571.46 3,142,851 117,286 
5850 1,000.02 1,500.03 2,999,997 118,251 
5950 952.40 1,428.60 2,857,143 119,286 
6050 904.78 1,357.17 2,714,289 120,393 
6150 857.16 1,285.74 2,571,434 121,572 
6250 809.54 1,214.31 2,428,580 122,822 
Similarly, the railroad fleet size response to the amount 
of guaranteed service ordered for Table 5.4 is shown in 
equation 5.22. The greater the amount of guaranteed service 
ordered, the lower the shipper salvage value, and the greater 
likelihood of high conventional service demand. Hence, the 
railroad acquires a large fleet when the aggregate guaranteed 
service order is large. 
l?-ie0.42B2 + 0.6668*G (5.22) 
Finally, plugging equation 5.22 into equation 5.21 gives 
the relationship between railroad fleet size and the shipper 
salvage value as shown in equation 5.23. 
R-3942.Q27 - 0,4762*z (5.23) 
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Table 5.2. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with X=0.4, t=$4800, C=$3000, 
and 6=1. 
Shipper 
Salvage 
Parameter 
z 
Railroad 
Fleet 
R 
Guaranteed 
Service 
G 
Railroad 
Expected 
Profit 
Errjr 
Shipper 
Expected 
Profit 
Esir 
$5650 1,190.46 1,785.68 $3,214,205 $119,821 
5750 1,142.84 1,714.25 3,085,719 120,571 
5850 1,095.22 1,642.82 2,957,145 121,392 
5950 1,047.60 1,571.39 2,828,570 122,285 
6050 999.99 1,499.96 2,699,996 123,249 
6150 952.37 1,428.54 2,571,422 124,285 
6250 904.75 1,357.11 2,442,819 125,392 
Table 5.3. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with A,=0.5, t=$4822, C=$3000, 
and 0=1. 
Shipper Railroad Shipper 
Salvage Railroad Guaranteed Expected Expected 
Parameter Fleet Service Profit Profit 
z R G Errw Esjr 
$5650 1,220.08 1,709.85 $3,134,746 $119,731 
5750 1,172.46 1,638.42 3,004,602 120,496 
5850 1,124.84 1,566.99 2,874,458 121,333 
5950 1,077.22 1,495.56 2,744,314 122,242 
6050 1,029.60 1,424.14 2,614,169 123,222 
6150 981.99 1,352.71 2,484,025 124,274 
6250 934.37 1,281.28 2,353,881 125,396 
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Table 5.4. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with X=0.6, t=$4862, C=$3000, 
and 6-1. 
Shipper Railroad Shipper 
Salvage Railroad Guaranteed Expected Expected 
Parameter Fleet Service Profit Profit 
z R G Errw ESJT 
$5650 1,251.27 1,606.06 $3,079,997 $119,343 
5750 1,203.65 1,534.63 2,947,003 120,137 
5850 1,156.09 1,463.20 2,813,999 121,002 
5950 1,108.47 1,391.78 2,681,014 121,940 
6050 1,060.85 1,320.35 2,548,030 122,948 
6150 1,013.18 1,248.92 2,415,026 124,028 
6250 965.56 1,177.49 2,282,032 125,179 
Table 5.5. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with A.=0.7, t=$4901, C=$3000, 
and 6=1. 
Shipper Railroad Shipper 
Salvage Railroad Guaranteed Expected Expected 
Parameter Fleet Service Profit Profit 
z R G Errjr ESTT 
$5650 1,295.11 1,484.91 $3,051,406 $118,975 
5750 1,247.49 1,413.48 2,915,642 119,797 
5850 1,199.87 1,342.05 2,779,878 120,690 
5950 1,152.25 1,270.63 2,644,113 121,655 
6050 1,104.63 1,199.20 2,508,349 122,691 
6150 1,057.01 1,127.77 2,372,585 123,799 
6250 1,009.39 1,056.34 2,236,820 124,978 
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Table 5.6. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with A,=0.8, t=$4938, C=$3000, 
and 0=1. 
Shipper Railroad Shipper 
Salvage Railroad Guaranteed Expected Expected 
Parameter Fleet Service Profit Profit 
z R G Errrr Esnr 
$5650 1,360.61 1,333.65 $3,057,441 $118,628 
5750 1,313.00 1,262.22 2,919,026 119,476 
5850 1,265.38 1,190.79 2,780,612 120,396 
5950 1,217.76 1,119.36 2,642,198 121,388 
6050 1,170.14 1,047.94 2,503,783 122,450 
6150 1,122.52 976.51 2,365,369 123,584 
6250 1,074.90 905.08 2,226,955 124,790 
Table 5.7. Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit under 
Guaranteed Service with A.=0.9, t=$4973, C=$3000, 
and 0=1. 
Shipper Railroad Shipper 
Salvage Railroad Guaranteed Expected Expected 
Parameter Fleet Service Profit Profit 
z R G Errrr ESJT 
$5650 1,473.59 1,114.58 $3,114,916 $118,294 
5750 1,425.97 1,043.15 2,974,021 119,167 
5850 1,378.35 971.73 2,833,127 120,112 
5950 1,330.74 900.30 2,692,233 121,128 
6050 1,283.12 828.87 2,551,339 122,215 
6150 1,235.50 757.44 2,410,444 123,374 
6250 1,187.88 686.01 2,269,550 124,605 
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Equation 5.21 shows how the railroad is able to extract 
the shipper salvage value from the guaranteed service orders. 
Equation 5.22 shows the railroad fleet size response to the 
aggregate amount of guaranteed service ordered. The railroad 
uses the shipper salvage information in making capacity 
decisions. Hence, the shipper upon learning its salvage value 
z also knows the railroad fleet size as shown in equation 
5.23. 
The Demand Variabilitv Effects Without Productivity Gains 
Under the pre-Staggers system, an increase in demand 
variability through the shipper salvage value decreased the 
tariff rate and expected railroad profit but the direction of 
the change in the fleet size was indeterminate. The numerical 
example shows that in a rail car ordering system offering 
conventional tariff service and guaranteed service, the 
variability of demand has no affect on the tariff rate and 
expected railroad profits. Hence, offering guaranteed service 
not only allows shippers to insure against rationing but also 
stabilizes the railroad tariff rate and railroad expected 
profit. 
Table 5.8 shows the value of r and expected railroad 
profit for various values of k and salvage value spreads. The 
spread (c) indicates the three shipper salvage values to be 
Ez-e, Ez, and Ez+e, where the expected value of z (Ez) is 
equal to $5950. The tariff rate and expected railroad profit 
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Table 5.8. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on Expected 
Railroad and Shipper Profit, C=$3000 and 6=1. 
Ratio 
of 
Costs 
A 
Spread 
e 
Tariff 
Rate 
t Errw ESJT 
Total 
Ew 
0.0 
100 
200 
300 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
119,310 
119,382 
119,501 
2,976,453 
2,976,525 
2,976,644 
0.1 
100 
200 
300 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
119,310 
119,382 
119,501 
2,976,453 
2,976,525 
2,976,644 
0.2 
100 
200 
300 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
119,310 
119,382 
119,501 
2,976,453 
2,976,525 
2,976,644 
0.3 
100 
200 
300 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
119,310 
119,382 
119,501 
2,976,453 
2,976,453 
2,976,644 
0.4 
100 
200 
300 
4,800 
4,800 
4,800 
2,828,570 
2,828,570 
2,828,570 
122,309 
122,380 
122,499 
2,950,879 
2,950,950 
2,951,059 
0.5 
100 
200 
300 
4,822 
4,822 
4,822 
2,744,314 
2,744,314 
2,744,314 
122,266 
122,337 
122,456 
2,866,580 
2,866,651 
2,866,770 
0.6 
100 
200 
300 
4,862 
4,862 
4,862 
2,681,014 
2,681,014 
2,681,014 
121,963 
122,035 
122,154 
2,802,977 
2,803,049 
2,803,168 
0.7 
100 
200 
300 
4,901 
4,901 
4,901 
2,644,113 
2,644,113 
2,644,113 
121,679 
121,750 
121,869 
2,765,792 
2,765,863 
2,765,982 
0.8 
100 
200 
300 
4,938 
4,938 
4,938 
2,642,198 
2,642,198 
2,642,198 
121,411 
121,483 
121,602 
2,763,609 
2,763,681 
2,763,800 
0.9 
100 
200 
300 
4,973 
4,973 
4,973 
2,692,233 
2,692,233 
2,692,233 
121,152 
121,223 
121,342 
2,813,385 
2,813,456 
2,813,575 
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are constant regardless of the salvage value spread. There 
exists, however, an E* large enough such that the tariff rate 
and expected railroad profits increase. In this case, the 
railroad increases its tariff rate and expected profit by 
selling services only during periods very high demand, i.e. 
the shipper salvage value is extremely low. 
The stabilization of railroad tariff rate and expected 
profit is due to the linearity existing in the numerical 
example. The relationships between guaranteed service orders 
and shipper salvage value (equation 5.21) and between railroad 
fleet size and shipper salvage value (equation 5.23) are 
linear. Using Table 5.4 the relationship between expected 
railroad profit and shipper salvage value is shown in equation 
5.24. 
£?rrii-10,594,174.458- (1,329. 943 *z) (5.24) 
The implications of this linearity is that the optimal 
tariff rate and maximum expected profits will remain unchanged 
given a mean preserving spread of the salvage value z, as 
shown in equation 5.25. 
£'p[rr7ilgj-£p Jrrii] (5.25) 
Simulation Results of Informational Effects 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the expected railroad and 
shipper profit for a car allocation system with guaranteed 
171 
service and the pre-Staggers system. The informational effect 
of guaranteed service is to increase expected railroad profit. 
The increase in expected railroad profits is due to tariff 
rate changes, the ability to lock in business, and the ability 
to acquire a more appropriate conventional service fleet. 
In Table 5.11, when capacity costs are relatively high 
(A,^0.3) the tariff rate is greater with guaranteed service 
than in the pre-Staggers system. In these instances, 
conventional service demand at the pre-Staggers tariff rate is 
insufficient for the railroad to acquire a conventional 
service fleet. Also, the guaranteed service demand at the 
pre-Staggers rate is too high for the railroad to maximize 
profits. The choice of a tariff rate for a scheduled carrier 
automatically implies a fleet size, since the railroad must 
acquire enough capacity to satisfy all guaranteed service 
demand. To increase its profits beyond the pre-Staggers 
level, the railroad increases the tariff rate to choke off 
demand for guaranteed service. 
When capacity costs are lower and the fear of rationing 
is decreased, the railroad produces guaranteed and 
conventional service. In order to lock in business and 
encourage shippers to purchase guaranteed service without full 
knowledge of grain market conditions, the railroad decreases 
its tariff rate. In these cases, the tariff rate with 
guaranteed service is lower than in the pre-Staggers system. 
Table 5.9. The Informational Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad and 
Shipper Expected Profits for 0.0 < A, < 0.4. 
Guaranteed Service Pre-Staaaers 
Total Total 
k JE Errjr Esff ErrTT ESff 1*1 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 1,942,197 122,545 2,064,742 
0. 0 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 1,923,545 122,626 2,046,171 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 1,892,971 122,759 2,015,730 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 1,981,791 122,444 2,104,235 
0. 1 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 1,963,895 122,524 2,086,419 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 1,934,539 122,658 2,057,197 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 2,025,860 122,333 2,148,193 
0. 2 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 2,008,122 122,415 2,130,537 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 1,980,831 122,548 2,103,379 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 2,075,354 122,211 2,197,565 
0. 3 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 2,059,269 122,292 2,181,561 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 2,032,854 122,426 2,155,280 
100 2,828,570 122,309 2,950,879 2,131,552 122,076 2,253,628 
0. 4 200 2,828,570 122,380 2,950,950 2,116,571 122,157 2,238,728 
300 2,828,570 122,499 2,951,059 2,091,960 122,289 2,214,249 
Table 5.10. The Informational Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad and 
Shipper Expected Profits for 0.5 < k < 0.9. 
Guaranteed Service Pre-Staaaers 
0.5 
100 
200 
300 
Errw 
2,744,314 
2,744,314 
2,744,314 
Esff 
122,266 
122,337 
122,456 
Total 
Ev 
2,866,580 
2,866,651 
2,866,770 
Ernr 
2,196,229 
2,182,529 
2,160,025 
EST 
Total 
ES. 
121,926 2,318,155 
122,007 2,304,536 
122,138 2,282,163 
100 2,681,014 121, 963 2,802,977 2,271,956 121,758 2,393,714 
0. 6 200 2,681,014 122, 035 2,803,049 2,259,771 121,836 2,381,607 
300 2,681,014 122, 154 2,803,168 2,239,768 121,968 2,361,736 
100 2,644,113 121, 679 2,765,792 2,362,707 121,569 2,484,276 
0. 7 200 2,644,113 121, 750 2,765,863 2,352,353 121,647 2,474,000 
300 2,644,113 121, 869 2,765,982 2,335,384 121,777 2,457,161 
100 2,642,198 121, 411 2,763,609 2,475,237 121,359 2,596,596 
0, 8 200 2,642,198 121, 483 2,763,681 2,467,170 121,437 2,588,607 
300 2,642,198 121, 602 2,763,800 2,453,997 121,562 2,575,559 
100 2,692,233 121, 152 2,813,385 2,623,288 121,129 2,744,417 
0. 9 200 2,692,233 121, 223 2,813,456 2,618,239 121,202 2,739,441 
300 2,692,233 121, 342 2,813,575 2,610,071 121,322 2,731,393 
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Table 5.11. The Informational Effect of Guaranteed 
Service on the Tariff Rate, C=$3000. 
Guaranteed Pre-
g^rvApe St^qq^rs 
Tariff Tariff 
X e t t 
100 5,000 4,802 
o
 
•
 
o
 
200 5,000 4,797 
300 5,000 4,790 
100 5,000 4,817 
0.1 200 5,000 4,813 
300 5,000 4,806 
100 5,000 4,833 
0.2 200 5,000 4,829 
300 5,000 4,823 
100 5,000 4,850 
0.3 200 5,000 4,846 
300 5,000 4,841 
100 4,800 4,868 
0.4 200 4,800 4,865 
300 4,800 4,860 
100 4,822 4,887 
0.5 200 4,822 4,885 
300 4,822 4,881 
100 4,862 4,908 
0.6 200 4,862 4,096 
300 4,862 4,903 
100 4,901 4,931 
0.7 200 4,901 4,929 
300 4,901 4,927 
100 4,938 4,955 
0.8 200 4,938 4,954 
300 4,938 4,952 
100 4,973 4,979 
0.9 200 4,973 4,979 
300 4,973 4,978 
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The Informational effect on railroad capacity is shown in 
Tables 5.12 through 5.15. The railroad acquires a more 
appropriate capacity level with the additional information 
provided by guaranteed service. Total railroad capacity is 
allowed to decrease (increase) when the shipper salvage value 
is higher (lower) than average. Also, conventional tariff 
service capacity decreases with the introduction of guaranteed 
service as shippers substitute guaranteed service for tariff 
service. In this manner, the lost sales from insufficient 
capacity and investments in idle equipment are reduced. 
Hence, expected railroad profit always increases from the 
informational effect on railroad capacity. 
The informational effect of guaranteed service on 
expected shipper profits depends on whether unit capacity 
costs are high or low relative to unit operating costs. If 
unit capacity costs are relatively high (A.<0.4), shippers are 
worse off with guaranteed service than under the pre-Staggers 
system. In these cases, expected shipper profit with 
guaranteed service is lower than the pre-Staggers level 
because guaranteed service is offered totally at the expense 
of conventional tariff service. Shippers lose marketing 
flexibility when only guaranteed service is produced. Also, 
in some instances, the tariff rate is higher with guaranteed 
service than the pre-Staggers tariff rate. This further 
decreases the expected shipper profit. 
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Table 5.12. The Informational Effects of Guaranteed Service 
on Railroad Capacity for A.=0.0, 0.1, and 0.2. 
Guaranteed Service Prei-staq. 
Conv. Guar. Total Conv. 
X 
€ 
z Caoacitv Caoacitv Canacitv 
5850 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
100 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,412.22 
6050 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
5750 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0. 0 200 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,411.41 
6150 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
5650 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
300 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,409.91 
6250 0.0 1,214.31 1,214.31 
5850 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
100 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,436.51 
6050 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
5750 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0. 1 200 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,436.19 
6150 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
5650 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
300 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,435.59 
6250 0.0 1,214.31 1,214.31 
5850 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
100 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,464.27 
6050 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
5750 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0. 2 200 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,464.60 
6150 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
5650 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
300 5950 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 1,464.99 
6250 0.0 1,214.31 1,214.31 
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Table 5.13. The Informational Effects of Guaranteed Service 
on Railroad Capacity for A.=0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. 
Guaranteed Service Pre-Staa. 
X € 2 
Conv. 
Caoacitv 
Guar. 
Canacitv 
Total 
Capacity 
Conv. 
Caoacitv 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,500.03 
1,428.60 
1,357.17 
1,500.03 
1,428.60 
1,357.17 
1,496.46 
0. 3 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,571.46 
1,428.60 
1,285.74 
1,571.46 
1,428.60 
1,285.74 
1,497.47 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,642.89 
1,428.60 
1,214.31 
1,642.89 
1,428.60 
1,214.31 
1,499.09 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,642.82 
1,571.39 
1,499.96 
1,642.83 
1,571.40 
1,499.97 
1,534.52 
0. 4 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,714.25 
1,571.39 
1,428.54 
1,714.26 
1,571.40 
1,428.55 
1,536.36 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,785.68 
1,571.39 
1,357.11 
1,785.69 
1,571.40 
1,357.12 
1,539.30 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
120.27 
120.27 
120.27 
1,566.99 
1,495.56 
1,424.14 
1,687.26 
1,615.83 
1,544.41 
1,580.51 
0. 5 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
120.27 
120.27 
120.27 
1,638.42 
1,495.56 
1,352.71 
1,758.69 
1,615.83 
1,472.98 
1,583.34 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
120.27 
120.27 
120.27 
1,709.85 
1,495.56 
1,281.28 
1,830.12 
1,615.83 
1,401.55 
1,587.99 
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Table 5.14. The Informational Effects of Guaranteed Seirvice 
on Railroad Capacity for A.=0.6, 0.7, and 0.8. 
Guaranteed Service Pre-Staa. 
Conv. Guar. Total Conv. 
k e Z Caoacitv Caoacitv Capacity Cacacitv 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
270.85 
270.85 
270.85 
1,463.20 
1,391.78 
1,320.35 
1,734.05 
1,662.63 
1,591.20 
1,637.94 
0. 6 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
270.85 
270.85 
270.85 
1,534.63 
1,391.78 
1,248.92 
1,805.48 
1,662.63 
1,519.77 
1,641.96 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
270.85 
270.85 
270.85 
1,606.06 
1,391.78 
1,177.49 
1,876.91 
1,662.63 
1,448.34 
1,648.73 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
457.75 
457.75 
457.75 
1,342.05 
1,270.63 
1,199.20 
1,799.80 
1,728.38 
1,656.95 
1,713.09 
0. 7 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
457.75 
457.75 
457.75 
1,413.48 
1,270.63 
1,127.77 
1,871.23 
1,728.38 
1,585.52 
1,718.75 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
457.75 
457.75 
457.75 
1,484.91 
1,270.63 
1,056.34 
1,942.66 
1,728.38 
1,514.09 
1,728.20 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
707.27 
707.27 
707.27 
1,190.79 
1,119.36 
1,047.94 
1,898.06 
1,826.63 
1,755.21 
1,819.46 
0. 8 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
707.27 
707.27 
707.27 
1,262.22 
1,119.36 
976.51 
1,969.49 
1,826.63 
1,683.78 
1,827.39 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
707.27 
707.27 
707.27 
1,333.65 
1,119.36 
905.08 
2,040.92 
1,826.63 
1,612.35 
1,840.47 
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Table 5.15. The Informational Effects of Guaranteed Service 
on Railroad Capacity for A.=0.9. 
GMarant^^d gervigg prg-gt^gt 
A c Z 
Conv. 
Caoacity 
Guar. 
Caoacitv 
Total 
Cacacitv 
Conv. 
Caoacitv 
100 
5850 
5950 
6050 
1,095.80 
1,095.80 
1,095.80 
971.73 
900.30 
828.87 
2,067.53 
1,996.10 
1,924.67 
1,995.99 
0.9 200 
5750 
5950 
6150 
1,095.80 
1,095.80 
1,095.80 
1,043.15 
900.30 
757.44 
2,138.95 
1,996.10 
1,853.24 
2,007.42 
300 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,095,80 
1,095.80 
1,095.80 
1,114.58 
900.30 
686.01 
2,210.38 
1,996.10 
1,781.81 
2,026.28 
Shippers, however, are better off with guaranteed service 
when the railroad offers guaranteed service as well as 
conventional tariff service. In these cases, capacity costs 
are relatively lower (A>0.4) and the railroad decreases its 
tariff rate from the pre-Staggers rate. Both the lower tariff 
rate and increased service offerings cause expected shipper 
profit to increase beyond the pre-Staggers level. 
Total welfare and expected railroad profits are higher 
with guaranteed service than under the pre-Staggers system, 
regardless of the distribution of capacity and operating 
costs. If a portion of the railroad gains are transferred to 
shippers to offset their losses, all parties are made better 
off with guaranteed service. 
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Effect of A with the Tariff Rate and Salvage Value Constant 
This section presents the effects of increasing X on the 
railroad capacity decision and the shipper choice of 
guaranteed service holding the tariff rate and shipper salvage 
value constant. The railroad capacity decision and the 
shipper choice of guaranteed service are made simultaneously. 
The railroad and shippers choose a best response given the 
others' decision. Recall, that with X=0, the unit operating 
cost is zero and the unit capacity cost is the entire unit 
cost of production. Assume the tariff rate is at a level such 
that at A,=0, only guaranteed service is produced. In other 
words, the tariff rate is assumed to be at a level where there 
is no incentive for the railroad to acquire a conventional 
service fleet. Hence, at the given tariff rate, conventional 
service demand is insufficient and the high capacity costs 
overwhelm the large expected operating profit from producing 
conventional service. 
As A increases, the rise in unit operating costs equals 
the fall in unit capacity costs. The decrease in expected 
marginal operating profit from producing conventional service 
is less than the decrease in unit capacity costs, since the 
probability of producing conventional service is less than 
one. Hence, holding the tariff rate and shipper salvage value 
constant, an increase in A, serves to increase the incentive 
for the railroad to acquire a conventional service fleet. 
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Assume there exists some such that the railroad 
begins to acquire a conventional service fleet at the assumed 
tariff rate and shipper salvage value. Hence, when A.6[0,A.|,], 
there Is no Incentive to a acquire a conventional service 
fleet, the probability of having a conventional service order 
rationed is equal to 1, the amount guaranteed service produced 
remains constant, and the railroad profit is also constant. 
The railroad is a scheduled carrier. 
As k increases beyond A.g, the railroad acquires a 
conventional service fleet, which decreases the probability of 
having a conventional service order rationed, causing the 
amount of guaranteed service purchased to decrease. The 
Increase in conventional service capacity is larger than the 
decrease in the amount of guaranteed service purchased, so 
that total railroad capacity rises. The loss in profit from 
reduced guaranteed service sales exceeds the gain in expected 
profit from increased conventional service sales. Hence, 
expected railroad profit decreases. 
However, as A. Increases to some A,,, the Increase in 
conventional service capacity is large enough such that 
expected railroad profit increases. In these cases, the gain 
in expected profit from conventional service exceeds the loss 
in profit from guaranteed sales. In this Interval [A,,,l], the 
cost of adding conventional service capacity is low enough 
allowing the railroad to add capacity and gain sales when the 
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grain price is high. The additional conventional service 
capacity, however, decreases the amount of guaranteed service 
purchased causing the railroad to lose sales when the grain 
price is low. The increase in expected conventional service 
sales exceeds the expected loss in guaranteed service sales. 
In Figure 5.7, the loss in railroad profit from reduced 
guaranteed sales occurs when the resulting grain price is in 
the interval [0, p®], where p®=z+2vT-2vy+2vG/n. If guaranteed 
sales decrease from G to G', the loss in sales is (G-G*) when 
the grain price is in the interval [0,p°'] and [G-G'-Q*''(p) ] 
when the grain price is in the interval [p'^p®], where 
p'''=z+2vT-2vy+2vG'/n and is the corresponding conventional 
service demand. For grain prices in the interval [p^/p*"], 
where p'"=z+2vT-2vy+2va^R/n, the decrease in guaranteed service 
produced equals the increase in the amount of conventional 
service produced. 
The gain in railroad profit from increased conventional 
service capacity (i.e. increasing fleet size R) occurs when 
the resulting grain price is high. If the fleet size 
increases from R to R', sales increase [Q'''(p)-a„R] when the 
grain price is the interval [p'",p'"] and increase a^(R'-R) 
whenever the grain price is greater than p*"', where p'"=z+2vT-
2vy+2vaj,R'/"• 
Table 5.16 reviews the effect of increasing X on the 
railroad capacity decision and shipper choice of guaranteed 
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Total sales 
(in carloads) 
Q + G 
am 
Q + G 
Loss 
Grain price p 
Figure 5.7. The effect of increasing R to r'and 
decreasing 6 to g'on total sales. 
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service holding the tariff rate and shipper salvage parameter 
constant. For A,=0, it is assumed there is no incentive to 
acquire a conventional service fleet. At first, increasing 
unit operating costs and decreasing unit capacity costs leaves 
all the variables unchanged. The "NC" in Table 5.16 means no 
change in the variable and a "0" implies the variable is equal 
to zero when A, is in the corresponding interval. Eventually, 
at the incentive to acquire a conventional service fleet 
appears. Conventional service capacity increases, the 
probability of having a conventional service order rationed 
decreases, the amount of guaranteed service decreases, total 
railroad capacity increases, and expected railroad profit 
decreases. However, at A.=X,, expected railroad profit begins 
to increase. 
Table 5.16. Effect of k Holding Tariff Rate and Shipper 
Salvage Value Constant. 
Conv. Ration Guar. Total 
Lambda Capacity Pro)3t Service qjipe^city Errw 
[ 0, A.(,] 0 NC NC NC NC 
~ ~ [ A , ,  1  ]  +  -  -  +  +  
The Effect of A. on Optimal Railroad and Shipper Decisions 
In Table 5.17, the numerical results indicate that when A, 
is less than or ecjual 0.33, the railroad is a scheduled 
carrier. All grain is moved using guaranteed service and the 
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railroad does not acquire a fleet for conventional tariff 
service. In this case, the profit margin for a car producing 
a conventional service trip is large, but the probability of 
the car being used in conventional service is too small to 
offset the high costs of acquiring a car. 
Table 5.17. Relationship Between Optimal Decisions and A.. 
Shipper Salvage Value= $5950 
Range 
k Tau Esir 
Guar. 
Cap, 
Conv. 
Cat). 
Total 
Cap. 
0.00 
to 
0.33 
NC NC NC NC 0 NC 
0.34 
to 
0.40 
-
- + + 0 + 
0.41 
to 
0.76 
+ - - - + + 
0.77 
to 
0.99 
+ + - - + + 
The distribution of total costs between operating costs 
and capacity costs, for ^6[0,0.33], has no affect on the 
decisions of the railroad. The railroad sets the tariff rate 
knowing it will acquire a fleet large enough to satisfy the 
demand for guaranteed service in each of the three states of 
demand. The problem is similar to the deterministic pre-
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Staggers case of the railroad choosing its tariff rate knowing 
it will acquire a fleet large enough to satisfy shipper 
conventional service demand. In each case, the choice of a 
fleet is determined by the tariff rate. Therefore, the total 
constant cost of producing a unit of output is important, not 
the breakdown between operating and capacity costs. 
For Act0,0.33], the probability of having a conventional 
service order rationed is equal to one, since the tariff rate 
remains constant and there is not an incentive to acquire a 
conventional service fleet. Therefore, the amount of 
guaranteed service purchased by shippers and the expected 
shipper profit remains constant. 
From the discussion in the previous section, as X 
increases beyond 0.33 and holding the tariff rate constant, 
the railroad begins to acquire a conventional service fleet. 
The larger conventional service fleet decreases the 
probability shippers are rationed. The amount of guaranteed 
service purchased decreases and expected railroad profit 
decreases. In response, the railroad decreases its tariff 
rate to recapture the lost sales of guaranteed service. 
The lower tariff rate causes three reactions to the 
incentive of acquiring a conventional service fleet. First, 
the reduction in the tariff rate decreases the marginal 
revenue of a car, which reduces the incentive to acquire a 
conventional service fleet. Second, a lower tariff rate 
187 
Increases guaranteed service orders which decreases the 
probability a car is used in conventional service, since 
conventional service demand is reduced. This also reduces the 
incentive to acquire a conventional service fleet. Third, the 
lower tariff rate also increases conventional service demand 
which increases the probability a car is used in conventional 
service. This final reaction increases the incentive to 
acquire a conventional service fleet. These conflicting 
reactions cause the affect on the probability a car is used in 
conventional service to be indeterminate. 
The results, however, indicate for values of A, e[0.34, 
0.40], as the tariff rate falls, the incentive for the 
railroad to acquire a conventional service fleet disappears. 
In these instances, the railroad lowers it tariff rate in 
order to continue operating as a scheduled carrier. The lower 
tariff rate increases the amount of guaranteed service 
purchased. The railroad profit from increased guaranteed 
service sales is greater than the loss in expected profit from 
decreased conventional service sales. Hence, railroad profit 
is maximized by lowering its tariff rate and operating as a 
scheduled carrier. 
For the interval Xe[0.34,0.40], expected railroad profit 
decreases as X increases. The lower tariff rate increases 
guaranteed sales, but total railroad profit decreases. 
Expected shipper profit, on the other hand, increases as the 
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lower tariff rate more than offsets the loss In marketing 
flexibility due to Increased guaranteed service sales. 
As X, continues to Increase beyond 0.4, the Incentive to 
recapture lost guaranteed service sales by lowering the tariff 
rate disappears because of shrinking profit margins on 
guaranteed service. The railroad begins to increase its 
tariff rate. The effect of an Increased tariff on the 
incentive to acquire a conventional service fleet is again 
indeterminate. The results indicate that the lower capacity 
costs and higher profit margins give the railroad the 
incentive to acquire a larger conventional service capacity. 
The higher tariff rate and larger conventional service 
capacity decreases guaranteed service sales. The total 
railroad capacity increases, since the Increase in 
conventional service capacity more than offsets the decrease 
in guaranteed service sales. 
For A.c[0.41, 0.76], expected railroad and expected 
shipper profit decrease as k increases. In these cases, the 
loss in expected profit from decreased guaranteed service 
sales is greater than the gain in expected profit from 
increased conventional service sales. However, when k is 
greater than or equal to 0.77, expected railroad profit 
increases. In these Instances, capacity costs are very low. 
The railroad acquires an even larger conventional service 
fleet, enabling the gain in expected profit from Increased 
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conventional service sales to be larger than the loss 
expected profit from the decreased guaranteed service 
in 
sales. 
Rail Car Productivity Effects 
This section examines the effect of rail car productivity 
improvements from guaranteeing service. Guaranteeing service 
provides railroads with new information concerning the 
specific origins and destinations of future movements. With 
the exact origin and destination of guaranteed future 
movements, the railroad moves empty cars directly to the next 
point of origin. Conventional tariff service does not provide 
the railroad with future origins or destinations and the 
railroad does not know if the movement will actually occur. 
Empty cars in conventional service are moved to where the 
railroad believes will be the next point of origin. Since, 
the railroad may receive wrong or clouded signals from 
shippers with conventional service, guaranteed service 
enhances the productivity of rail cars by reducing empty 
mileage. 
Rail car productivity effects are examined by using the 
guaranteed model in the previous section and assuming the 
trips completed by a car in guaranteed service are 10 percent 
greater than the trips completed by a car in conventional 
tariff service, 6=(ajyag) = (1.5/1.65)=0.91. The previous model 
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assumed the number of trips completed by a car in conventional 
service equals the number of trips completed by a car in 
guaranteed service, a„=aj=1.5 and 0=1. Next, the analysis 
examines the effects of demand variability on railroad 
expected profits and tariff rates under guaranteed service 
with productivity gains. Finally, the effects of k on 
railroad and shipper decisions is examined in the presence of 
productivity gains. 
Simulation Results for Rail Car Productivitv Gains 
Tables 5.18 and 5.19 show expected railroad profit, 
expected shipper profit, and total welfare in the absence of 
productivity gains and in the presence of a 10 percent 
increase in rail car productivity from guaranteeing service. 
Expected railroad profits increase and expected shipper 
profits do not decrease as a result of the productivity gains. 
Hence, for all values of X, total welfare increases due to the 
productivity gains. 
Tables 5.20 and 5.21 show the railroad tariff rate with 
and without rail car productivity gains. The railroad 
decreases its tariff rate except in a few cases. The railroad 
decreases the tariff rate in order to attract more guaranteed 
service. Productivity gains implies the capacity costs per 
unit of guaranteed service is reduced. Consequently, a unit 
of guaranteed service is cheaper to produce than a unit of 
conventional service. 
Table 5.18. The Productivity Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad and 
Shipper Expected Profits for 0.0 < A < 0.4. 
Guaranteed Service 
No Productivity Gain 
Guaranteed Service 
Productivity Gain - 10% 
0 . 0  
100 
200 
300 
grrw 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
2,857,143 
119,310 
119,382 
119,501 
Total 
E2L 
2,976,453 
2,976,525 
2,976,644 
Errff 
3,260,035 
3,260,035 
3,260,035 
Est 
Total 
121,325 3,381,360 
121,396 3,381,431 
121,515 3,381,550 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 3,218, 551 121,116 3,339,667 
0. 1 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 3,218, 551 121,187 3,339,738 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 3,218, 551 121,306 3,339,857 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 3,177, 332 120,911 3,298,243 
0. 2 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 3,177, 332 120,982 3,298,314 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 3,177, 332 121,101 3,298,433 
100 2,857,143 119,310 2,976,453 3,136, 378 120,707 3,257,085 
0. 3 200 2,857,143 119,382 2,976,525 3,136, 378 120,778 3,257,156 
300 2,857,143 119,501 2,976,644 3,136, 378 120,897 3,257,275 
100 2,828,570 122,309 2,950,879 3,085, 707 122,309 3,208,016 
0. 4 200 2,828,570 122,380 2,950,950 3,085, 707 122,380 3,208,087 
300 2,828,570 122,499 2,951,059 3,085, 707 122,499 3,208,206 
Table 5.19. The Productivity Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad and 
Shipper Expected Profits for 0.5 < X < 0.9. 
Guaranteed Service 
No Productivity Gain 
Total 
X Errjr Esff in 
100 2,744,314 122,266 2,866^ 
0. 5 200 2,744,314 122,337 2,866 
300 2,744,314 122,456 2,866 
100 2,681,014 121,963 2,802 
0. 6 200 2,681,014 122,035 2,803 
300 2,681,014 122,154 2,803 
100 2,644,113 121,679 2,765 
0. 7 200 2,644,113 121,750 2,765 
300 2,644,113 121,869 2,765 
100 2,642,198 121,411 2,763 
0. 8 200 2,642,198 121,483 2,763 
300 2,642,198 121,602 2,763 
Guaranteed Service 
Productivity Gain - 10% 
Total 
Ernr Esff £21 
2,953,975 
2,953,975 
2,953,975 
123,701 
123,773 
123,892 
3,077,676 
3,077,748 
3,077,867 
2,836,363 
2,836,363 
2,836,363 
123,058 
123,130 
123,249 
2,959,421 
2,959,493 
2,959,612 
2,749,978 
2,749,978 
2,749,978 
122,465 
122,536 
122,655 
2,872,443 
2,872,514 
2,872,633 
2,704,060 
2,704,060 
2,704,060 
121,911 
121,983 
122,102 
2,825,971 
2,826,043 
2,826,162 
580 
651 
770 
977 
049 
168 
792 
863 
982 
609 
681 
800 
100 2,692,233 121,152 2,813,385 2,716,977 121,390 2,838,367 
0.9 200 2,692,233 121,223 2,813,456 2,716,977 121,461 2,838,438 
300 2,692,233 121,342 2,813,575 2,716,977 121,581 2,838,558 
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Table 5.20. The Productivity Effect of Guaranteed 
Service un the Tariff Rate, C=$3000. 
Productivity Productivity 
Gain - 0% 
Tariff Tariff 
X 
€ 
t t 
100 5,000 4,858 
0.0 200 5,000 4,858 
300 5,000 4,858 
100 5,000 4,877 
0.1 200 5,000 4,877 
300 5,000 4,877 
100 5,000 4,891 
0.2 200 5,000 4,891 
300 5,000 4,891 
100 5,000 4,904 
0.3 200 5,000 4,904 
300 5,000 4,904 
100 4,800 4,800 
0.4 200 4,800 4,800 
300 4,800 4,800 
100 4,822 4,727 
0.5 200 4,822 4,727 
300 4,822 4,727 
100 4,862 4,788 
0.6 200 4,862 4,788 
300 4,862 4,788 
100 4,901 4,847 
0.7 200 4,901 4,847 
300 4,901 4,847 
100 4,938 4 ,904 
0.8 200 4,938 4,904 
300 4,938 4,904 
100 4,973 4,956 
0.9 200 4,973 4,956 
300 4,973 4,956 
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Table 5.21. The Productivity Effect of Guaranteed 
Service on the Tariff Rate, C=$3000, 
and 6=100. 
Productivity Productivity 
gain - Ot gain - 3,0% 
Tariff Tariff 
X t t 
0.30 5,000 4,904 
0.31 5,000 4,906 
0. 32 5,000 4,907 
0.33 5,000 4,909 
0.34 4,980 4,910 
0.35 4,950 4,911 
0.36 4,920 4,913 
0.37 4,890 4,802 
0.38 4,860 4,860 
0. 39 4,830 4,830 
0.40 4,800 4,800 
0.41 4,785 4,770 
0.42 4,790 4,740 
0.43 4,793 4,710 
0.44 4,798 4,687 
0.45 4,802 4,695 
0.46 4,805 4,701 
0.47 4,810 4,708 
0.48 4,814 4,714 
0.49 4,818 4,721 
0.50 4,822 4,727 
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In a few cases, the railroad leaves the tariff rate 
unaltered. The railroad produces the same guaranteed output 
at the same tariff but at a lower cost. The railroad absorbs 
the entire efficiency gains from the Increased productivity of 
rail cars in guaranteed service. 
Tables 5.22 through 5.25 shows the conventional service 
and guaranteed service capacity of the railroad with and 
without the 10 percent productivity gain. The guaranteed 
service capacity with productivity gains is always greater 
than or equal to the case without productivity gains. The 
increase in guaranteed service capacity is greatest when 
capacity costs are relatively high, e.g., A=0.0, 0.1, and 0.2. 
In these cases, all of the grain hauled by the railroad Is 
through guaranteed service. Once again, the productivity 
gains Implies a reduction in the per unit costs of acquiring a 
car for guaranteed service. The railroad increases the amount 
of guaranteed service demanded by decreasing its tariff rate 
and acquires a larger guaranteed service capacity. 
Simulation results also indicate guaranteed service 
productivity gains reduces the incentive for the railroad to 
acquire conventional service capacity. Tables 5.22 through 
5.2 5 show the conventional service capacity decreasing and the 
guaranteed service capacity increasing. The increase in 
guaranteed service capacity more than offsets the decrease in 
conventional service capacity, so total railroad capacity 
5.22, 
z 
5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
6250 
5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
6250 
5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
6250 
The Productivity Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad 
Capacity for 0.0 < A. < 0.2. 
Guaranteed Service Guaranteed Service 
Productivitv Gain - 10% No Productivity Gain 
Conv. Guar Total Conv Guar. Total 
Cacacitv Caoacitv Cacacitv Caoacitv Caoacitv Caoacitv 
0.0 1,740.29 1,740.29 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
0.0 1,668.86 1,668.87 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0.0 1,597.43 1,597.43 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
0.0 1,526.00 1,526.00 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 
0.0 1,454.57 1,454.57 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
0.0 1,383.14 1,383.14 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
0.0 1,311.71 1,311.71 0.0 1,214.31 1,214.31 
0.0 1,730.49 1,730.49 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
0.0 1,659.06 1,659.06 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0.0 1,587.63 1,587.63 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
0.0 1,516.20 1,516.20 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 
0.0 1,444.77 1,444.77 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
0.0 1,373.34 1,373.34 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
0.0 1,301.91 1,301.91 0.0 1,214.31 1,214.31 
0.0 1,720.79 1,720.79 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
0.0 1,649.36 1,649.36 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0.0 1,577.93 1,577.93 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
0.0 1,506.50 1,506.50 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 
0.0 1.435.07 1,435.07 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
0.0 1,363.64 1,363.64 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
0.0 1.292.21 1.292.21 0.0 1.214.31 1.214.31 
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5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
6250 
5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
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5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
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The Productivity Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad 
Capacity for 0.3 < A, < 0.5. 
Guaranteed Service Guaranteed Service 
Productivity Gain - 10% No Productivity Gain 
Conv. Guar Total Conv Guar. Total 
Caoacitv Caoacity Caoacitv Caoacitv Caoacitv Caoacitv 
0.0 1,711.09 1,711.09 0.0 1,642.89 1,642.89 
0.0 1,639.66 1,639.66 0.0 1,571.46 1,571.46 
0.0 1,577.93 1,577.93 0.0 1,500.03 1,500.03 
0.0 1,506.50 1,506.50 0.0 1,428.60 1,428.60 
0.0 1,435.07 1,435.07 0.0 1,357.17 1,357.17 
0.0 1,363.64 1,363.64 0.0 1,285.74 1,285.74 
0.0 1,292.21 1,292.21 0.0 1,214.31 1,214.31 
0.0 1,785.68 1,785.69 0.0 1,785.68 1,785.69 
0.0 1,714.25 1,714.26 0.0 1,714.25 1,714.26 
0.0 1,642.82 1,642.83 0.0 1,642.82 1,642.83 
0.0 1,571.39 1,571.40 0.0 1,571.39 1,571.40 
0.0 1,499.96 1,499.97 0.0 1,499.96 1,499.97 
0.0 1,428.54 1,428.55 0.0 1,428.54 1,428.55 
0.0 1,357.11 1,357.12 0.0 1,357.11 1,357.12 
87.11 1,794.43 1,881.54 120.27 1,709.85 1,830.12 
87.11 1,723.00 1,810.11 120.27 1,638.42 1,758.69 
87.11 1,651.57 1,738.68 120.27 1,566.99 1,687.26 
87.11 1,580.14 1,667.25 120.27 1,495.56 1,615.83 
87.11 1,508.71 1,595.82 120.27 1,424.14 1,544.41 
87.11 1,437.29 1,524.40 120.27 1,352.71 1,472.98 
87.11 1,365.86 1,452.97 120.27 1,281.28 1,401.55 
5.24. 
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5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
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6050 
6150 
6250 
5650 
5750 
5850 
5950 
6050 
6150 
6250 
The Productivity Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad 
Capacity for 0.6 < A. < 0.8. 
Guaranteed Service 
Productivity Gain - 10% 
Guaranteed Service 
No Productivity Gain 
Conv. Guar Total Conv Guar. Total 
Cacacitv Canacitv Caoacitv Cacacitv Cauacitv Caoacitv 
246.18 1,670. 90 1,917.08 270.85 1,606.06 1,876.91 
246.18 1,599. 47 1,845.65 270.85 1,534.63 1,805.48 
246.18 1,528. 04 1,774.22 270.85 1,463.20 1,734.05 
246.18 1,456. 61 1,702.79 270.85 1,391.78 1,662.63 
246.18 1,385. 18 1,631.36 270.85 1,320.35 1,591.20 
246.18 1,313. 75 1,559.93 270.85 1,248.92 1,519.77 
246.18 1,242. 33 1,488.51 270.85 1,177.49 1,448.34 
440.66 1,531. 55 1,972.21 457.75 1,484.91 1,942.66 
440.66 1,460. 13 1,900.79 457.75 1,413.48 1,871.23 
440.66 1,388. 70 1,829.36 457.75 1,342.05 1,799.80 
440.66 1,317. 27 1,757.93 457.75 1,270.63 1,728.38 
440.66 1,245. 84 1,686.50 457.75 1,199.20 1,656.95 
440.66 1,174. 41 1,615.07 457.75 1,127.77 1,585.52 
440.66 1,102. 98 1,543.64 457.75 1,056.34 1,514.09 
697.01 1,363. 28 2,060.29 707.27 1,333.65 2,040.92 
697.01 1,291. 85 1,988.86 707.27 1,262.22 1,969.49 
697.01 1,220. 42 1,917.43 707.27 1,190.79 1,898.06 
697.01 1,148. 99 1,846.00 707.27 1,119.36 1,826.63 
697.01 1,077. 57 1,774.58 707.27 1,047.94 1,755.21 
697.01 1,006. 14 1,703.15 707.27 976.51 1,683.78 
697.01 934. 71 1,631.72 707.27 905.08 1,612.35 
\o 
00 
Table 5.25. The Productivity Effects of Guaranteed Service on Railroad 
Capacity for A, = 0.9. 
Guaranteed Service Guaranteed Service 
Productivity Gain - 10% No Productivity Gain 
Conv. Guar Total Conv Guar. Total 
z Caoacitv Caoacitv Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity 
5650 1,091.45 1,128.56 2,220.01 1,095.80 1,114.58 2,210.38 
5750 1,091.45 1,057.13 2,148.58 1,095.80 1,043.15 2,138.95 
5850 1,091.45 985.70 2,077.15 1,095.80 971.73 2,067.53 
5950 1,091.45 914.27 2,005.72 1,095.80 900.30 1,996.10 
6050 1,091.45 842.84 1,934.29 1,095.80 828.87 1,924.67 
6150 1,091.45 771.42 1,862.87 1,095.80 757.44 1,853.24 
6250 1,091.45 699.99 1,791.44 1,095.80 686.01 1,781.81 
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increases. 
Recall from Table 5.21, that in a few cases (A.=0.38, 
0.39, and 0.40), productivity gains from guaranteeing service 
had no affect on the railroad tariff rate, leaving shipper 
demand unchanged. In these instances, railroad capacity also 
remains unchanged. The railroad uses the productivity gains 
from guaranteeing service to decrease its fleet but leave 
total railroad capacity unchanged. 
Total railroad capacity is the total amount of grain the 
railroad is capable of hauling with conventional and 
guaranteed service. The conventional service capacity is 
defined as the conventional service fleet multiplied by the 
number of trips a car in conventional service completes (a^). 
Similarly, the guaranteed service capacity is defined as the 
guaranteed service fleet multiplied by the number of trips a 
car in conventional service completes (a^i) . The guaranteed 
service and conventional service fleet are defined as the 
number of cars available to produce guaranteed and 
conventional service, respectively. The sum of the guaranteed 
servica fleet and conventional service fleet is the total 
railroad fleet (R). 
Since, the railroad must serve all requests for 
guaranteed service, guaranteed service capacity is also 
represented by guaranteed service demand (G) and the 
guaranteed service fleet can be represented by (G/otg) . 
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Therefore, the conventional service fleet consists of the 
remaining cars [R-G/ttjj] and the conventional service capacity 
is denoted as aj,[R-G/ag]=a^R-0G. 
Total capacity of the railroad never decreases with rail 
car productivity gains but the total fleet size may decrease. 
The total railroad fleet may be reduced for two reasons. 
First, the increased rail car productivity allows the amount 
of cars in guaranteed service to be reduced even though the 
total amount of guaranteed service capacity increases. 
Second, the conventional service fleet is reduced, since rail 
car productivity gains decreases the conventional service 
capacity. 
For example, in Table 5.24 with X=0.8 and z=5650, the 
guaranteed service capacity is 1333.65 and 1363.28 units 
without and with a 10 percent productivity gain from 
guaranteeing service, i.e., 6=1.0 and 0.91, respectively. The 
fleet needed to provide these guaranteed service capacities 
are 889.10 (1333.65/1.5) and 826.23 (1363.28/1.65) cars. The 
guaranteed ser-vice fleet decreased 62.87 cars even though 
guaranteed service capacity increased 29.63 trips. 
Furthermore, the conventional service fleet also decreases 
from 471.51 to 464.67 cars. Hence, total railroad capacity 
increases 19.36 trips from 2,040.92 to 2,060.28, while the 
fleet is reduced 70 cars from 1,361 cars to 1,291 cars. Rail 
car productivity gains allows the railroad increase the 
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capacity of an existing fleet or increase its capacity while 
reducing its fleet. 
The Demand Variability Effects With Productivity Effects 
The effect of a mean preserving spread on the tariff rate 
and expected railroad and shipper profits with a 10 percent 
increase in rail car productivity is shown in Table 5.26. For 
the numerical example, the effects of a mean preserving spread 
has no affect on the tariff rate and expected railroad 
profits. Rail car productivity gains leave the stabilizing 
effect of guaranteed service unchanged. 
The Effect of X With Productivity Effects 
The effect of A, on railroad and shipper decisions in the 
presence of productivity gains is the same as without the 
productivity gains except in one instance. Without 
productivity gains the tariff rate was either constant or 
decreasing. However, Table 5.27 shows the tariff rate 
increasing in the interval 0£[0.0,0.36]. In this interval, 
only guaranteed service is produced. An increase in k 
increases the per unit cost of producing guaranteed service. 
In response to this slight increase in cost the railroad 
increases its tariff rate slightly and shippers decrease the 
amount of guaranteed service purchased. 
For example, with the total unit cost of production 
C=$3,000, if A.=0.2, then unit operating costs b=A,C=600 and 
unit capacity costs B=(l-A.)C=2400. Similarly, if A.=0.3, then 
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Table 5.26. The Effect of a Mean Preserving Spread on 
Expected Railroad and Shipper Profit, C=$3000 
and 0=0.91. 
Ratio 
of Tariff 
Costs Spread Rate Total 
k £ t Err»r Esir EW 
100 4,858 3,260,035 121,325 3,381,218 
0.0 200 4,858 3,260,035 121,396 3,381,431 
300 4,858 3,260,035 121,515 3,381,550 
100 4,877 3,218,551 121,116 3,339,667 
0.1 200 4,877 3,218,551 121,187 3,339,738 
300 4,877 3,218,551 121,306 3,339,857 
100 4,891 3,177,332 120,911 3,298,243 
0.2 200 4,891 3,177,332 120,982 3,298,314 
300 4,891 3,177,332 121,101 3,298,433 
100 4,904 3,136,378 120,707 3,257,085 
0.3 200 4,904 3,136,378 120,778 3,257,156 
300 4,904 3,136,378 120,897 3,257,275 
100 4,800 3,085,707 122,309 3,208,016 
0.4 200 4,800 3,085,707 122,380 3,208,087 
300 4,800 3,085,707 122,499 3,208,206 
100 4,727 2,953,975 123,701 3,077,676 
0.5 200 4,727 2,953,975 123,773 3,077,748 
300 4,727 2,953,975 123,892 3,077,867 
100 4,788 2,836,363 123,058 2,959,421 
0.6 200 4,788 2,836,363 123,130 2,959,493 
300 4,788 2,836,363 123,249 2,959,612 
100 4,847 2,749,978 122,465 2,872,443 
0.7 200 4,847 2,749,978 122,536 2,872,514 
300 4,847 2,749,978 122,655 2,872,633 
100 4,904 2,704,060 121,911 2,825,971 
0.8 200 4,904 2,704,060 121,983 2,826,043 
300 4,904 2,704,060 122,102 2,826,162 
100 4,956 2,716,977 121,390 2,838,367 
0.9 200 4,956 2,716,977 121,461 2,838,438 
300 4,956 2,716,977 121,581 2,838,558 
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b=900 and B=2100. But these values are unit costs for 
conventional service. With a 10 percent increase in 
productivity of cars in guaranteed service, the unit capacity 
costs for guaranteed service are 2182 (2400/1.1) and 1909 
(2100/1.1) for A.=0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Hence, as k 
increases from 0.2 to 0.3, the per unit cost of guaranteed 
service increases from 2782 to 2809. 
Table 5.27. Relationship Between Optimal Decisions and k With 
Productivity Gains. 
Range 
X Tau Errw Esw 
Shipper Salvage Value=$5950 
Guar. Conv. Total 
Cap. Cap. Cap. 
0 . 0 0  
to + - - - 0 
0.36 
0.37 
to - - + + 0 + 
0.43 
0.44 
to + - - - + + 
0.83 
0.84 
to + + - - + + 
0.99 
The remaining phenomenon of Table 5.17 are replicated in 
Table 5.27, but at larger values of A.. For example, in the 
interval A.e[0.37,0.43] the railroad reduces its tariff to 
attract guaranteed service in order to remain as a scheduled 
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carrier. Without productivity gains the interval was 
[0.34,0.40]. 
The incentive for the railroad to remain a scheduled 
carrier disappears occurred in the interval Ac[0.44,0.83] with 
productivity gains and the interval [0.41,0.76] without the 
gains. The railroad increases its tariff rate and begins to 
acquire a conventional service fleet. Expected decreases in 
the interval, as the increased expected profit from 
conventional sales is less than the decreased profit from the 
lost guaranteed sales. 
Eventually, railroad expected profit increases, when 
A,e[0.84,0.99] with productivity gains and [0.77,0.99] without 
the gains. In these instances, the increased expected profit 
from conventional sales is greater than the decreased profit 
from the lost guaranteed sales. 
Guaranteed Service Limit 
Currently, railroads limit the amount of guaranteed 
service offered to shippers. The BN limits the amount of COTs 
to 40 percent of its projected fleet, while the Soo PERX limit 
is 25 percent. An auction is used by these railroads to 
distribute the guaranteed service among shippers. Limiting 
the supply of guaranteed service increases shipper bids and 
contributes to the restricted supply. The UP, which offers 
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guaranteed service at the same rate as conventional service, 
also restricts the amount of guaranteed service. Each shipper 
is given an upper limit on the amount of guaranteed service it 
can acquire. The upper limit is based on a four year 
historical average of railroad provided cars. The upper limit 
gives the shippers the incentive to use more rail service 
(guaranteed and conventional service) to protect their future 
allocations of guaranteed service. The UP reasoning for such 
a system is to increase the equity in the distribution of 
guaranteed service [Machalaba, 1990]. 
The constraints on guaranteed service appear to be more 
political than institutional. The Staggers Act stated (in 
regards to contract service) that a railroad is prohibited 
from entering into contracts for the transportation of 
agricultural commodities which utilizes more than 40 percent 
of its fleet [Goldstein, 1991]. The ICC, however, found the 
BN COT program not to be a form of contract service and 
therefore is not bound by such a constraint [Brown, 1992; 
Cawthorne, 1992]. The purpose of the contracting constraint 
was to ensure railroads could fulfill their common carrier 
obligation of providing adequate conventional tariff service 
to shippers on reasonable request. 
Railroads may limit guaranteed service in order to 
maintain a good working relationship with shippers. Railroads 
are usually perceived as giant enterprises enjoying a high 
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degree of monopoly power, while small farmers and grain 
shippers operate in highly competitive markets. Consequently, 
railroad actions attract a great deal of public and political 
concern and rail executives may well avoid any negative 
attention [USDOT, 1994]. The self-imposed limit may serve as 
public relations device to ensure shippers there is enough 
rail capacity for the railroad to satisfy its common carrier 
obligation. A smaller guaranteed fleet is perceived by 
shippers to imply a larger conventional fleet. The railroad 
is then perceived as providing adequate conventional tariff 
service on reasonable request. 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effects of 
railroads limiting the amount of guaranteed service to 
shippers. The guaranteed service limit will be shown to 
inhibit the railroad fleet sizing decision. The limit serves 
to restrict the grain market information flowing from shippers 
to the railroad when acquiring guaranteed service. The 
guaranteed service limit causes the conventional service fleet 
to increase, but the expected railroad and shipper profit 
decrease. 
Simulation Results for Guaranteed Service Limit 
The two situations studied are shown in Table 5.28 with 
e=300, and X=0.3 and 0.5. The shipper salvage value is either 
$5650, $5950, or $6250. Suppose the amount of guaranteed 
service each shipper can purchase is limited to 13 units. 
Table 5.28. The Effect of Limiting Guaranteed Service On Railroad and 
Shipper Expected Profit and Decisions. 
Guar. 
A Limit 
None 
Tariff 
Rate 
t Erry Esy 
Guar. Conv. Total 
z Capacity Capacity Capacity 
0.3 1,300 5,167 2,692,985 117,413 
5,000 2,857,143 119,501 
5650 
5950 
6250 
5650 
5950 
6250 
1,300.00 
1,299.94 
1,085.66 
1,642.89 
1,428.60 
1,214.31 
233.54 
19.31 
19.31 
1,533.54 
1,319.25 
1,104.97 
0.0 1,642.89 
0.0 1,428.60 
0.0 1,214.31 
0.5 1,300 5,046 
None 4,822 
2,625,367 119,418 
2,744,314 122,456 
5650 1,300.00 
5950 1,299.94 
6250 1,085.66 
5650 1,709.85 
5950 1,495.56 
6250 1,281.28 
405.94 1,705.94 
191.72 1,491.66 
191.72 1,277.38 
120.27 1,830.12 
120.27 1,615.83 
120.27 1,401.55 
209 
Henca, the railroad cannot produce more than 1300 units. In 
the two situations, the guaranteed service constraint is non-
binding during the lowest demand period (z=6250) since 
shippers purchase less than 1300 units of guaranteed service. 
In the remaining two demand states (z=5950 and 5650) shippers 
desire to purchase more than 1400 units, but are constrained 
to 1300 units. 
In this example, the railroad is able to identify the low 
demand period, but is unable to distinguish between the other 
two demand states. In the absence of rail car productivity 
gains, Figure 5.8 shows the relationship between shipper 
salvage value and guaranteed service purchased with and 
without the 1300 unit limit on guaranteed seirvice purchased. 
With the constraint the railroad is unable to extract the 
private shipper salvage information whenever shippers order 
13 00 units of guaranteed service. 
There are three possible tariff rate responses to the 
guaranteed service limit. First, the railroad may increase 
the tariff rate until it is able to distinguish between all of 
the demand states. The tariff rate is increased until the 
amount of guaranteed service in the middle demand state 
(z=5950) is less than the guaranteed service limit. In this 
case, shippers purchase the guaranteed service limit only if 
their salvage value is very low (2=5650) and the railroad is 
able to identify each demand state. Second, the railroad may 
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Z 
Ez 
G(z) 
0 1300 
Figure 5.8. The effect of limiting guaranteed service. 
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alter Its tariff rate but remain unable to distinguish between 
the middle and high demand states. Finally, the railroad 
could decrease its tariff rate until it is unable to 
distinguish between all demand states. The tariff rate is 
decreased until the amount of guaranteed service purchased in 
the low demand state (z=6250} is equal to the guaranteed 
service limit. 
Table 5.28 shows the change in the tariff rate, 
conventional and guaranteed capacities, expected railroad 
profits, and expected shipper profits due to the guaranteed 
service limit of 1300 units. Expected railroad and shipper 
profits decreased in response to the limit, while the tariff 
Increased. In each instance, the tariff rate was increased so 
the railroad could identify each demand state. In each 
instance, the tariff rate is increased until the amount of 
guaranteed service in the middle demand state is slightly 
below the limit. 
212 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The findings of this research are presented by 
highlighting the conclusions of previous chapters. Also, 
extensions of the model and suggestions for further research 
are presented. 
Conclusions 
The movement of grain by the railroad industry is plagued 
by the consistent presence of car shortages and surpluses. 
Due to these difficulties and others the Staggers Rail Act of 
1980 was passed. Since the passage, the railroad industry has 
begun experimenting with different types of rail car ordering 
systems. 
Previous to Staggers, railroads offered only conventional 
rail service. In the pre-Staggers system, shippers ordered 
rail service on a spot basis. Shippers have full information 
about grain market conditions when ordering conventional 
service. However, the conventional service order may be 
rationed. 
The most recent car ordering systems offer guaranteed 
service in addition to conventional rail service. Guaranteed 
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service is ordered by shippers in advance and before 
possessing full grain market information. However, guaranteed 
service orders cannot be rationed by the railroad. The 
railroad uses the guaranteed service orders to make a more 
informed capacity decision. Furthermore, the advance 
information concerning demand also allows the railroad to 
route its assets more efficiently and reduce operating costs. 
Conventional service is handled in the same manner as the pre-
Staggers system. 
The model representing the pre-Staggers system replicated 
the persistent existence of car shortages and car surpluses. 
The railroad choosing its tariff and capacity before knowing 
demand creates the car shortages and car surpluses. The 
railroad is assumed to have constant per unit operating costs 
and constant per unit capacity costs. This problem of a 
monopolist choosing capacity and price before knowing demand 
has been discussed previously in the literature. 
The effect of increased demand variability, by the use of 
a mean preserving spread, on railroad decisions indicate that 
the tariff rate decreases and the railroad capacity either 
increases or decreases. Since the grain industry export 
demand for rail service is more volatile than its domestic 
demand, a railroad serving primarily export markets has a 
lower tariff rate than a railroad serving primarily domestic 
markets. Furthermore, government policies stabilizing demand 
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for rail service increases the tariff rate. The effect on 
railroad capacity is indeterminate. 
However, due to the shipper Inventory constraint, larger 
mean preserving spreads of the random demand variable no 
longer correspond to a mean preserving spread of aggregate 
demand. Under such conditions, aggregate demand eventually 
becomes either all or nothing. The tariff rate Increases to 
take advantage of shippers needing rail service. The effect 
on capacity is still indeteirmlnate. 
A recent trend in American business is for customers and 
suppliers to develop closer working relationships by sharing 
information. If shippers share their grain market information 
with the monopolist railroad the expected shipper profit 
decreases and expected railroad profit Increases. Expected 
shipper profit decreases due to a slight increase in the 
tariff rate. Expected railroad profit increases due to the 
increased tariff rate and the increased information it 
possesses when determining its capacity. Total welfare 
increases since the Increase in expected railroad profit 
exceeds the decrease in expected shipper profit. Then the 
monopolist railroad would have the incentive to transfer a 
portion of its Increased expected profits to shipper in order 
to obtain their grain market information. 
The distribution of operating costs to capacity costs has 
no effect on the tariff and capacity decisions of the 
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monopolist when demand is known. Given total unit costs, 
monopolists with relatively higher operating costs than 
capacity costs act the same as monopolists with relatively 
lower operating costs than capacity costs. The only factor 
affecting the decisions of the monopolist is the sum of unit 
operating and unit capacity costs. However, under demand 
uncertainty, a monopolist with higher operating costs relative 
to capacity costs will have a greater tariff rate and capacity 
level than a monopolist with higher capacity costs relative to 
operating costs. 
Recently, railroads have instituted car ordering systems 
offering guaranteed service as well as conventional tariff 
service. The effect of guaranteeing service was divided into 
the shipper externality, informational effect, and the rail 
car productivity effect. 
The shipper externality was identified as the shippers 
failing to take into account the effect of their guaranteed 
car order on the conventional service ration quantity 
available to all shippers. The externality serves to reduce 
shipper expected profit. 
The railroad is able to extract the grain market 
information possessed by shippers by offering guaranteed 
service. The additional grain market information allows the 
railroad to make a more informed capacity decision. This is 
the informational effect of guaranteeing service. The 
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informational effect always increases total welfare and 
expected railroad profits. Expected shipper profit may 
increase or decrease. 
Expected shipper profits decrease when capacity costs are 
high relative to operating costs. In these cases, the 
railroad becomes a scheduled carrier. The railroad increases 
its tariff rate (from the pre-Staggers rate) to take advantage 
of shippers fear of rationing. Conventional service demand 
and capacity is zero. Expected shipper profits decrease, 
despite the increased reliability in rail service, due to the 
increased tariff rate and the loss in marketing flexibility. 
Expected shipper profits increase when capacity costs are 
low relative to operating costs. The fear of being rationed 
is not as great and the railroad must decrease its tariff, 
enticing shippers to purchase guaranteed service. The 
railroad is able to lock in business through the reduced 
tariff. In these cases, expected shipper profit increases due 
to the lower tariff rate and increased service offerings. 
Guaranteed service is purchased in advance giving the 
railroad advance notice of the specific origin and destination 
of future movements. With this advanced information, the 
railroad is able to reduce its car cycle time and increase the 
productivity of its cars in guaranteed service. This is 
called the rail car productivity effect of guaranteeing 
service. 
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The rail car productivity effect always increases total 
welfare and expected railroad profit. Expected shipper profit 
either increases or remains unchanged. Rail car productivity 
effects lower the unit capacity costs of guaranteed service 
implying a lower total unit costs of producing guaranteed 
service (operating plus capacity costs). The railroad lowers 
its tariff rate (except in a few cases) in order to increase 
the purchase of guaranteed service. Expected shipper profit 
increases due to the lower tariff rate. In a few cases, the 
tariff rate is unchanged leaving cv^mand unchanged. The 
railroad uses the productivity gains to lower its costs of 
producing the same output level. Expected shipper profit is 
unchanged in these cases. 
Rail car productivity gains may increase the railroad 
capacity or leave it unaltered. However, the fleet size 
necessary to produce the improved or unaltered railroad 
capacity may actually decrease. Hence, with rail car 
productivity gains comparing the fleet sizes of pre-Staggers 
car ordering systems to current car ordering systems in order 
to make inferences about shipper welfare is meaningless. 
Currently, railroads limit the amount of guaranteed 
service shippers may acquire. The reasons for this limit 
appear to be more political than economic. The limit appears 
to serve as a public relations device to ensiire shippers there 
is enough rail capacity for it to satisfy its common carrier 
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obligation. A smaller guaranteed service fleet implies a 
larger conventional service fleet, and thus the better the 
railroad becomes at providing adequate conventional tariff 
service at reasonable rec[uest. 
The effect of the guaranteed service limit is to decrease 
expected railroad profits, expected shipper profits, and thus 
total welfare. The railroad increases its tariff rate, so 
shippers only purchase the guaranteed service limit when the 
future expected demand for conventional rail service is high. 
This allows the railroad to maintain its informational gain 
when making capacity decisions. The limit decreases 
guaranteed service capacity and increases conventional service 
capacity. However, total capacity of the railroad decreases. 
The guaranteed service limit increases conventional service 
capacity, but decreases the welfare of both the railroad and 
shippers. 
A final result from guaranteeing service is its 
stabilizing effect on the tariff rate and expected railroad 
profits. A mean preserving increase in the volatility of rail 
demand leaves the tariff rate and expected railroad profits 
unchanged when the railroad offers both guaranteed service and 
conventional service. Hence, a railroad serving primarily 
domestic markets acts the same as a railroad serving primarily 
export markets. If the railroad offers only conventional rail 
service, an increase in demand volatility decreases the tariff 
219 
rate and reduces expected railroad profit. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The model presented In this research to study the effects 
of guaranteed service is very restrictive. The restrictions 
were necessary to simplify the analysis and to obtain initial 
results. The model consists of a single period, a single 
market, and a single carrier. Extensions of the model include 
a multi-market dynamic model allowing shippers to either sell 
their grain to many markets or store the grain to sell at a 
later date. The extended model could also include alternative 
modes of transportation or more than one carrier for each mode 
of transportation. The transportation industry could be 
modeled an oligopolistic industry with a few large carriers. 
Alternatively, the dominant firm model could be used to model 
the transportation industry, with the railroad as the dominant 
firm and the trucking Industry as the competitive fringe 
[Wilson et al., 1987 and 1988]. 
The model assumed a single price for both tariff and 
guaranteed service which is representative of the Union 
Pacific Railroad. However, the Burlington Northern Railroad 
and Canadian Pacific Soo Line offer guaranteed service through 
a quasi auction. A model could be formulated allowing 
different prices for guaranteed service and conventional 
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service. Also, the auction process of allocating guaranteed 
service could be modeled and the effects of the auction rules 
on the shipper and welfare be investigated [Wilson, 1989]. 
The model also assumed each shipper is identical. Each 
shipper could be assumed to possess different salvage 
parameters. Hence, the demand for guaranteed and conventional 
service would differ among shippers. Under these assumptions, 
the allocation rule used in this research to ration 
conventional service would be inefficient. Furthermore, if 
shippers value guaranteed service differently, the process 
used for rationing a limited supply of guaranteed service 
would affect the welfare of both the railroad and shippers. 
Also, grain supply is assumed to be constant and 
homogenous. Shippers at the time of ordering guaranteed 
service may not know how much grain they will have in storage. 
Supply uncertainty would affect shippers desire for guaranteed 
service. Similarly, differing the Inventory of each shipper 
would allow the distinction between how small and large 
shippers are treated by railroads under various car ordering 
systems. 
With many carriers between a single origin and 
destination demand for rail services could be a function of 
reliability and price. Shippers are affected by the delay 
length In receiving timely service. Reliability could be 
measured as the number of days waiting for transport service. 
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The expected costs of waiting for transport service, the 
transport price, and the grain market price would determine 
where and how shippers move their grain. The expected costs 
of waiting for rail service has been estimated as well as the 
maximum amount shippers are willing to pay for more reliable 
rail service [Pautsch et al., 1995]. 
The model presented in this research assumes shippers 
either receive their entire car order on a timely basis or 
only a portion of the order on a timely basis. Queueing 
models could replicate the wait shippers experience when 
ordering rail service. Shippers could renege or cancel orders 
if the delay is too long. The fleet size could be the number 
of servers and car cycle times the customer service times. 
The affects of guaranteed service could be analyzed in a 
priority queue where guaranteed service receives service 
before conventional tariff service. The informational effect 
of guaranteed service on the delay length of conventional 
service has been formulated in a priority queue setting 
[Pautsch, 1995]. 
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